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SECOND VOLUME.

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MEMOIRS

OF

GENERAL PÉPÉ.

CHAPTER I.

1814.

The army having retreated between Piacenza and Parma, I and many other Generals determine upon compelling the King to grant us a Constitution—How the conspiracy dies away—Joachim, with much hesitation, decides upon yielding up to the Pope his ancient provinces, with the exception of the Marches of Ancona — The Neapolitans evacuate Tuscany — Orders are received from the King that I should proceed to the Castle of St. Elmo at Naples, to be tried by a court-martial—On reaching Naples I am ordered to present myself before the King—What passes between his Majesty, myself, and my accomplices—Joachim does not find a single supporter at the Congress of Vienna—The Princess of Wales at Naples—The writer, Saffi.

DURING our retreat, sorrow was depicted upon the countenances of the soldiers, who seemed to feel by a sort of instinct no less deeply than their superiors, the misfortune of letting those wealthy provinces fall into the hands of strangers. From my post in the rear, I had constantly under my eyes the hated Austrian standard, the sight of which lacerated my heart. The least clear-sighted might foresee the misfortunes in

store for us; no wonder, then, that those very Generals, who in the assembly of Reggio had evinced, though feebly, their interest for the national welfare, were now fully disposed to exert their best endeavours in behalf of our expiring country. Accordingly we assembled together at the residence of Carascosa at St. Donino, and, as at Reggio, we all agreed that it was necessary to force the King to grant us the Constitution we so ardently desired. I had hoped that we should have deliberated at once upon the manner and method of bringing about instantly what we all agreed upon as indispensable and just. But there was no deliberation. Carascosa and Ambrosio, brave officers, but timid politicians, decided that it would be prudent to send a messenger to Lord William Bentinck, at Genoa, to inquire whether he would support us by his authority, and furnish us with men and money to sustain our attempt, should the obstinacy of the King drive us to a civil war. I was amazed at such a determination, and asked them from whence the opposition they feared could arise, whilst we had on our side the populace, the landholders and the army. They replied that the intrepid Joachim might present himself at the head of his royal guard before the different corps under our command, and that he might perhaps succeed in bringing them back to obedience to his will. It was in vain that I denied the possibility of such an event; in vain I offered to take upon myself the imaginary and dreaded encounter with the King; my wary colleagues were bent upon temporizing, and decided that General Filangieri should be sent to Genoa to confer with the British General.

To keep this step a profound secret, General Filangieri, who was stimulated by a noble and patriotic

feeling, was to cross the Apennines, and enter the city in the dead of night, which he accordingly did. The day after that on which Filangieri had departed on his secret mission, there arrived at the residence of Carascosa, the Marquis Rivello, officer of ordnance, who was bearer of a sword enriched with diamonds which the King was sending to the English General. This circumstance made us fear that Lord William Bentinck, dazzled by the splendour of the gift, and solicitous of the friendship which the King tendered to himself and his Government might receive Filangieri coldly, and still greater were our apprehensions lest Rivello should imbibe any suspicion of our envoy's expedition to Genoa.

My quarters at the time were at St. Donino, not far from Piacenza. Carascosa wrote to me to detain the Marquis when he came for four or five days, on the plea that the roads were not safe enough for him to attempt his journey with so valuable a gift about him. Although I did not entirely invent them, I exaggerated the reports that had reached me of the banditti who infested the high road. I told him I would write and obtain further intelligence on the matter, and the officer of ordnance expressed himself in very grateful terms for the care I took of him and of the gift of which he was the bearer. After three days he proceeded on his way, and General Filangieri returned, bearing an unfavourable answer from the English Commander. Lord William Bentinck, although honest and a liberal, was not a man of enlarged views. He promised to support us by money and arms to establish liberal institutions in our native land, but on the condition that we dethroned Joachim, and brought back the Bourbons. The aversion of his Lordship to

the King proved how blind he was to the real interests of his own country, which would have found in Murat, a constitutional King unfettered by any connexions, an ally far more faithful to its interests than the Bourbons, who would naturally enough be always inclined to favour the Princes of their own blood occupying the thrones of France and Spain. The true interest of our own country and our honour, demanded that we should not dethrone Murat, unless he compelled us to such a step by his own folly; for although the Bourbon dynasty may be joined to a constitutional form of government in the fanciful brain of the poet, they cannot assuredly exist together in the more sober reality of political life.

The seductions of the King and the unfavourable answer from Bentinck, caused this first attempt to fail, and I remained, as was said by my faithful Calabrese, with my eyes full and my hands empty. About this period I received a letter from Carascosa, directed to the "General Baron Pépé," its contents couched in the most friendly terms, informing me that the King had created me a Baron with the gift of a very fine estate in the immediate vicinity of Naples, a reward which it hardly became a *Tribune* to accept.

Without a moment's hesitation I wrote and thanked the General for his kindness, but refused in the most positive manner to receive either the title or the estate, adding at the same time, that I would never accept anything from the King, until he granted us a Constitution. This determination on my part must have proved any thing but satisfactory to my fellow-conspirators, all of whom about the same time had received rewards from the King. Carascosa was promoted to the rank of General of the Guard, Ambrosio and Filangieri were

made aides-de-camp. These three were excellent officers, but Colletta, who had never even seen the enemy, was likewise elevated to the post of State Counsellor. This office, as well as the promotions bestowed upon the former Generals, produced considerable annuities. I was made aware some time after that Joachim, who had so often extolled me in his orders of the day, had not even mentioned my name whilst he was decreeing the above rewards. Carascosa, inspired by sentiments of equity and friendship, suggested to his Majesty that it was an act of injustice to overlook my services on such an occasion, to which the King replied that having already more Lieutenant-Generals than he required, it was quite impossible that he could promote me. But when Carascosa, ceasing to insist upon the promotion to which I was strictly entitled from the date of my services, spoke to him of the Barony, the King seized upon the idea with evident satisfaction, and immediately selected the best which he had at his disposal. The following is the decree by which it was awarded to me.

"Bologna, April 14th, 1814.

"Joachim Napoleon, King of the Two Sicilies. We have decreed, and do hereby decree:—Firstly: That Major-General William Pépé shall assume henceforth the title and rank of Baron. Secondly: That the annuity annexed to this said Barony, is to be taken from that heretofore appertaining to General Soye, now retired. Our Minister of Finance and the President of the Council of the Maggiorati are entrusted with the execution of the present decree.

(Signed) "JOACHIM NAPOLEÓN."

General Soye had been instigated by feelings of national honour to forsake Joachim as soon as the latter had declared war with France. I always look upon my refusal of this Barony with pleasure, especially, because at that period, the only son of my elder brother being still alive, and entitled to almost all the family property, I did not myself possess an inch of land on earth. At a more advanced part of this work, I will explain the motives which induced me eventually to receive the Barony I had already refused, and the reader shall judge whether I was right or wrong.

Even the best Princes prefer flattery to frankness and truth. Joachim professed great affection and esteem for me, notwithstanding my annoying opposition to his politics. Nevertheless, having on one occasion received from the Austrian Government three decorations of the order of St. Leopold, to be bestowed upon the Generals who had most merited such a distinction by their conduct during the campaign, he gave them to Carascosa, Ambrosio and Macdonald. Carascosa was certainly entitled to one of the decorations, but Ambrosio and Macdonald although both excellent officers, by the fortune of war had never once chanced to encounter the enemy during the whole campaign. The injustice thus done to myself was so manifest, that Nugent conceived the idea of writing to his Government, that the order might be conferred upon me, and was only prevented by my telling him that I could not have accepted it.

Pope Pius VII, who had long since arrived in Bologna, was now staying at his native place, Cesena, and the King was compelled to restore him the States of the Church with the exception, however, of the Marches of Ancona. His Holiness was then proceeding

slowly forward towards Rome, and was at Rimini when I reached it with the rear-guard of the army. When I was admitted to offer my respects to him, and to kiss his hand, I found with his Holiness, General Carascosa and the Marchese Mondrone, Chamberlain to the King, who had been appointed to the same office about the Pope's person. His Holiness, probably out of the natural urbanity of his manners, immediately addressed himself to me, saying that he had not only heard, but read much in my favour. On expressing my thanks to him for so flattering a compliment, I added that it would be worthy of an Italian Pontiff to collect about him the sons of Italy, and to drive the foreigners out of our native land. The Pope appeared to listen with great attention and complacency to my discourse; but the Marquis Mondrone, evidently alarmed at the conversation, hastened to introduce some one else, to whom the Pope was to give audience. He did not fail likewise to inform the King of this occurrence. Joachim when speaking of me was wont to say: "Il ne laisse tranquille pas même le Pape," which saying was in every mouth as a jest at my expense. A Bishop, forming one of the Pope's establishment, informed me that I was invited to dine with his Holiness, but when I presented myself at the appointed hour, the domestics of the Papal Court, thinking I wanted an audience of his Holiness, informed me that he had retired to his own chamber. On my undeceiving them by mentioning the invitation I had received, they informed me that no one, not even Kings, ever sat at table with the Pope. I was conducted to the table of the Cardinals, at the head of which presided Cardinal Gabrieli. There were seven of these high dignitaries present, and without the least exaggeration, they ate with a better appe-

tite than my grenadiers after a march of thirty miles. The table was amply provided with every delicacy, the gift of the devotees of that and the neighbouring cities. The Bishop I have shortly before mentioned, suggested to me that there would be no impropriety in my asking some favour from his Holiness, " Such for instance," added he, " as permission for your family to have mass celebrated at home." I thought of my excellent father, who was in truth overjoyed at this indulgence, no less than by the kind reception given me by the Pope. A few days after, when his Holiness was at Ancona, General Ambrosio was conversing with him in a liberal spirit of an Italian Constitution. On the following day, whilst this officer was escorting the Pope's carriage, a crippled gentleman was brought up to the carriage door, who requested the Pontiff to bestow his blessing upon him, that he might recover the use of his limbs. The Pope turning towards Ambrosio, said: " You see, General, where we are; Italy is still far from the period you so ardently desire."

Joachim had hoped to succeed in keeping Tuscany, at least for some time longer; but Austria having opposed this, of all the provinces we had held between Trento and the Po, we only kept possession of the Marches of Ancona. A corps was stationed there, consisting of two divisions of infantry and a brigade of lancers, besides the accessory forces, all of which were commanded by Carascosa, whose rank was of an earlier date in the army than that of the other Lieutenant-General, Ambrosio.

I advanced towards Pesaro with the rear-guard, and was extremely sorry when I was obliged to quit this city, which was the native place of my two dear friends,

Giulio Perticari and Francesco Cassi. I next proceeded to Sinigaglia, where I established my quarters. I was lodged in the house of the Marchese Grossi. I had at that moment under my own command not only my brigade, but likewise a regiment of lancers commanded by Colonel Rusconi, and the 6th regiment of the line commanded by Major Guarini. These troops, as well as their leaders, were devoted to me. Disgusted with the mental feebleness, or the anxious sense of self-interest which had withheld my brother Generals, on two previous occasions from entering into my views, I now determined to act alone. I strengthened the discipline and increased my care of the corps under my command, and I decided upon raising, in the course of a few days, the standard of Neapolitan liberty in the town of Gesi, where part of my battalions were quartered. With the four regiments of which I could dispose, it was easy to reach the Abruzzi in three marches, and there I might collect together even more armed Carbonari than I required. Although I was fully conscious that neither Carascosa nor Ambrosio would approve my movement, yet I was in no fear of their offering any opposition: first, because they were already half compromised; secondly, because I was convinced that their troops would refuse to obey were they directed against me; and lastly, because I well knew their indecision in every kind of political combination.

Whilst I was on the point of carrying this useful and hardly hazardous attempt into execution, a courier arrived bearing despatches from Carascosa, desiring me to lose no time, but to proceed to Ancona, where he had important business to transact with me. On my arrival, the General said to me, "I am aware that you are about to make a movement to proclaim

the Constitution, and that your patriotism is entirely without a particle of ambition. I am fully convinced, therefore, that you will join your companions, who are now determined to act firmly. Seventeen general officers have decided upon affixing their signatures to a request—of which there is to be a duplicate—to the King, to grant us a Constitution no less necessary for our native land than for the consolidation of his dynasty. Moreover, we mean to add, that should he refuse to grant our request, he will force us to proclaim the existence of a Constitutional Government by means of the army. Filangieri and Ambrosio will corroborate my statement, and tell you that it is decided that you shall command the vanguard of our army in the event of the King's refusal." Ambrosio and Filangieri confirmed this statement, and the latter, who was then my most intimate friend, informed me that Colonel Russo of the lancers had revealed my intentions to Carascosa, in a letter from Sinigaglia, which was written in so familiar a strain that it began: "Dear Michael," (which was the name of Carascosa). Filangieri extorted my solemn promise never to reveal my knowledge of this fact.

The Generals who were in Ancona, as well as those from the neighbouring cities, assembled, and after much discussion it was decided that Ambrosio, who was looked upon as the most capable amongst us, should draw up the address. My handwriting being clear and legible, I transcribed the two copies of the address, which, after being signed by all present, were sent to Naples through the medium of a faithful officer, that they might have affixed to them the signature of other Generals on whom we reckoned. The following are all the names present to my memory which were affixed

to an address that ought to have bestowed the blessings of freedom upon the kingdom of Naples, and might probably have done so in the rest of Italy: Carascosa, the Prince Pignatelli, Strongoli, Vincenzo Pignatelli, Ambrosio, Florestano Pépé, Guglielmo Pépé, Filangieri, the Prince of Campana, d'Aquino, Alessandro Medici, Pietro Colletta, Arcovito, Petrinelli. There were four more which I do not perfectly recollect, although I am certain that neither the names of Roccaromana nor of Macdonald were affixed—those two officers being devoted to the King. When the two copies of the address were returned to us, duly signed, it seemed to me as though I held the liberty of our country in my hands. Discoursing amongst ourselves upon the extravagance of the King, whom we regarded as capable of the most reckless daring, it was decided that as soon as one of the two addresses should have been forwarded to him, I was to march forward to meet any opposition the King might offer.

From the moment the address was signed, I did not allow my companions an instant's peace. I urged them to hasten the memorial to its destination, and that we ourselves should prepare everything for our defence, and be ready to march upon Naples, should circumstances require it. A majority of the officers who had signed were then in the capital. Aquino and Medici were at Macerata; so that the execution of our scheme rested with Carascosa, Filangieri, Ambrosio, and myself. Carascosa and Ambrosio told me that they stayed for the arrival of letters from the advocate Pocrio, and General Colletta, who, being Counsellors of State, were calculated to give us good advice as to our proceedings. Almost carried beyond myself by this, I replied, that I could not conceive how the execution of what had

been decided upon by the Generals, could depend in any way upon the approval, or, at all events, the advice of these two persons, one of whom was an advocate, and, although a sincere patriot, noted for his love of temporizing, and the other, merely a General by favour.

Carascosa and Ambrosio, in their desire to conceal their irresolution, fell from one foolish answer to another. Carascosa took me aside, and in a confidential tone informed me, that when Ambrosio was about to sign he had exhibited great perplexity. I replied, that the address *was* signed; that they who had affixed their names to it were already compromised, that it was impossible that a design in which so many were involved could long remain a secret, and that our hesitation would bring upon us, not merely the contempt of the nation, but that of Joachim himself. All my words, and all my reasoning were unavailing to convince this man's soul, which was insensible to the moral utility and grandeur of so magnanimous an undertaking. It is scarcely credible, but one morning as we were walking together, Carascosa remarked, that his sense of religion caused him to feel a repugnance to revolt against a King to whom he had sworn fidelity!

"And did you never swear anything to your unfortunate country?" I exclaimed. Irritated beyond measure, I confided to Filangieri my intention of getting possession of the two copies of the address, of returning to my quarters at Sinigaglia, from whence I would send one to the King, and immediately after doing so, of marching into the Abruzzi with such corps as would follow me, preceded by an ardent proclamation. Filangieri approved my scheme, and as the two copies of the address were in the hands of Ambrosio, I went to him, and said that Carascosa desired to look at them

again, to verify some doubt which had arisen in his mind. After scrutinizing me closely, and perceiving nothing in my appearance, on which I had enforced a studied calmness, he gave them up to me. As soon as I had them in my possession, I sprang into my carriage, to which the post-horses were already harnessed; but, as I was about to quit the city of Ancona, I was followed by Ambrosio, who, having been to Carascosa, had discovered the deceit I had practised upon him. He was in a violent rage, and demanded the return of the papers.

"They are in good hands," was my reply; but, Ambrosio, forgetting his own dignity, raised his voice to such a pitch, that a crowd began to gather around us. To avoid the scandal of such a scene, I alighted from the carriage. In his anger he observed to me, that by acting according to my own immediate views, I proved myself far more tyrannical than the King, whose despotism was more bearable than mine. This saying of Ambrosio was repeated derisively long afterwards, the more so from his having used it as a pretext for his own hesitation. I answered, that I would refer the case to Filangieri, by whose judgment I would abide. We accordingly proceeded to his residence, where the General exhorted me in the name of the friendship which united us, to restore the copies of the address, saying, that any discord amongst ourselves must prove fatal to the undertaking. Carascosa and Ambrosio, whose indecision of purpose proved so fatal to our cause, declared that, far from intending to abandon the execution of the purposed movement, they were bent upon carrying it into effect as soon as a more favourable opportunity should offer itself. In truth, I never knew what they really wished, for it is not easy

to penetrate what passes in the heart of men. Nevertheless, I knew well that in such cases, when men enter into so many calculations, the love of country is not deeply rooted in the heart. Indeed, it rarely has a strong hold upon the hearts of men, who are absorbed by the desire of enjoying the comforts of life, and of acquiring wealth.

There existed in the kingdom, at that period, a singular method of purchase. The King was entreated to allow the purchase of some property or building belonging to the State at an extremely reduced price; he then gave orders to the Minister of Finance to blink at the estimate formed of the property in question, and thus, it was obtained by the purchaser at half its real value. Sometimes other advantages, for instance, as to the mode of payment, were likewise granted. The King never refused such a request to any of his Generals on active duty, and I recollect that one of my brothers, Ferdinand, an excellent person, but rather too fond of money, offered me a very considerable sum if I would convey possession to him of an estate in Calabria, which I could have purchased in the way above-mentioned. But such a speculation was repugnant to my feelings at the moment when there was a rupture between the King and myself. No doubt that the King would have been delighted had I requested him to allow me to make such a purchase, for like all Princes, he regarded corruption as a means of consolidating a dynasty, whilst, in reality, it only renders its foundation less secure.

I returned to my quarters at Sinigaglia in a state of despondency, such as I have often since experienced during the many years of my long and painful exile. I was overwhelmed with sadness, nor had I spirits

to write to my friends at Pesaro, Giulio Perticari and Francesco Cassi, to ask them to come and console me. Without having revealed to them the secret of the conspiracy, and of the projected address, I had promised them wonders as to the future fortune of our hapless Italy; and now what could I say to men excited by ill-founded hopes? Both my friends, however, came without a summons from me. Perticari recited to me his electric verses, in which he describes Rome meditating upon her past splendour; Rome shuddering at the insults heaped upon her misfortunes by one of her own sons, who, elevated to the highest pinnacle of human power, and intoxicated by glory, thought she was honoured by his declaring her the second city in the French Empire. The art and feeling with which he recited these verses were so great, that they harrowed my very soul. My friends, ignorant of the cause which produced such emotion, were astonished to see me hide my face with my hands, and I did so blushing with shame at the weakness of my hesitating coadjutors, whence would ensue years and years of servitude for Italy, and of humiliation for us natives of the south, who had given proofs of no common valour under the walls of Naples, when we repelled the army of Championnet, and had no less distinguished ourselves at Andria, Trani, Vigliena, in the various castles of the capital, and in Amantea; and finally against Massena in Calabria.

I was unexpectedly called away from the pleasure I derived from the society of these well-beloved friends by a letter from Carascosa, desiring me to proceed immediately to Ancona upon business which concerned myself. What business had I in the world beyond the one which had hitherto proved so inauspicious? On

reaching Ancona, Carascosa read me a letter which he had received from Macdonald, now no longer one of our partisans, in which he ordered in the King's name, that I should depart for the Castle of St. Elmo at Naples, there to be brought before a court-martial. I did not hesitate a moment to declare my readiness to proceed thither, and to surrender myself a victim to the weak and vacillating conduct of my companions. I hoped that my perseverance, and the punishment which it had entailed upon me, being known in the kingdom, would tend to produce more beneficial results to my native land than I had been able to effect with the sword. By the depression I perceived in Carascosa, I was convinced that he had not taken any part in the present proceeding, as had been rumoured. It was Filangieri who had gone to the King, and Ambrosio was no less painfully impressed than Carascosa. I believe they anticipated, from the rigour with which the King would probably treat me, that disgrace might fall upon themselves. After much division of opinion, they proposed that I should go to Milan, and remain there until the affair should have blown over.

"To Milan!" I exclaimed, "do you forget that Milan is in Austria? I am sure of being well received by Austria on account of the trifling services I performed during the last campaign; but what would my countrymen say on learning that I had sought a refuge amidst the oppressors of Italy? Would you have me thus degrade myself?"

Carascosa then offered to give me an order dated back to inspect some troops in the district of Pergola, which is situated at a great distance from Ancona. He then proposed to write to the Minister of War, stating

that he had summoned me, and that I should proceed to Naples as soon as I had returned to Ancona. Carascosa intended, also, to write to Pocrio and Colletta, to learn what punishment I had to fear. Both Carascosa and Ambrosio said, that, in the event of the King's displaying any degree of rigour against me, they would immediately despatch the address, and execute the projected movement. To avoid the appearance of wishing to become a martyr to the public cause, I started for Pergola to inspect the troops stationed there.

As I proceeded on my journey to that place, I reflected on these matters, and the more my mind dwelt upon them, the more I found difficulty in raising a reasonable conjecture why the King's anger should vent itself on me alone. It is true, I had shown myself more zealous than the other Generals; but they, nevertheless, were my accomplices. It seemed to me impossible, that the King would inflict a capital punishment on me. His natural clemency, and the tottering condition of his throne, alike forbade that supposition. However, it was not safe to place too great a faith in the wisdom and benignity of crowned heads. My mind was engrossed by these various thoughts, till Carascosa wrote to me, requesting my return to Ancona. On my arrival, he hastened to impart to me the tidings he had received from Naples, which were to the effect, that I should run no risk by going thither. One letter mentioned, that Florestano, having been invited to a fête given by the Queen, her Majesty informed him that my punishment would have been limited to a few days' confinement in the castle.

I quitted Ancona, and having reached the Abruzzi, I saw at Chieti my intimate friend the Duke of

Móntyasi, who had been Prefect of that province, and who now informed me, that he had lost his office, owing to his having favoured the Carbonari. I only staid a few hours in this town to avoid the visits of the numerous Carbonari resident there, each of whom had a revolutionary plan to reveal to me. I was astonished to find them aware of the weakness of my companions, against whom they were furious. The difficulty never was how to create a rebellion, but how to direct it in such a way as to be of use instead of proving injurious to the national interest, which was periled on the one hand by the reluctance of Joachim to grant liberal institutions, and on the other by the Holy Alliance, which always aimed at re-establishing the Bourbons of Sicily on the throne of Naples.

On reaching that capital, my brother Florestano informed me that the King's anger had entirely passed away, and that instead of a court-martial and the castle of St. Elmo, every indulgence would be shown me. I presented myself to the Minister of War, by whom I was told that the King wished to see me, and a few minutes after, I found myself in the royal apartment. I there met the Prince of Strongoli, captain of the guards, and Filangieri the aide-de-camp on duty, so that the King was guarded by my accomplices.

The Chamberlain on duty ushered me into the King's presence; he was with the Queen, whose beautiful head was covered by an immense hat, according to the fashion of the time. I know not whether her presence there was accidental, or whether I am to ascribe it to a curiosity to hear the justification of the *savage*, for such was the name she gave me, even when speaking of me to others. I had decided, in the event of the

King mentioning the conspiracy, to say, that after having revealed to him the ardent desire of the nation to be ruled by a constitutional form of government, and the advantages to be derived by his granting their request, I regarded every means of destroying absolute power as warrantable. But instead of alluding to the address, of the existence of which he could not have been ignorant, he began by saying, "I treat all my subjects, and you in particular, like my children." I replied that had he done otherwise, and followed the example of Ferdinand in 1799, when Cirillo, Mario Pagano, and other illustrious victims had been executed and had shown the greatest contempt for life: they would now find imitators. At this speech the King turned round and with some irritation, exclaimed: "Non, Monsieur, nous nous batterions plutôt dans la chambre à côté." Sorry that I had said to him what he did not deserve to hear, I said, "I will fight with your enemies, Sire, since you are not without them, and I will regard them as the enemies of my own country; it will then be seen whether your flatterers or myself act better in the field." The King replied, "I have never had a doubt of this, and I am convinced that had you been aware of all the evil your conduct has done me, you would have acted differently." I answered, "I love your Majesty, and my grateful heart has never forgotten the kindness of your reception the first time I was in your presence. If your interests were opposed to those of my country, I should be the most miserable of men, but there would be no doubt of my choice. If your Majesty were to grant the Constitution we pray for, you would consolidate your throne for ever; you would be adored by the Neapolitans. You who so generously poured your private fortune into the public treasury; you, whose

soul is so noble, why refuse to give us liberal institutions?" The Prince replied, "Can you suppose that I have forgotten that I have been a Republican? I should long since have granted a Constitution, had I not been aware that such a proceeding would draw down upon me the implacable animosity of Austria." "Sire," I exclaimed, "it is not the dubious friendship of Austria, but the six millions of Neapolitans with their natural strongholds that will best defend your throne. Your people excited by their love of country, and led by a warlike Prince, would show Europe what they are capable of." "It suffices," was his reply, "that we have the army on our side." This answer put me beside myself, and I could not help exclaiming. "This false principle, Sire, makes me despair of our and of your salvation." He held out his hand to me, which against my custom I offered to kiss, but he would not allow me to do so. After I had succeeded in calming myself, I continued, "The army is not a body of Janissaries, but is composed of men who feel and think like the people from whom they have sprung. Manfred who combined all your personal advantages, and who was endowed with the most dauntless valour, had the people against him and was forsaken by the army." He replied, "You forget that I have a Council of State and wise ministers." I resumed, "call here the wisest amongst them, and I will maintain, in your presence, that they have declared they are fully of my opinion, only they have not the frankness to say so, because they wish to retain your favour." I added a great deal more, to which he replied; and then after he had granted me leave to return to his presence whenever I pleased or required to see him, I withdrew.

,,The King had not behaved well towards Florestano, who of all the Generals, was the one who had had the greatest opportunity of signalizing himself in war; and who of all the Generals was the only one neglected. Florestano had three great faults in the eyes of the King: first, he was in great favour with the French, and had been recommended both by Marshal Suchet and Napoleon; secondly, he had requested to march against the enemy in Poland, with his brigade of the horse guards, which suffered severely from the snow, having been almost annihilated; and lastly, he had shown the utmost indulgence to the Carbonari in the Abruzzi, which province he had pacified by granting them an amnesty. They who are unacquainted with the eccentricity of character of the King of Naples will scarcely credit my statement.

One evening my brother was obliged to accept an invitation from the King. When his Majesty beheld him, he exclaimed aloud: "Peut on ne pas aimer une figure comme ça." As to myself, I cannot even at the present day affirm positively whether the King liked me or not. Carascosa used to say that he could not bear, but that he esteemed me. It is certain that after my country I was most truly attached to Joachim, and I would have given my life for him. It is scarcely credible that a man so brave and frank by nature, should have acquired, after he ascended a throne, all the duplicity of Princes. I must admit, however, that very often his nature triumphed over his dissimulation. After the conversation we had held together, immediately after my return to Naples, he told the Princess of Caramanico that he should succeed in *taming the savage;* she replied that he would assuredly lose his time in the attempt. I was invited during a whole month to the select entertainments

given by the Queen, who must have hated me most cordially. On one of these evenings somebody asked me if I felt inclined to dance. Without heeding much what I said, I replied that I had never attempted to do so ridiculous a thing. The courtiers immediately hastened to impart my speech to the King and Queen, who were both fond of dancing. I was invited another time to go to the Villa Belvedere, situated on the Vomero, then occupied by the fascinating Pauline, Princess Borghese. There were so few persons there, that when the two sisters, the Queen and the Princess Borghese determined upon playing at *petit paquet*, I was obliged to take part in the game. I was likewise invited by the King to dine at this villa. The dinner was served in the beautiful garden overlooking the sea. We had scarcely risen from table when Prince Ischitelli, aide-de-camp to the King, arrived. Whilst I was conversing with some persons of the Court, Joachim called me and desired me to read a letter which Ischitelli had just brought from Lord William Bentinck. After perusing it, I said: "Lord William Bentinck is not your friend, Sire!" The King exclaimed, "He may not have been once, but he is so now." I alluded to the answer given by the English General to Filangieri, and perhaps the King likewise alluded to it. Had the King any knowledge of our intended conspiracy? I cannot answer the question. Had he really been aware of it, how would he have kept Carascosa, Ambrosio, and Filangieri in favour? On the other hand, with the numerous spies he was accustomed to employ, how could he have remained in ignorance of a conspiracy known to so many officers? There was a circle around the King composed of six or seven Generals, or Counsellors of State, one of whom moved

by a momentary generous impulse, said to the Prince, "Notwithstanding his opposition, General Pépé loves your Majesty." "Certainly," I exclaimed, "I love your Majesty, and I will prove my affection by now entreating you not to persecute the Carbonari." "Not persecute them!" cried the King, "when in their meetings at Lanciano they declare me to be a tyrant." "If you will allow me, Sire, I will express to you my opinion upon the matter." The King drew back a few steps, and crossing his arms, looked at me and said: "Messieurs, vous allez voir que le Général Pépé me croit un tyran." "I do not calumniate," I replied, "and I am happy to make known all your excellent qualities; but I will continue to speak openly if you will grant me leave." He made a gesture that I might proceed, and I continued: "Nobody knows better than myself how generous and humane is your nature. I recollect among other things, that when you sent me into the revolted provinces of Leece and Doria, you desired me to prevent the effusion of blood, when blood was called for by those of our own party; but if you are averse to shed the blood of the guilty, whilst one of your Generals in the Abruzzi, by means of a military commission, puts to death myriads of citizens, what name do you suppose the citizens can give you?" The King answered: "Assure yourself that I will recal the General in question from those provinces," but he never did recal him.

It is strange that even those who lauded the frankness of my speech were far from attempting to imitate it. I was one day with the King when his two young children, Achilles and Lucien were brought in. Turning towards me, he said: "The only happy hours of my life are those I spend with my children. You

should marry; I would give you forty thousand ducats out of my private purse, and the Queen would select to be your wife one of the most estimable young ladies of the capital." I replied: "My father likewise wishes me to marry; but shackled with a wife, there is an end to all real independence; then indeed *the Tribune* would talk to you just like your own Counsellors of State." The King invited me to all the reviews and to all the entertainments given at Court, and I could not conceive why I was not sent back to resume the command of my troops. A lady, the Marchesa di l'Inchiatura, sister of General d'Aquino, had been endeavouring for three years to get her two daughters admitted into the establishment of the Miracoli, where they would have been educated free of expense, which the State of her fortune rendered highly desirable.

I spoke to the King upon the subject, and begged him to grant an audience to the Marchesa, who was a most lovely person. "The Queen does not much like my giving audience to ladies," was his reply; to which I rejoined, "I pity the Queen if she notices the gallantries of your Majesty." The King demanded to see the Marchesa's petition, as I had it about me. He immediately put his signature to it, and the request was granted. The poor mother was overwhelmed with joy. I likewise entreated the King to appoint the Marchese Mosca, of Pesaro, Chamberlain, and to grant him the order of the Two Sicilies, which request was immediately complied with. I had not the least hesitation in asking favours in reason for persons who I knew deserved them, provided always that they were not related to myself.

The King occupied himself incessantly with increasing the numerical force of the army, and forming a

National Guard in the provinces, which was denominated a Legion. Although Joachim was endowed with all the necessary talent for leading troops against an enemy, he had not the most distant notion of properly organizing them, or of keeping up the degree of discipline which is indispensable. The grand military axiom, that the quality of the troops is far preferable to their number was quite unknown to him; nor is this wonderful, for even Napoleon used to say that large battalions alone gain battles. As to the National Guard, although the King had been most prodigal of his rewards in a thousand ways, not having shown much discrimination in bestowing them, the result was far from satisfactory. The King never called the chosen companies of the National Guard into the ranks of the army, either for their instruction, or to excite emulation among the troops. What would the Prince have said had he lived, when five years later, I, a mere General, unfavourably regarded by the King, unsupported by the Parliament, and with no other means than telegraphic orders, caused eighty battalions of the National Guard, armed and clothed at their own expense, to march towards the frontier? The King bestowed great attention upon the financial, interior, and judicial departments of his government; but his success was not great, owing in great part to the bad selection of his ministers and subordinates of every kind.

It became necessary to look to force, or to unforeseen circumstances for the formation of a Constitutional Government; as, indeed, a people must ever do, who live under an absolute monarchy. The dismissal of the strangers holding employments under the King's Government, was also called for by public opinion;

because they were mostly without personal merit, extremely numerous, and interested in the preservation of his arbitrary power. Not only did he refuse to discharge this horde, but as if the nation could not see that the Council of State was ever ready to second all his views, whether good or bad, he caused it to publish a law for their protection.

At this time, Carascosa came to Naples from Ancona. He always manifested the greatest friendship for me. He was constantly with me, and expressed himself warmly in unison with my sentiments upon the necessity of a Constitutional Government. But he had received from the King, along with the rank of Captain of the Guards, an estate in the Marches. Perhaps these favours, which, to say the truth, he had deserved better than any other General, prevented his acting against King Murat, and embracing the interests of his country. The King at length told me that I was free to return to my quarters at Sinigaglia, and Carascosa proposed that we should travel together; and we left Naples for the Marches of Ancona.

I arrived at Sinigaglia at about the time that the Congress of Vienna accused Joachim of disloyalty in allying himself with Austria; and Marshal Bellegarde and General Nugent endeavoured, in various publications, to show that had the King supported them truly and faithfully, the Austrian troops would have conquered those of the Viceroy. At Vienna, all the representatives of the different European powers turned their backs upon the Neapolitan Ministers, and Joachim was requested to return the Marches of Ancona to the Church.

This Prince now began to see how little reason he had to trust the Emperor of Austria. Joachim was in constant correspondance with the Emperor Napoleon in the Isle of Elba; and at the same time he gave ear to obscure men, who pretended to be at the head of conspiracies throughout Italy. Although he found himself obliged to rely upon his own people and on those of the rest of Italy, now that he was forsaken by the Allied Powers, he still persisted in maintaining his absolute sway.

To prove how men are blinded by the love of power, the King, instead of striving to gain the love of his people by giving them freedom, hoped to acquire it by lavishing upon them golden medals, with his own head on one side, and the motto "honour and fidelity" on the other. His ministers and counsellors devised other means no less absurd than the medal, which, according to them, was to obtain great credit and popularity for the King. These means consisted of the presentation of addresses from the army and from the other bodies employed in the administration of the State. I received a letter from Carascosa, pressing me warmly to hasten to Loreto, to take part in an assembly of Generals. On my arrival there, I found that a question was on foot of sending an address to the King, signed by the Generals occupying the Marches. I declared that I would not sign it until the King had granted us a Constitution. Never was man more solicited than I was upon this occasion. Carascosa and Ambrosio affirmed that we should obtain everything we wanted from the King, because of his promises, and because we had him entirely in our power; that his fall would be no less injurious to

ourselves than to the rest of Italy, and that consequently we ought all to unite in supporting him. They added, that in the situation in which the King found himself, he could not grant a Constitution to his people without irritating Austria more strongly against him: that it was essential to prove to Europe that we were unanimous in maintaining him upon the throne, and so destroying a rumour very prevalent at Vienna that several of the Generals were unfavourable to his cause. As I still remained firm in my determination, my companions said that they would sign for me, and that they were certain I would not contradict them, and that, in this particular case, I was instigated by obstinacy, and not by patriotism. As there was a great deal of truth in what they urged, I yielded; but they insisted, in order that the reconciliation should be complete, that I should accept the proffered Barony, and write to thank the King. I received letters from Naples saying, that many wagers were pending there and in the Abruzzi, as to whether or not my signature would be affixed to the address. I do not know to this day whether I was right or wrong in signing the address, and in accepting the Barony.

During this summer, the Princess of Wales came to Naples. A short time previous to her arrival, the King wrote to the Duke of Campo Chiaro, who was his minister (although not acknowledged as such), to inquire in London from the British Minister of State how she should be received. The reply was, that if he would please the Regent, it would be well to treat her with the most complete indifference and neglect. As soon as the Princess arrived in Naples Joachim went to visit her, and showed her every possible attention

and kindness, as if he wished to prove that he prized her friendship far above that of her husband. I was informed of all these circumstances some months after their occurrence by Campo Chiaro, and they will serve to show the eccentricity of the King. The Princess was accompanied by Keppel Craven and Sir William Gell, men of high merit, but whose good advice she never followed. The Regent, as soon as he became King of England, endeavoured to divorce his wife.

I had not forgotten the promise I had made to the Calabrese *litterato,* Salffi, when I passed through Milan on my return from Spain. When I spoke about him to the King, his Majesty told me that he had known him at Milan, and that I might write to him to give up the lucrative office he held in that city, and to return to his native place, where he should have an advantageous situation. I asked permission of the King to bid the Minister of the Interior, Zurlo, to write likewise in his name, which was accordingly done. Salffi quitted Milan, and reached Sinigaglia at the moment of the fair, which had also brought there my other two friends, Perticari and Cassi. When I reviewed my troops, I said to Salffi during the intervals of rest, whilst the band was playing, that he might converse freely with the soldiers and subordinate officers. He was struck with admiration at their appearance, their national feelings, and the confidence they seemed to feel in themselves. He then asked whether the other corps of the army were in the same condition. I was silent, and Perticari and Cassi answered for me; their answer was not what he would have wished to hear. The remainder of the year 1814 passed without any remarkable event. I exerted myself to ameliorate the condition of the

corps under my command, and enjoyed as much of the society of my friends from Pesaro as I could. Perticari had inspired me with such love for Dante, that I endeavoured to commit to memory his most beautiful passages. I had never much taste for Petrarch, whose eternal love-making was most sickening to me; the more so that, notwithstanding my savageness, this same love had more than once increased the bitterness of my misfortunes.

CHAPTER II.

1815.

How I passed the winter in the Marches of Ancona—Napoleon escapes from Elba and lands in France—Effect produced in Italy by his return—Conduct of Joachim on this occasion—It is decided to attack the Austrian army—Hostilities begin near Cesena—I am on the point of being taken prisoner—Jerome Buonaparte—Entrance into Bologna—Battles of Panaro, Occhiobello, and Carpi—Conduct of the general officers who commanded the Royal Guard in Tuscany—Battle of Bologna, which is evacuated.

It did not require any very great sagacity to foresee the misfortunes which threatened, not only the kingdom of Naples but the whole of Italy. I was in a state of great despondency on perceiving the impossibility of avoiding the trials which awaited us. I was fully of opinion, that the consequences of any revolutionary movement in the kingdom would have been most pernicious at that moment. I was, therefore, extremely cautious. I saw a great deal of my friends from Pesaro, and read several of their select works. About the same time, I was in the habit of receiving letters as well from Naples as the Abruzzi, containing projects which savoured of madness. Few, if any, of these letters evinced the slightest wisdom. A great many officers from the kingdom of Italy, who came to serve with us, asserted that in the event of the King's movement,

more than a hundred thousand men from that part of the country which lies between the Roman States and the Alps would assemble, clothed and armed at their own expense. I gave no more credit to such reports than they deserved; but not so the King, who did not prepare for the coming time with that steadiness which was necessitated by the difficulty of his situation. He wasted his hours in needless reviews, and in giving entertainments to the English and other foreigners who crowded his capital. In the midst of the apparent tranquillity in which we lived, we were suddenly astounded by the intelligence that Napoleon had landed in France from the Isle of Elba.

I did not expect so important an event, but I could not doubt that the King, who had during the preceding year been in uninterrupted communication with the great Captain, would now have seconded his views to the utmost of his power. I was convinced that, supported by the Emperor, Joachim would have decided upon the mode of conducting his impending war with Austria, and that both, profiting by the experience of their past misfortunes, would have acted with wisdom and unanimity, not only in war but in politics. However, notwithstanding the long correspondence they had kept up together, subsequent events will show how little real communication existed between the two Princes.

On the 26th of February, Napoleon quitted the small island forming his sole empire. On the 20th of the following month, the Neapolitan forces marched beyond the frontiers of the kingdom, and the King arrived in Ancona. I went immediately to pay my respects to him, and he did me the honour of inviting me to dinner. On this occasion, he said to me, "I

am on terms of friendship with Florestano," and added, "We will talk shortly of giving a Constitution to the kingdom, and of driving the strangers out of it." I replied that now that it was a question of fighting for the nationality of Italy, he would no longer find in me a *Tribune*, but a blindly obedient soldier. We were only six persons at table. The King affirmed that there were not, at the utmost, above fifteen thousand Austrians in Italy. I was of opinion that in such a case the population of that portion of the country which lies beyond the Po would have risen immediately.

Before dismissing me, the King said that he had sent Florestano upon an important mission to the coast of Rome, on board a vessel conveying troops to be landed there. To my infinite surprise, I received, on the following day, a letter from Florestano, in which he advised me by no means to urge the King to commence hostilities. This letter was sent to me open, through the Minister of Finance, Count Morbourg, a man wholly devoted to the King and Queen.

I thus became aware of the existence of two opposite opinions prevalent at Court, and amongst the general officers, one of which was, that the King ought to temporize; whilst the other was, that he should assault the enemy with as much promptitude as circumstances would admit. The King leant towards the latter course, which was likewise my own opinion. I was impressed with the idea that the triumph of Napoleon would prevent the fall of Joachim, and that Italy would then cast off the yoke both of France and Austria; that the fall of the Emperor must inevitably produce that of the King, and the consequent ruin of the whole of our Peninsula. However clear such views were to myself, they were not so in the eyes of the Ministers and

Counsellors of State, who were all of opinion that it would be wiser to maintain a neutral position. What amazed me more than anything else, was that the Queen, Napoleon's own sister, who had been in constant correspondence with her brother during the whole time of his residence in the Isle of Elba, now entreated the King not to declare himself against Austria. My own inclination was decidedly for war; and I regarded it as indispensable, when once the die was cast, to avail ourselves of all the forces at our disposal, as well as of those furnished by the whole of Italy, aroused by the intoxicating promise of the most unbounded freedom and independence. But Machiavel truly says, that "Men rarely perish but through half measures!"

Joachim was guilty of two very serious errors; the first was, not opening the campaign with all his troops of the line, gendarmes and the select companies of the militia, amounting in all to at least sixty thousand men; the second, not to have summoned to arms, under the banner of Italy, all those who had already served either in the kingdom of Italy, or under the Empire, as well as all the unmarried and able-bodied men under thirty years of age, declaring all those who declined to do so, guilty of treason to their country. By such means the sixty thousand Neapolitans would have been joined on their march by about thirty thousand veterans, and by an equal number of fighting-men, well fitted to defend the different fortresses and to fight in detachments. There is not the slightest exaggeration in affirming that Joachim, at the head of sixty thousand men, would have been joined by at least an equal number on his progress from his capital to the Alps. To those who urge, "How could the King have left the kingdom unprotected?" I answer that Gaeta with a small

garrison would have been a safe asylum for the royal family, and that the provinces and the capital would have been protected by the National Guard, and by the knowledge that the King was at the foot of the Alps at the head of a hundred and twenty thousand Italians. Admitting, however, that the kingdom might have been invaded by the Anglo-Sicilians, they would, at the first intelligence of the advantages gained by Joachim, have crossed the Strait again, accompanied by the curses of the inhabitants on this side of it. Some may, perhaps, be disposed to question that the army would have been increased by thirty thousand veterans and by the National Guard; but I knew Italy thoroughly, both as a citizen and a soldier.

A few months previous I had laughed at the wonders promised to the King; but in April of the year 1815, I felt a depth of conviction amounting to certainty, that with the forces at the head of which Joachim advanced, the return of Napoleon to power, and the patriotic excitement which prevailed from the Tronto to the Alps, he would have gathered reinforcements perhaps exceeding the number I have specified. If the inhabitants of that portion of Italy which lies beyond the Tronto did not rush to arms, the fault was entirely the King's own, who did not know either how to excite, or how to compel them to defend their country's cause.

The army with which the King opened the campaign was composed of the foot and horse-guards, together about six thousand men; of four divisions, three of infantry and one of cavalry, forming altogether under arms a body of about twenty-four thousand men. Of these, only about thirteen thousand men belonged to the regular active army, out of which scarcely eight

thousand had been trained to war in Spain and Germany. In the campaign of the preceding year, my own brigade was the only one which had had the opportunity of acquiring military experience. Scarcely a thousand men had returned from Spain. There was more ardour, soul, and energy in the soldiers and non-commissioned officers than in the subalterns, and these in their turn were better than the superior officers. Nearly half the Colonels were French; and of what value were these men, whilst every one of their countrymen who was imbued with a right sense of honour had returned to France, that he might not draw his sword against his native country? There were at least ten general officers of that nation, and not one of them had ever led a regiment into the field of battle. Of the sixteen Neapolitan Generals, the really brave and able ones were, Carascosa, Ambrosio, Florestano Pépé, Macdonald, Filangieri, the Prince Campana, De Gennaro, Napolitano, and the Duke of Roccaromana.

The royal foot-guard was led by the Prince Strongoli, and the horse-guards by General Livron. This officer had been heretofore a French Marquis, but subsequently became purveyor to the army of that country in Naples. The former had served amongst us as a Lieutenant, but by a whim of the King, and without ever having commanded in the field, he soon rose to the rank of Lieutenant-General. Carascosa commanded the first division of infantry, Ambrosio the second, and Lecchi the third. The cavalry was divided by squadrons into three divisions. Giuseppe Lecchi had commanded the Italian Legion at Marengo, in which I served as a volunteer. The bravery of this officer was known to all; he had commanded a division

in Spain, belonging to the kingdom of Italy, with the greatest honour; but having been found guilty of great irregularity in the financial branch of his duty, he had been dismissed the service and cast into prison by order of the Emperor. Some time after, he was pardoned by Napoleon at the request of Murat, who gave him an employment in his army. General Lecchi, either on account of his misfortunes or from the little faith he had in the success of the Neapolitan troops, inferior both in experience and in number to those of Austria, did not answer the expectations raised by his former well-deserved military fame.

The army moved in two columns. The royal guard was directed upon Tuscany, and the remainder of the troops marched towards Fano and Pesaro. In order to gain time, the King endeavoured to consolidate his alliance with Austria, by stating that his safety required that he should advance upon the right of the Po; but judging of his faith by his movements, the Austrian power continued to increase the force of its army in Lombardy under the command of General Frimot. This officer was seconded by the Lieutenant-Generals Bianchi, Mohr, Wied and Neiperg. The wings of the Austrian army, which consisted of about fifty-five thousand men, were stationed at the fortresses of Alessandria and Ferrara, between which lay Legnago, Mantua and Pezzighettone. They likewise held the four fortified bridges of Piacenza, Borgoforte, Occhiobello and Lagoscuro. When we were quitting the Marches to advance against the Austrians, they had at least eighteen thousand men between the Po and the Cattolica. I was ignorant of the above particulars at the time, and I question whether the King was much better informed.

His Majesty arrived in Sinigaglia towards the end of March, and reviewed the first division. After having saluted him at the head of my brigade, as was the custom, I placed myself at his side. The brigade was in the most admirable condition, and animated by feelings of the deepest enthusiasm. The King, highly gratified by this sight, bestowed great praise upon its appearance as the men filed off before him. I said to him: "With such men we can go far," to which he replied: "N'en doutez pas, nous irons." A few hours after the review, I received orders to march towards Pesaro on the following morning at day-break. My column was beyond Fano, when an officer, who commanded an advanced piquet of lancers came to me to ask permission for a traveller, just come from the upper part of Italy, to continue his journey. I replied that he might proceed. The traveller on beholding me from his carriage, sent to request that I would alight from my horse, as he had something of importance to reveal to me. He proceeded to state, that he was secretary to Joseph, Ex-King of Spain, who had sent him from Switzerland to urge Joachim to hasten the march of his troops. This gentleman who was provided with a passport, in which he was styled a Swiss merchant, assured me that the Austrian troops in Italy were by no means numerous, and that they were not likely to receive any support, because Austria was making preparations to second the Allied Powers then directed against France. I thanked him for his intelligence, which at a later period, I discovered to have been not quite exact, and told him that he would find the King either at Fano or Sinigaglia. I next reached the town of Pesaro, where for a few hours I was the guest of my friend Perticari.

I took leave of this enthusiastic, though not strong-minded man, whose soul devoted to our native Italy, breathed the warmest hopes for its future fate, and we parted. On the day I quitted Pesaro, I directed my march towards the Cattolica, where I was joined the next day by Carascosa with a regiment of lancers followed by the second brigade of the division under his command. The Austrians retreated before us without commencing the attack, and after we had reached the Rubicon, which awakens in the mind the remembrance of mighty events, Carascosa extended his hand, when we were in the midst of the little river, and clasping mine, he said: "Let us swear to perish rather than give up the enterprise we have entered upon," and we both took the oath from the depth of our hearts. At night we entered Rimini, and on the following day we resumed our march; the Austrians constantly retreating before us. They, however, took up their position upon the high road, a few miles on this side of Cesena, and there began to fire. As the white plume upon my hat was extremely conspicuous, the bullets were directed so constantly against me, that one of the lancers by my side was wounded. Without loss of time, and accompanied by two battalions of the second light regiment, I turned to my left, and favoured by the inequality of the ground I concealed this movement from the enemy, and reached a church which commands the city of Cesena. From this elevation, I could perceive that the Austrians within the walls were in a state of the utmost confusion, having been driven from the high road by Carascosa. The circuit I had made to reach the church was not known, and I recommended my followers to advance at full speed, but without firing. They did not all hear my orders, and

some by discharging their muskets hastened the retreat of the enemy. I reached one of the gates of the city which was opened to me by the inhabitants; I left there an aide-de-camp with orders to let no one enter, and to prepare for the second light regiment's taking possession of the bridge across the Lavio. Accompanied merely by two lancers, I then proceeded into the city, which I supposed to have been evacuated. As I advanced through the streets, several ladies who were at the windows called out to me, saying: "Do not go on, General, or the enemy's cavalry will take you prisoner." Not rightly hearing what they said, I supposed that they were exclaiming in favour of Italy, and I saluted them as I proceeded on my way. All of a sudden, I saw an Austrian Colonel, Gavendo, (who had been my companion during the last campaign) at the head of a detachment of hussars. Such an unexpected sight caused me immediately to turn my horse's head and I galloped back at full speed. The Austrian officer, on his part, concluding that I was followed by my column, took to flight; so that the ladies at the windows must have had ample food for laughter at our expense.

I returned to the gate from whence I had entered, and after gathering together a small column of infantry I again returned into the city. We drove the Austrians before us the whole length of the town; they abandoned a few horses, and finding that we pressed so closely upon them, they threw themselves from the walls to avoid being made prisoners.

When the King arrived, he congratulated me on this little event, and unluckily invited me to dine with him at a time when I stood far more in need of rest, having to establish my camp on the other side of Cesena, and

again to follow the enemy at dawn on the following day. Carascosa and Millet, chief of the staff, likewise dined with the King, who said so many and such things during the course of the evening, that Carascosa and myself gazed at each other with wonder. The King fancied he possessed an army that could vie with the Imperial Guard of Napoleon, and was little pleased to hear me say, that with the exception of the hussars of the guard, of the guard of honour, which was by no means numerous, and the light horse, the remainder of the cavalry stood in great need of instruction.

Before day-break, I was on horseback with my column upon the heights of Bertinoro, and on the other eminence upon the left of the high road which leads to Bologna. I was in hopes of overtaking the Austrian forces; but they continued their retreat, in order to concentrate their forces in the territory of Bologna. I was presented at Forli by the King to the Emperor's brother, Jerome Buonaparte, ci-devant King of Westphalia, who had arrived thither by sea. This personage, instead of exerting himself to unite the veterans of the kingdom of Italy under the banner of Joachim, in defence of the common cause, called upon them to bear in mind that they were subjects of Napoleon, and that they ought to serve no other Prince.

We reached Bologna after a long and weary march, having only rested for a few hours from time to time. The King ordered me to equip my men in their best uniforms, and to cross Bologna, in order to encamp on the right bank of the Reno. The Austrian papers stated, that Joachim had entered Bologna, followed by a most brilliant staff, so that he might attract the applause of the multitude. Far from such being the case,

the King had proceeded around the exterior of the walls, and found the enemy's cavalry upon the bridge of the Reno.

My aide-de-camp, being challenged by the National Guard, who was on duty at the gate of the city, replied, "the independence of Italy." How can I describe the joy of that animated population, at the magic sound of Italian independence! On all sides, from the windows under the porticoes, men old and young, women of every age and condition, and even children were waving their handkerchiefs, and raising their voices in token of enthusiasm and love. I seemed to behold a family loaded with chains hailing the arrival of the brethren who were to restore them to freedom. I was so deeply affected by what I beheld, that I could scarcely keep my seat in the saddle, and the long street which crosses Bologna seemed to me interminable. I then first became aware that joy—to which I was so little inured—had far more power over me than sorrow. Having at length passed through Bologna, I galloped on towards the King, followed more slowly by my jaded troops. His Majesty, besides his staff, was accompanied by a piquet of lancers. I beheld at a small distance a considerable number of Hungarian hussars formed into a column. I inquired of the Duke Roccaromana, the King's master of the horse, why he remained there thus exposed to the charge of the enemy; he answered that I ought to ask his Majesty the reason.

After having presented my respects to him, I said, "My column fatigued by so many forced marches is following me but slowly, and in the meanwhile your Majesty remains here exposed to the charge of the enemy." "Ah, bah!" was his only reply; and I resumed, "Sire, the Hungarian hussars have their

eyes fixed upon you, and I shall be unable to resist them before a quarter of an hour." Affecting not to hear me, he continued to remain there motionless, and I sent off orders to the head of my column, which, although harassed by fatigue was advancing at full speed, and as soon as it appeared in sight, the Austrians recommenced their retreat.

It is essential to state in this place, that although the British Government desired to unite the Two Sicilies under the Bourbon sceptre, as soon as it became acquainted with the return of Napoleon, the Duke of Campo Chiaro was informed that if Joachim would remain faithful to the Allied Powers, he would be recognised as King of Naples by England, and by the other allied Princes, and, moreover, that he should have secured to him a territory in the Marches of Ancona of four hundred thousand inhabitants, which had been promised him by Austria. But when the Austrians were attacked at Cesena, all hope of any treaty with the King of Naples was abandoned. This was expressly told me months afterwards by Campo Chiaro.

We entered Bologna on the 2nd of April, and it was with the greatest difficulty that the King was prevailed upon to remain there till the following day. Like an angry child he said, "You urged me to war, and now you complain that you are fatigued, whilst the best results may be obtained by the rapidity of our movements." I answered, that troops more accustomed to warfare would have required a day's rest after such forced marches, and that it would be running very great risk to open the campaign with men exhausted by fatigue. It was besides indispensable that we should halt for a day, to allow the men of the first division who had remained behind from exhaustion to

come up with us, and to give time for the second division to join the first. During this day of rest, the King remained upon a terrace belonging to his residence, and the women and even ladies of station kept passing along the street to behold him. Whilst I was talking to him upon more serious matters, he said to me, "Vous voyez, nous avons toutes les dames pour nous." "Pretty assistance!" thought I, as I observed that he had neglected taking vigorous measures to collect together Napoleon's Italian troops under the national flag.

The Austrians continued their retreat without fighting, in order to defend the passage of the Panaro, which is one of the largest tributary rivers to the Po. This river is fordable from its source as far as the bridge of St. Ambrogio, after which point it ceases to be so. General Bianchi had assembled a force of at least twelve thousand Austrians to defend the passage, and the King who had taken it into his head to cross by dint of fighting, was at the head of only the first division, composed of seven thousand infantry and a regiment of lancers, amounting to four hundred horse. I have read two volumes upon the campaign made by the Austrians against Murat in 1815, by V— C— de B—, an eye-witness. Amongst other matters, the author states, that at the battle of Panaro, the Neapolitan forces consisted of sixteen thousand men, rather more than double their real number.

The second division only reached Bologna on the evening of the same day, and the third was a full march behind the second: in point of fact, neither of these two divisions ever came to Panaro at all; the second being directed towards Occhiobello, and the third upon Cento. Had the eye-witness been exact in stating the

number of the Neapolitan forces in that campaign, every Italian having at heart the honour of his southern compatriots would read his work with satisfaction. The author appears to have been an Austrian officer of rank.

On the morning of the 4th of April, our column moved towards Modena. I was in front with the vanguard, and having met with the advanced posts of the enemy at Anzula, forced them to retreat across the Samoggia. The King had ordered that the second brigade, led by Major Pépé, (not any relation of mine,) should cross the river at Spilimberto, carefully concealing this manœuvre from the enemy, which it was to attack on the right flank as soon as the whole of the division should have come up, which was to begin the attack in front.

Our entire column had halted a short distance from the bridge of St. Ambrogio. Keeping at the head of my brigade, I had pushed on before me four of the chosen companies. At this moment, Carascosa came up, and I observed to him, that by threatening the enemy on the bridge with the third battalions of each regiment, and a hundred lancers, and then crossing the river at Spilimberto, and making a sudden attack on the right, we should send half the Austrians prisoners to Bologna. Carascosa replied that he fully agreed with me, and immediately communicated my observation to the King, who at that moment approached. His Majesty approved of our scheme, and added: "Vous avez raison, pourquoi aller se casser le nez au pont." Having uttered these words, he rode on, followed by his staff, towards the advanced posts. I refrained from accompanying him, that I might reserve the strength of my horses, six in number, which were

considerably fatigued. Who would believe that the King, like a second Charles XII., on beholding the enemy, suddenly opened his fire with only two companies? I immediately advanced to his assistance with the other two, and at the same time sent orders to the brigade to advance at their utmost speed. Soon perceiving that the King intended to proceed diametrically contrary to his original plan, I lost no time in informing Carascosa of the circumstance.

The first four chosen companies, led by Major Astuti, who had served as captain in my regiment in Spain, fought under the King's eye with a degree of dauntless bravery and ardour calculated to excite him to the most daring measures. Whilst I was awaiting fresh orders, with my column drawn up in a mass on the high-road, the Marquis Rivello, officer of ordnance to the King, rode up to me in the greatest haste, and ordered me, in Joachim's name, to cross the river a little lower down, with two battalions of the second light regiment; upon the prompt execution of which manœuvre, he said, depended the success of the battle. I said to Rivello, that he must have mistaken the King's orders, and that I was to cross the river above the ford of Spilimberto. Rivello persisted in the correctness of his statement; but I was aware of the absurdity of such a measure, and charged him to gallop back to the King, and to say that I would move towards Spilimberto. As I was on my march thither, the chief of the staff, General Millet, galloped towards me, saying that Rivello had completely misunderstood the King's directions, and that his Majesty fully approved of my proceedings. I begged this officer to remind the Prince, that of my two battalions, two of the chosen companies were with him; but that,

admitting even that the two battalions were complete, they were by no means sufficient to fulfil the orders they were about to attempt, but that I assured his Majesty, although it was not in my power to perform a miracle, I would do my duty to the utmost.

Whilst I was advancing at full speed to execute the orders of the King, his Majesty and Carascosa had forced the enemy to abandon the right bank of the Panaro. The enemy, however, prepared to defend the opposite side. The King immediately ordered Carascosa to cross the river, who executed this injunction with the greatest promptitude, and vigorously assaulting the Austrians, made several prisoners. He was, however, soon repulsed by the superior force of the enemy, and driven into the water. He contrived to shelter himself and his followers under the arches of the bridge, from whence he succeeded in gaining the right bank, by the assistance of General de Gennaro.

On reaching the passage of Spilimberto, I reckoned upon the assistance of the battalion which had been sent thither; but this having discovered itself at the first fire of the companies pushed forward by the King, had been put to flight by the superior number of the enemy's troops, and was scattered about in the woody fields. I had, therefore, only my two battalions, from which two companies were wanting, in all scarcely a thousand men. The bank opposite the passage of Spilimberto, was defended by the Austrian General, Stefanini, with about three thousand men, who occupied an excellent position. I could see through my telescope the powerful force of the enemy drawn out before me; and upon the bridge of St. Ambrogio, the King was fighting with the greatest fury to drive the Austrians from it. Judging that in such a predica-

ment, daring would be better than prudence, I formed my soldiers into a column, and after addressing them in a style which would perhaps appear ridiculous in any other situation—since I assured them that the eyes of the whole universe were upon them, and that I held them in greater esteem than the ancient Romans—I ordered the drums to beat a charge, at the sound of which the whole column plunged unhesitatingly into the river and forded it. It was immediately thrown into a state of confusion, and the fire kept up by the enemy was so murderous, that it was impossible for me to reorganize my troops, so that I had no alternative but to rush upon the enemy or to recross the river. I shouted the order to advance, which was loudly repeated by the brave Verdenois, Colonel of the regiment, and we rushed headlong upon the enemy. Verdenois was driven back by the Austrians almost as soon as he had come upon them. I had assembled more than half my men upon the edge of a species of parapet, formed by the unevenness of the soil; and advanced with them as fast as possible to the assistance of the Colonel who had renewed his attack upon the enemy. The Austrians perceiving that their General Stefanini was wounded, and unable to believe that they had been attacked with such fury by only a thousand men, began to retreat.

Whilst fortune and daring had been thus favourable to me, the King ordered the cavalry General, Fontaine, to get possession of the bridge, the barricades of which had been destroyed by the fire of our artillery. This officer failing in his attempt to execute the commands of the Prince, his Majesty transferred them to his aide-de-camp, General Filangieri, who at the head of twenty-four horsemen, charged a battalion of the enemy with such effect, that it immediately laid down its

arms. Fontaine, who ought to have followed Filangieri with a regiment of lancers remained inactive, and the Austrians, perceiving the small number of Filangieri's force, opened a brisk fire upon them, and their leader fell severely wounded by several balls. Almost all his men were killed or wounded.

Perceiving this, the King caused a strong column of infantry to advance to the charge under his own eye, and succeeded in scattering the centre of the enemy's line. The left wing of the Austrians now rushed forward, but was likewise dispersed, so that the enemy were obliged to retreat; their right wing being formed of the troops under the command of General Stefanini. Joachim now drew nigh the walls of Modena, reformed his troops and then entered the city. Had the King, on this day, executed the movement suggested to him by Carascosa and myself, and which he had approved at the time; and had Fontaine done his duty, half of the Austrians would have been taken prisoners.

Every Italian will exult to learn that seven thousand four hundred Neapolitans, obliged to ford a river, and to force a passage over a fortified bridge, beat at least twelve thousand Austrians commanded by General Bianchi, one of their most famous officers. About three hundred of our soldiers were killed and wounded on this occasion. The enemy had upwards of a thousand killed and wounded. Had the wisdom of the King equalled his bravery, the success we obtained on this day would have been more decisive in its effects; and our army would have acquired more confidence in its own powers.

Millet, Carascosa, and myself were invited to join the King at dinner. His Majesty, intoxicated with joy at

the events of the day, repeated more than once: "J'ai vu combattre l'infanterie française, mais jamais avec plus d'élan que la nôtre aujourd'hui." There was a great deal both of truth and exaggeration in what he said, and his good opinion of the Neapolitans was the primary cause of the affection I ever felt for this singular man. It seems scarcely credible that, instead of bringing Fontaine before a court-martial, his punishment was limited to being deprived of his active command.

On the following day, which was the 5th of April, the King found himself near the Po with three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry; but the six thousand men forming the guard, and which, if led by able Generals, would have proved of the greatest service, were so far behind that they had not yet reached Florence. Out of the number of Italian troops, which might easily have been obtained, not one had augmented the force of our ranks. On the other hand, the Austrians who had retreated to the left bank of the Po, could fall upon us either from Piacenza, Borgoforte, Occhiobello, or Lagoscuro. But who could tell the number and the force of the enemy? Certainly not Joachim, for from his ignorance on this score, and the eccentricity of his character, arose that indecision which prevented our acting under a regular, well-conceived, digested plan.

On the 6th of April, I received orders to occupy Carpi with only three battalions, eighty lancers, and two pieces of artillery. The sole instruction given me was to observe and report the movements of the enemy. Whilst the first division remained between Modena, Reggio and Carpi, the third was at Cento; and the second, after quitting Ferrara, the Austrian garrison of which had retreated into the citadel, continued its march towards Occhiobello.

The third division came in sight of the bridge of Occhiobello on the morning of the 7th of April. This bridge was defended by fortified houses and by batteries. Our officers of engineers requested the King to grant them a couple of days to raise a few batteries before opening the assault, but the King, actuated by his natural impatience, ordered the attack without delay. The contest was carried on with great vigour on both sides: every time the Austrians sallied forth, they were driven back with great loss both to ourselves and to them. The assault was renewed no less than six times against us, but always in vain. Night was approaching, and the King who was constantly exposed to the fire of the enemy, persisted in continuing a struggle which cost much blood with very little chance of success. He was obliged finally to desist, and withdrew into the city of Bologna, ordering that the engineers should pursue their necessary labours. These ought to have been completed before; for how much easier had it been not to have sacrificed needlessly so many lives, and what is still worse, daunted the spirits of our young soldiers by exposing them to a defeat? The second division remained in observation at the foot of the bridge of Occhiobello, whilst the third continued to occupy Cento.

Occhiobello, in the King's estimation, ought to be the main point of his operations; and as he hoped that the enemy would not be in a situation to advance, his object was to renew the assault at the foot of the bridge. But before long he became aware, that he had been ill-informed as to the means the Austrians had in readiness, as well as of their projects.

On the 8th and 9th of April, I occupied Carpi with three battalions, eighty horsemen, and two pieces of

artillery. Keeping on the defensive, I endeavoured to discover with what forces the enemy might advance from Guastalla and Borgoforte, which lay at the distance of only a short march from me. It was extremely difficult to me to reconnoitre, on account of the movements of the enemy, who were concealed from my sight by the Po. Isolated and exposed as was my situation, I continued constantly on horseback examining the country around the town, so as to learn in what manner we could best resist any attack that might be made; or how to effect my retreat as far as the bridge across the Secchia. A young man, a true Italian, and a native of Modena, came during the evening of the 9th to inform me that the enemy, supported by numerous forces, had appeared in sight of Novi, which was only six miles distant. I could not communicate such intelligence to Carascosa as certain, for in the event of its being erroneous, it would have led the King into false movements. Two countrymen, my paid spies in the Austrian camp, came and related to me absurd tales upon this occasion. During the course of the same evening, I was joined by a battalion of the fifth of the line, composed entirely of Calabrese, which increased my forces to the number of two thousand five hundred men. No longer to remain in ignorance of the strength and proximity of the Austrians, I came to the determination of going myself to reconnoitre at day-break on the morning of the 10th.

Accompanied by two battalions and part of the cavalry, I followed the canal which goes from Carpi to Novi. As soon as I was in sight of the latter city, I looked through my telescope, and beheld various columns of infantry and cavalry ready to advance; upon this I said to myself, " on this occasion I shall

assuredly not have the same fortune as in the Panaro." I drew back with the greatest speed, and without any loss of time wrote to inform Carascosa of what I had observed, after which I made my preparations for defence. The Duke of Modena, who was with the enemy and who did not lack spies in his States, was notwithstanding led to believe from seeing me, that I had been joined by considerable forces during the night, and was therefore extremely cautious. In his turn, therefore, he came to reconnoitre my forces, and attacked my advanced posts, by which he was repulsed. But after a couple of hours, he resumed the attack at the head of a powerful column. Leaving a battalion in the city, half of which I placed upon the rampart looking towards Novi, upon which I likewise ordered the two pieces of artillery to be planted, I advanced with a few horsemen and the three battalions, enjoining the Calabrése to flank me on ground well calculated for my defence. The Austrians advanced with the utmost caution, being uncertain as to the number they had to encounter. All on a sudden, their dexterous Tyrolese rushed forward with great impetuosity. I held myself prepared with my right wing towards Carpi, whilst I ordered the Calabrese to come to my support by slow degrees. A strong column of the enemy, composed of several thousand men presented itself, and the second light regiment executed *un feu de file* with the utmost coolness and regularity. Their Colonel, Verdenois, committed the imprudence of calling out in a loud voice, to inform me that the enemy would get possession of the gate of Carpi, which was situated on my right hand. I immediately sent thither two chosen companies, but the courage of my troops was somewhat damped by the exclamation of the Colonel. I

formed them into a column and ordered a retreat. Their ranks immediately fell into such confusion, that any attempt to command them would have been vain. Alighting from my horse, and entering the gates, I directed all those who were without the town to go round the walls and to join me by the Modena gate. It was not without difficulty that this order was executed, for they were hotly pursued by the Austrians. I succeeded, however, in shutting and barricading the gate by which I had entered.

The brave Calabrese continued to fight outside the town; whilst from above the walls I kept up an incessant fire of musquetry and discharges from my two pieces of cannon. The officer of artillery was brave and experienced, so that the enemy who durst not attempt the assault, and yet would not turn its back upon us, suffered a very considerable loss. The contest was carried on with great vigour on both sides, and I had succeeded in re-forming the second light regiment, which was drawn up in a close column in the square of the town when I received a letter from Carascosa. Far from promising me any assistance, he bade me retreat. But how was I to attempt a retreat in full day, and against forces so very superior to my own? Such an attempt I conceived to be impossible; especially as the enemy continued to receive considerable reinforcements, and was manœuvring towards the Secchia. Impressed by the idea that it was my fate to be made prisoner, I determined that such a misfortune should befall me only after having fought to the utmost; the more so, that my only chance of safety lay in the return of night which I resolved to await, making, in the meanwhile, the most obstinate defence.

My eyes were constantly fixed upon the enemy,

whom I could distinctly behold from the walls of Carpi. It wanted about an hour to sunset, when the brave officer of the artillery, who was wounded, sent to inform me that he had no more cartridges for the infantry, and that but a very small number remained for the two pieces of cannon. I was, therefore, obliged to begin my retreat, although it was still day. I formed the second light regiment into a column outside the Modena gate; gave orders to the Calabrese to retire slowly, and suddenly withdrawing from the walls the artillery and the battalion of the first of the line, which had been fighting there, I left a few horsemen to guard the Novi gate, until the enemy should penetrate into the town.

I was now in full retreat, and as the manœuvres of the Austrians, which I had observed, did not indicate any intention of attacking the rear of my column, I expected that I should find them on the high road, ready to cut off my retreat before I could reach the Secchia. To my great surprise, I reached the bridge across that river in very good order, unable to comprehend how the enemy, so superior in strength, had not opposed my retreat at a distance of eight miles. At the end of the campaign, I was informed by an Austrian officer, that the Generals Bianchi and Neiperg, commanding about fifteen thousand men in front of Carpi, had entrusted the charge of cutting off my retreat to Colonel Gavendo, with about two thousand men, but that the Colonel having missed his way, had come up too late to execute the orders he had received. The historian Colletta, in opposition to all the reports at the time, states that my column reached the bridge of Secchia in a state of great confusion. If the fact had been so, the enemy would have pursued me as far as

the walls of Modena, cutting off Carascosa who was at Rubiera. Only seventy Calabrese voltigeurs who had covered our retreat were taken prisoners. My killed and wounded were very numerous, and the enemy, from the loss it sustained, must long have remembered the battle of Carpi.

As soon as I had crossed the bridge of the Secchia, I procured a supply of cartridges from the artillery stationed at Modena; and after properly establishing my advanced posts, I hastened to Carascosa, who was at Rubiera. This officer having heard from the King that the Austrians were not numerous in Italy, could hardly believe that so many of them had attacked me. He related the vain attempt which had been made at Occhiobello, which filled me with concern. I quitted him, and rode quickly towards Modena to be present at the distribution of the provisions, and to see if the guard was set, and that my wounded were properly attended to. Nothing touches the soldier's heart more deeply than the care bestowed upon the sick and wounded by his Commander. On this occasion, I recollect remaining on horseback for more than fifty hours without alighting. On the following morning at day-break we were again fighting, having stationed our advanced posts in the neighbourhood of Rubiera, and towards the bridge of the Secchia, which was now in the hands of the enemy. The King came, and as I talked to him respecting the affair of Carpi, he said: "Je sais que vous avez fait votre devoir." In war, as in every other circumstance of human life, the result is the standard by which we are judged. I, who had often been highly praised for things of trifling import, now that on the preceding day I had held out against a powerful enemy, and then made my retreat in excel-

lent order, was only not blamed, and that, as a mark of special favour; nevertheless I did not attempt to avoid the censure. Even Carascosa, who was always inclined to speak well of me, said that if I had not attempted to reconnoitre, the enemy would have let me alone at Carpi. I asked the King what number of Austrians he supposed had attacked me. He replied, four or five thousand. Upon which, I said: "You will see in the course of to-day or to-morrow that they were far more numerous." The King then ordered me to take two of the select companies and one squadron, and to go and explore the enemy towards the Secchia. It is difficult with only two companies to reconnoitre an enemy, powerful in number and in position; I therefore made a whole battalion which was at the advanced posts join me. Thus supported, I opened a brisk fire in front of the enemy from the high road leading to the bridge of the Secchia, which is flanked on one side by a canal, and on the other by a thick hedge. At one moment I was in hopes of having attracted towards me upon the high road a squadron of Austrian hussars; but as they were but too well acquainted with skirmishes, they retreated in time.

Night was closing in when I received orders from the King to withdraw after having well established the advanced posts. The Prince had received a report from General Lecchi, informing him of the number of Austrians who had crossed the Po, and stating likewise that he had advanced towards Mirandola with the division under his charge. On the 11th of April, the first division remained under arms from morning till night, whilst the King observed the movements of the enemy. We crossed the Panaro on the following day, the same river which a few days before, defended by a

numerous force, we had passed with so much valour, so small a number of troops, and no small loss of life. I received orders to leave the front of the line to defend the ford of Spilimberto, and to hold myself in reserve upon the high road with the second light regiment. On the 13th and 14th, the first division defended the right bank on the Panaro, the third had withdrawn within the city of Cento, and the second which was retreating from Occhiobello and Ferrara was halting at Malbergo. We were, therefore, in full retreat, and the Austrians, who were daily receiving reinforcements, were continually hanging upon our rear. Had the King been joined by six thousand men of the guard, our loss would have been more than repaid, and we might have assaulted the enemy on this side of the Po. Unfortunately, this guard which was as brave as the two Generals who commanded it were unskilful, was still at a very great distance from us. This guard, thus commanded, was like gold in the hands of inexperienced workmen. These Generals had shown themselves in so unfavourable a light, that, but for a sense of respect for truth, I would not allow my pen even to allude to the subject. These two Generals were advancing into Tuscany as slowly as gouty men, and finally came up with the Austrian General, Nugent, who occupied Pistoja. Nugent had committed the error of enclosing himself in that city, surrounded by feeble walls, having only three thousand and seventy men with him. On the borders of the Panaro and at Carpi, the Neapolitans, although inferior in number, had acted so as to acquire much advantage over the enemy; on the contrary, the royal guard in Tuscany, although superior in number to Nugent, not only did not exterminate him, but crossed the Arno and abandoned Florence, merely

because the two Generals had heard that some visionary Austrian corps were ready to take them on their rear. We had, therefore, no assistance from the royal guard when we attacked the Austrians. It is worthy of remark, that in this one instance alone, close to Pistoja, the Neapolitans had an opportunity of encountering the enemy, when it was inferior in number to themselves.

The evening was fast closing, when intelligence was brought me that the first regiment of the line, charged to defend the ford of Spilimberto, had turned its back upon the cavalry of the enemy, which had crossed the Panaro. The Colonel of this regiment had caused the arms to be piled close upon the bank of the river. The enemy opened its fire from the opposite bank, with six pieces of cannon, and our men, while fetching their arms from the ill-situated piles were exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery and fell into a state of the greatest confusion. The enemy perceiving this, sent its cavalry across the water, and the first of the line immediately fled without striking a blow. The real cause of this shameful retreat arose from the hatred felt by the Majors of that corps against the Colonel. This officer was in ill repute, even with the soldiers, but a great favourite of the King, because he boasted of his opposition to liberal principles. Of the three Majors of this corps, Astuti, who was an experienced and able officer, would alone have sufficed to repel the enemy; but he remained inactive, being bent upon the disgrace or sacrifice of the Colonel. I hastened on learning this unfortunate intelligence, and as it was now growing dark, I only took with me the first of the line which was already re-formed, being the second light regiment, to observe the Austrians who were on

the right bank, although I could not learn in what number. At the same time I wrote to Carascosa not to precipitate any thing, as I could at all events oppose the progress of the enemy.

On the following morning I received orders to retreat to the right of the Reno, which runs at a short distance from Bologna, whither Carascosa and the remainder of the troops soon joined me. The King arrived a short time after, and after exhorting me to keep my eyes upon the stone bridge, at the side of the mountain, he withdrew to Bologna followed by Carascosa. I was now in full command of the entire division, of a regiment of lancers, and I know not how many pieces of cannon under the direction of the brave Major of Artillery, Riario Sforza. I rejoiced in the absence of Carascosa, because I was dying to raise, in my own way, the spirits of the first of the line, depressed by the flight of the preceding day, without doing which, indeed, we must even have retreated from the right of the Panaro, since both Occhiobello and Ferrara had been abandoned.

I ordered the Colonel of the first regiment of the line to be arrested, and forming the first of the line into a column, ended my address to them by saying, that blood alone could efface so shameful a stain, and that I hoped that the enemy might give me an opportunity during the day of washing away that which marked this regiment. Putting my horse to its full speed, I hastened to the bridge at the foot of the mountain, and stationing there fifteen companies and two pieces of artillery, I gave orders that it should be barricaded by large trees, felled for the purpose; and directed the officer who commanded the post, that he should send me a couple of lancers, every half-hour, as soon as the enemy appeared in sight,

that I might be cognizant of its movements. On my return to the high road, I found the Austrians, according to their usual custom, making their first exploration with a very small number of troops. I had left Astuti at the foot of the bridge, on the left side of the Reno, with his battalion of the first regiment of the line. He had declared that he would not quit the advanced posts during the day, unless wounded. In truth, he behaved extremely well, for, protected by a few old houses, he repulsed both the infantry and the cavalry of the enemy, losing fifty men; but the enemy as it retreated left a still greater number of killed behind them.

At the sound of the first cannon, a great many young men from Bologna hastened to my camp. I listened with pleasure to the enthusiasm with which they spoke of my battalion on the other side of the river. In the meanwhile, addressing myself to the other two battalions of the first of the line, I said: "Your comrades have done half the work, you will accomplish the remainder before long, and the King and Italy will learn, at the same moment, your weakness of yesterday and the glory you have acquired to-day." The Bolognese, with much urbanity and kindness, assisted in conveying the wounded in their arms behind the camp. The King sent from Bologna to inform himself of the state of things, and I replied that all was going on well. His Majesty kept in council Carascosa, Ambrosio, and some other general officers, besides his ministers, and several of the municipal authorities of the city of Bologna.

Before two or three hours had elapsed, the main body of the enemy advanced, so that ere long their forces amounted to nearly eighteen thousand

men. Two things kept me in great uneasiness, the stone bridge at the foot of the mountain, and the expected arrival of the King; who, regardless of our inferior number, would have acted upon the offensive at a most ill-timed moment. The French, whilst admiring his valour and the justness of his eye in great manœuvres, nevertheless call him, "*Le boucher de l'armée.*" He did not come, however, thanks to the favourable intelligence I sent him every moment. Fortunately, the Reno was not fordable at that time, so that however numerous the Austrian forces were, my troops were so well disposed to fight, and in so excellent a position to do so, that the former never could have succeeded in taking the bridge. I proceeded across the side of the river with the other two battalions of the first of the line, and with two more taken from the excellent light regiment, leaving my colleague, General de Gennaro, with the reserve. Having so done, to deprive my followers of all hope of recrossing the bridge, I ordered it to be loaded with large artillery trains, and taking the large key which locked the gate of the bridge, I showed it jestingly to the soldiers, telling them that none but good swimmers could safely turn their backs upon the enemy. The Austrians exerted their utmost to reach the bridge: cavalry charges, uninterrupted fire from the artillery, volleys of musquetry, and columns sent forward against it, all were in vain, for my troops were partly supported by the houses which flanked the road, and the others were concealed by large trenches. Thus situated, my fire was far more effective than that of the enemy, who were entirely exposed.

The King, finding that the Austrians did not slacken their assault, sent his own nephew, General Bonafoux,

his aide-de-camp, to me. I caused the gate of the bridge to be opened to him, and when he had reached the left bank, where musket and cannon-balls were raining, I desired him to observe how well the first of the line fought, and how they were about to recover the esteem they had forfeited on the preceding day. Bonafoux informed me that the circumstance of the wind blowing in the direction from Bologna to the Reno, prevented the report of so heavy a fire from reaching the city. I requested him to inform his Majesty that for that day, at least, the Austrians would not cross the river. The contest lasted at least six hours. I was once obliged to summon to my assistance the Calabrese battalion, from the fifth regiment of the line, commanded by General de Gennaro, so closely did the enemy, especially the cavalry, press upon me. Astuti, more than once, lowered the bayonets of the platoons against the cavalry, and thus barred their passage across the high-road. With the setting sun, the enemy slackened their exertions, although the Austrian rifles kept up a continued fire till an advanced hour of the night. When Carascosa arrived, I made him acquainted with what had occurred, and he approved of my proceedings, saying, he would inform the King verbally of the events of that hot day. Joachim embraced me, and immediately appointed me one of his aides-de-camp, which he had not done heretofore, because of our political differences. I really expected being, after my brother Florestano, the senior major-general, the Prince would have promoted me to the rank of lieutenant-general, and he would doubtless have done so, had I breathed a single word upon the subject. But amongst his aides-de-camp, generals of division, and major-generals, there

were so many men without ability, that he who would serve his country, must do so regardless of promotion. I asked the King to give me Commanders' crosses, for the Colonels Palma and Sciudi, and for Major Astuti, which he immediately granted. The battle of the Reno, when we bear in mind the time it lasted, and the inferiority of our numbers, reflects great honour upon the Neapolitan army, which from that day recovered its energy and spirit. The historian, Colletta—wherefore, I leave others to judge—merely alludes to this day, and attributes all the merit of it to Carascosa, saying no more about myself than if I had been in my bed. In order to do justice to Carascosa, as well as to open the eyes of the public to the nature of Colletta's work, I here insert a postcript, written by Carascosa himself, to a letter he directed to me on the evening of the 15th of April, which letter is still in my possession. The postcript says: "*Owing to my absence, you have had the entire direction of the affair, which reflects, therefore, more glory upon you.*"

On the 16th of April, at early dawn, accompanied by the rear-guard, I crossed the city of Bologna in profound silence, after having abandoned the right bank of the Reno. On the second of the same month, we had been received in this city with acclamations of joy by a people who awaited their liberty from our hands. I envied the fate of my companions, who had lost their lives a few hours before in the noble cause of the independence of Italy.

CHAPTER III.

1815.

Continued retreat of the army—Various partial encounters with the enemy—The Royal Guard retreats and joins the King—Battle of Macerata—My brother made Lieutenant-General on the field of battle—The English threaten to land from Sicily—Two-thirds of the army disbanded—I am promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General—The King finds himself constrained to embark—Treaty of Casa Lanza with the Austrians—Entrance of the Austrians into the capital—Reflections on the Neapolitan troops in the time of Charles V. and his successors—Opinion of Napoleon upon the Neapolitan army of King Joachim.

In a preceding chapter, I have indicated the numerical forces which Joachim might have collected in the kingdom of Naples and in Italy; by means of which he might easily, in more than one instance, have triumphed over the Austrians. But reduced as he was to thirty thousand men, yet having the Alps behind them, they might still have produced an electric effect, from Reggio, in Calabria, to Turin, and they would soon have amounted to double that number; for the veterans of the former army of Italy and of Piedmont would have considerably increased the Neapolitan army; they would also have been joined by five or six thousand French, and these would have more than sufficed to drive the Austrians out of Italy. It never seemed to enter into the mind of Joachim, that his

best chance of maintaining his throne, was to keep his army out of the kingdom. His genius was not equal to conceive, or to execute so vast a plan; and finding himself compelled to abandon the right bank of the Po, in consequence of the scattered position of his troops, it would, in my opinion, have been a better plan to have recalled the royal guard to Bologna. Supported by that city, he might have offered battle to the enemy, instead of drawing near to the frontier of the kingdom, which, as I conceive, he ought to have avoided, as an expert mariner steers clear of a bed of rocks. The nature of the country round Bologna is such as to preclude all possibility of the cavalry acting with advantage, while it obliges the infantry to combat in detail. During the campaign of the preceding year, the Austrian soldiers were in the habit of exclaiming, that the Austrian cavalry, and the Neapolitan infantry, were always sure of victory. It was more than probable that the troops which, though inferior in number, had shown such bravery when opposed to the Austrians upon the Panaro near Occhiobello, and at Carpi on the Reno, would have gained a battle, had it been offered by the King, under the walls of the faithful city of Bologna, from whence he could have received every kind of assistance.

In the council which he held in this city, the King stated that England had broken the truce; that the royal guard which ought to have fought Nugent in Tuscany had retreated, and that the Italians had not assembled under our banner as they promised to do. Joachim should have anticipated the hostility of England and of the King of Sicily. It was his own fault that he had selected inexperienced generals to command his guard, and that, in default of proper measures,

he had only assembled about four hundred veterans in Bologna instead of several thousands which he might have had. To these three principal causes did Joachim attribute the necessity of continuing his retreat towards Cesena, and he gave orders that the guard which had evacuated Tuscany should cross the Appennines in the direction of Perugia. Not a single voice in the council exclaimed, "Sire, the more the Anglo-Sicilians threaten the kingdom, the greater the necessity for you to keep at a distance."

The hospitals were evacuated, and our army continued to retreat: no molestation was offered until it found itself between the Ronco and the Savio which touches Cesena. The Ronco can always be forded as far as the bridge on the high road; but from that point to the sea, it ceases to be fordable in all seasons. It appeared as if the King's intentions were to wait for the enemy between these two rivers, and the engineers were employed to construct batteries upon the Savio.

The Austian army, commanded by General Bianchi, was divided into two corps immediately after its arrival in Bologna. The more considerable of the two, composed of about twenty-two thousand men, comprising the column of General Nugent, and led by Bianchi himself, took the long tour of Tuscany. The second corps commanded by Neiperg, and amounting to about sixteen thousand men, kept constantly in sight of our army, and sent off considerable detachments to the Appennines, by which it was flanked on the right. The above corps of sixteen thousand men was followed by another Austrian division of about eight thousand men, under the command of General Best. In the meanwhile, Neiperg had occupied Forli for three days; and

on the 20th of April he evinced some intention of renouncing his inaction. He opened a heavy fire from the batteries on the left bank of the Ronco, under the cover of which two battalions and one squadron crossed to the opposite bank which was defended by General Lecchi with the third division. The Austrians were repulsed, and compelled to recross the Ronco: at midnight, however, they again passed it in silence, and landed at a short distance from our camp. The force which had crossed the river consisted of two squadrons of hussars, and five battalions which were immediately formed into a square. The brave Pole, Major Malusky, officer of ordnance to the King, and who commanded the rear-guard of General Lecchi, soon discovered the movement of the enemy. He immediately placed one battalion, in order of battle, in the river itself, while with the other and the cavalry he attacked the enemy in front.

The Austrians finding themselves thus assailed, both in front and flank, and being prevented by the darkness of the night from knowing the real force of their assailants, fell into a state of great confusion, and hastened to cross the river again. In this encounter, between killed, wounded, and prisoners, the enemy suffered a great loss, while we had only to regret the loss of fifty. Thus the rear-guard of the third division, amounting to only fourteen hundred men, repulsed an enemy of four thousand. It is necessary to admit, however, that the third division must have been prompted by their native courage alone to such noble feats, for, (as will be seen hereafter), Lecchi had completely lost his active and valiant spirit, and of the Major-Generals, one was wholly inexperienced, whilst the other, the Marchese Majo, one of the King's

favourites, enjoyed an unrivalled reputation for incapacity.

These two attempts made by the enemy, induced the King to believe that they meant to give battle. On the 22nd, he gave orders for the second and third divisions to be drawn out in order of battle across the high-road, having Bertinoro on their left; the cavalry and the third division formed themselves into a second line. The order maintained by these troops, and the elegance of their uniforms gave them a noble appearance, while the recollection of the recent conflict in which they had proved themselves so superior to the enemy, made me look on them unceasingly with affectionate admiration. The King soon arrived attended by his staff. The undulations of the ground over which he was passing, one minute concealed and then displayed to view the brave Captain whose valour had decided the victory in so many battles. As he passed by the spot where I stood, I said to him, "This will be a bright day for you and for Italy, Sire." "Je le crois aussi!" he replied, with the smile so peculiar to himself. In the midst of such recollections that still tear my heart, which seems born to suffer, I recal several particulars which I would willingly forget.

Being in front of my soldiers, I said to them, "My children, we are going to have a bright and glorious day." Several answered in an under-tone, "No doubt of it, for the sun begins to shine." Such a reply would be thought witty, had it been pronounced in the French ranks; but after our misfortunes, this was recorded by several officers to calumniate our soldiers; or still worse, to pay their court to many of the Generals, some of whom were wholly worthless, while others, although they had done their duty, were well pleased to

blacken the Neapolitan name, and to accuse them of being deficient in constancy of patriotism. It happens with nations as with individuals, when once fallen from a high position, they are despised by those very persons who ought most to venerate them.

Many hours elapsed in vain expectation of the enemy's attack, and our soldiers hissed, as in derision, at their delay. The King put his horse into a gallop, and went to reconnoitre the movements of the Austrians. From what he observed, he lost all hope of an immediate attack. This circumspection in the enemy induced Joachim to suppose that they were desirous of coming to an arrangement; under this impression, he sent off one of the officers of his household, Colonel Carafa, with a letter containing the proposal of a truce. Before this officer could return, I drew near to the King, who said to me, "We have waited for the enemy; but though stronger in numbers than ourselves, they hesitate to come to an engagement." We might have been the first to attack, but in such a case we should have lost between killed and wounded at least a thousand men without obtaining any decisive result. Carafa returned soon after from the Austrian camp with a civil answer, but one that was in the negative.

The King was not a little surprised to discover that the troops opposed to him were not commanded by the General-in-chief, Frimont, but by Neiperg, who, as will shortly be seen, was under the orders of General Bianchi. The astonishment of Joachim arose from his belief that he beheld all the Austrian forces drawn out before him. I found later, much to my concern, either that he was short of spies, or that he was shamefully ill served by those about him, for he remained

long in ignorance of the direction taken by the Austrian troops, which had just entered Bologna. The enemy committed a serious fault in dividing their forces, and only sending Neiperg after the King with sixteen thousand men; for these could derive no assistance from the principal corps, which was then marching from Tuscany towards Perugia. Had Joachim been acquainted with the movements of the Austrians, and had he sent troops over the mountains on the right of Neiperg, while with his usual impetuosity, at the head of the remainder of his forces, he opened an attack in front of the enemy, either he would have routed them on the first day, or else by following them up without allowing them an instant's repose, he would have obtained the same result in two or three marches, and have found himself at Bologna, close upon General Bianchi. The consequences of such an advantage over the oppressors of Italy would probably have purchased its safety. But, such was the evil destiny of my country, not only were its forces altogether inferior to those of the enemy, but during the whole of the campaign, Joachim was compelled to fight with troops less numerous than those opposed to him.

By not attacking Neiperg resolutely on the 22nd, between the Ronco and the Savio, the King lost an excellent opportunity; for immediately after, General Best advanced to support Neiperg.

Towards the end of April, and after the losses which had been sustained, the Neapolitan army amounted to twenty-one thousand five hundred infantry, and two thousand five hundred cavalry. The three divisions of infantry, and the detached 10th of the line, amounted to eighteen thousand men; the foot-guard to three

thousand five hundred; the horse-guard and the lancers to two thousand five hundred cavalry.

The Austrian army was composed of the divisions of Mohr, Eckhardt and Nugent, under the command of General Bianchi: these were advancing across Tuscany, and amounted to twenty-four thousand men. Besides these, were three brigades under General Neiperg of sixteen thousand men, as well as a division of eight thousand led by General Best, and advancing from Bologna in the direction of Forli. The entire Austrian army comprised forty-eight thousand men, and towards the end of April it was just double that of the Neapolitans.

The author of the work to which I have already alluded, gives a very particular account of the Austrian forces, excepting those comprised in Best's division, which he only just mentions. By that statement General Neiperg's brigades contained fourteen thousand eight hundred and two men, the three divisions of Bianchi, fifteen thousand four hundred and sixty-four; and we will allow General Best's division only five thousand men, which is the lowest computation ever made of it by the Austrians. According to this author, therefore, the Austrian army amounted to at least thirty-five thousand two hundred and sixty-eight men; which is very nearly half as many again as that of Joachim.

The head-quarters of the King remained between Savignano and Rimini until the 25th. On the 23rd, a Major-General named Napolitano, who was at Cesenatico with one battalion and a squadron of lancers, was heedless enough to allow himself to be surprised by two squadrons of hussars and one of Tyrolese. Another

of our own battalions which lay encamped just outside Cesenatico, though abandoned by its leader, behaved in the bravest manner. On being suddenly attacked by the enemy's cavalry, the men formed themselves into a square, and thus repelled their assailants. In these two encounters our loss amounted to three hundred men, and that of the enemy only to fifty. If Napolitano was deficient in the qualities essential to a General, he at all events proved himself an intrepid soldier. As he was hurrying through the streets of Cesenatico to assemble his scattered troops, he met an officer of the Austrian dragoons; although the latter was well mounted and the General on foot, he laid his adversary dead at his feet. I saw the King at Savignano: his Majesty made me peruse a letter he had received from the Queen, in which she said: "Mon ami, l'Empereur ayant appris que tu t'es déclaré contre l'Autriche en est aux anges."

In the meantime, the King was obstinately bent on approaching the Neapolitan frontiers, and did not perceive that Neiperg's unwillingness to come to an engagement was the result of the strategical combinations of General Bianchi. Having marched his troops in separate divisions from the foot of the Alps, this General wished to reunite them before coming to any serious encounter, or at all events to have them sufficiently near to be of assistance to each other in case of need, as well as to surround the King. This design of the Austrian General was evident to all who were clear sighted; and their movements were full of peril to themselves, allowing ample opportunity to the enemy to fall upon either of the two corps separately: in this manner, Joachim might easily have attacked Neiperg, or he might have held him in check with a

single brigade, whilst with the rest of his army, including the guard, he could have marched against Bianchi, who had fallen into the error of weakening his column, by sending off detachments from it in various directions. It would not be possible here to explain the facility of keeping the corps of Neiperg at bay with a single brigade; suffice it, it never entered into the mind of this General thoroughly to reconnoitre his opponents, without which it is impossible to be fully acquainted with the forces of an enemy.

While in the neighbourhood of the Cattolica, the King felt some inclination to put a stop to his retrograde movements; but later, the fatal desire to draw near to the kingdom prevailed, and having put the troops in march towards Ancona, he at the same time annulled the directions which he had previously given for the construction of several batteries to defend the passes near the Cattolica.

The first division, which was the last in the retreat, reached Pesaro; my brigade, and the battalion of Major Gabriel Pépé, accompanied by a platoon of lancers, formed the rear-guard. The whole division was encamped outside of the city in the direction of Fano. I caused all the gates of Pesaro to be closed, with the exception of that leading towards Fano, and that of the Cattolica, where I stationed a chosen company, warning the Captain that the battalion of Gabriel Pépé would soon arrive, accompanied by the lancers, and that before admitting them, he should, according to the custom of war, reconnoitre them closely. After these precautions, which I particularly urged, I proceeded to the residence of my friend Giulio Perticari, who with his wife, a daughter of the poet Monti, expected me to dinner. We had scarcely

finished the soup before one of my aides-de-camp came to inform me that a report of musketry had been heard outside the city walls. At first I gave no credit to the report, but shortly after, the same officer returned to say that the discharge continued with some violence. Upon this I quitted my valued friends, promising to return in the course of a few minutes; but, alas! our separation has been eternal! Whenever I was in expectation of the enemy, I was accustomed to have a horse and a lancer in constant readiness; I galloped through the city, which was lighted, as it was night, and took the direction of the gate of the Cattolica. When I first beheld at a distance a body of cavalry rapidly advancing, I concluded they were my own troops, and decided upon censuring them severely for thus galloping through the city. An instant sufficed to show me that they were Hungarian hussars. Without hesitating a moment I turned my horse's head, and proceeded at full speed until I reached the Great Square, where I fortunately found a regiment of lancers dismounted, commanded by one of the brothers Bonafoux, nephews of the King. On hearing me shout, "to horse, to horse!" an officer of that corps asked me, with how many horse he was to follow; and I replied, with as many as he could collect, but without loss of time. I was immediately at the head of about sixteen lancers, forming two ranks. In my haste, I omitted to direct the Colonel to send more men to join me.

Passing from the front to the side of my few followers, and crying, "Long live Italy!" I caused the lances to be lowered, and found myself in front of the enemy. They immediately turned and fled, but the extreme narrowness of the street prevented their manœuvring according to rule, and they were thrown into disorder.

Twenty-four horses fell into our hands, and the hussars who owned them were either killed, wounded, or concealed in the streets of the town. Other hussars galloped off towards the gate by which they had entered, but they found it defended by our infantry, and were made prisoners. Having ascertained that the gates were all properly closed, I sent to inform Carascosa of what had taken place. This General, who could not suppose the possibility of such a surprise in a walled city, had retired to rest. I then proceeded to the gates of Fano, where I found several hundred unarmed soldiers and other persons employed about the army, who with their carriages and equipages were endeavouring to get out, in order to reach the camp. The unarmed soldiers, who found themselves in the town whither they had come to receive the distribution of wine and provisions, could do nothing better than endeavour to get back to the camp and arm themselves. But the people of Pesaro, who were not in those days animated by the sentiments which now inflame their hearts, and inexperienced in warfare, spread about a report, that a handful of Austrians had put to flight the first Neapolitan division. This division, as I have already said, and as I mean to show shortly, began and closed the campaign by successfully resisting an enemy constantly superior in number. The disorder to which I alluded, took place in the following manner. The extremity of the rear-guard under my orders was formed by the battalion commanded by Major Gabriel Pépé, and by a detachment of lancers. At nightfall these troops were at a short distance from Pesaro, when the lancers were attacked by a small squadron of Austrian hussars, who had come suddenly down upon them from the mountains. Whether from the carelessness of their

officers, or from the unexpected nature of the attack, I know not; but the lancers finding themselves suddenly assaulted in flank, advanced at full gallop upon the battalion while closely pursued by the enemy. The obscurity of the night prevented our infantry from exactly discerning the assailants from the assailed; nor had they time to form into a column, so that they fired separately and at random. The Major endeavoured to resist, and received several sabre cuts on the head, other officers were likewise wounded. The guard stationed at the city gates was not in readiness to close them, or to bar with the bayonet the passage of our lancers, or that of the Austrian hussars, and thus did the confusion originate.

I proceeded to the camp, where I caused provisions to be distributed. Before dawn, on the 28th of April, the first division moved on by order of the King as far as Sinigaglia. On my arrival there, I hastened to embrace my worthy friend Francesco Cassi, translator of Lucan; and had my soul been capable of receiving consolation, I should have derived it from the conversation of that estimable and warm-hearted patriot. The royal guard, indignant at having been obliged to quit Tuscany, through its Generals' fault, without coming to action, had joined the rest of the army by Perugia and Furlo.

On the 29th of April, the army was distributed in the following manner. The first division was at Sinigaglia, the second at Geri, and the third in the vicinity of that city. Six battalions of the guard, one of pioneers, and one of marines, were at Ancona. The cavalry of the guard, and two battalions of the 10th of the line were between Recanati and Loreto. The regiments of lancers were distributed amongst the divisions of

infantry. These amounted in all to forty-four battalions, and although weakened by illness, deaths and wounds, reckoned about twenty thousand infantry, whilst the cavalry amounted to about three thousand horse. The frontier of the kingdom, the course of the line, and the Straits of Terracina were protected by about five thousand men.

The Austrians on the 29th were disposed pretty nearly in the following manner. General Neiperg, with about sixteen thousand men, occupied the course of the Metauro and Pergola. General Best and his division formed the reserved corps of Neiperg. General Bianchi had come out of Tuscany with twenty-four thousand men, fifteen thousand of which were with him between Camerino and Tolentino, and three thousand more between Matellica and Fabbriano. Part of the other six thousand formed the column of General Nugent, near San Germano, and parts of various small columns about Sora, Terracina, Fondi and Rieti. Whilst General Bianchi kept his forces thus dispersed, losing thereby the advantage he had over us in point of numbers, the King had the option of attacking either the corps of Neiperg or of Bianchi.

Let it not be supposed that two corps thus divided could assist each other; it will soon be seen that they did not succeed in doing so. And yet an army so commanded, which was proved so inferior to us in every encounter, was destined to conquer our country and to enslave all Italy!

On the 29th, as I have already stated, General Bianchi could only dispose of fifteen thousand men, and General Neiperg could only bring to the field his sixteen thousand; since Best was in the neighbourhood of Forli with the division under his command.

On the morning of the 30th April, the Cavalry General, Napolitano, encountered the van-guard of Neiperg, which was composed of hussars and of infantry, at a short distance from Sinigaglia. The former were repelled by our horse, and the latter, forming a small square, were routed and made prisoners. These trifling disadvantages did not prevent the enemy from occupying Sinpezzano, a small village situated upon an eminence at about three miles from Sinigaglia. The next day, before dawn, I proceeded thither at the head of three battalions. I took a few prisoners, and drove away the enemy, whom I pursued until I reached the summit of a hill from whence I could discover the troops of General Neiperg, upon an open plain leading to the sea, on the side of the high road. They were drawn out in order of battle, and amounted to about sixteen thousand men. I could see them distinctly enough to be able to count their battalions. They stood on the very spot on which Asdrubal, at the head of fifty thousand men, was defeated and killed by the Consuls Claudius Nero and Lucius Salinator. On returning to Sinpezzano, I prepared for my defence, and even for a retreat, whilst at the same time I sent a report of what I had observed to Carascosa and informed him that Neiperg was closely surrounding me with a considerable detachment. It was scarcely dark before the enemy, who had approached the sides of the mountain, moved towards me to begin the attack. The fire on both sides, which soon became extremely warm, could be seen and heard at Sinigaglia; and Carascosa, who was about to evacuate the city, wrote to me to withdraw. The enemy, confident in their superior numbers, endeavoured to stop my retreat, but thanks to the posts which I had stationed in different

houses along the road, not only did I effect my retreat, but I caused a considerable loss to the Austrians. This did not prevent my men from falling into confusion as they entered Sinigaglia in the dark, closely pursued by the enemy, who continued firing from the left of the canal with such violence that their balls penetrated the city itself. It was amid the enemy's fire that I embraced, perhaps for the last time, my dear friend Cassi;—I say, *perhaps*, because we are still both alive. The first division, by command of the King, quitted Sinigaglia on the morning of the 2nd of May, and reached Ancona on the same day.

Although I was not, neither was the first division, present at the battle of Macerata, I can nevertheless relate the minutest particulars concerning it, for not only have I spoken with the King upon the subject, but I have likewise talked with officers of every rank, and soldiers upon the subject. When I was at Paris I fell in with a manuscript by General Ambrosio which relates the whole campaign of 1815.

I have already explained what were the respective positions occupied by the Austrians and Neapolitans on the 29th of April. Several movements were made on both sides between the 30th of April and the 1st of May, but without resulting in any engagement. General Neiperg, with the best part of his corps, arrived at Geri on the 2nd of May. He continued separated from Bianchi, who with fifteen thousand men, encamped on this side of Tolentino, which he had caused to be fortified, and he advanced on the same day with half his forces to about four miles from Macerata. The King decided upon keeping Neiperg in check, and upon attacking Bianchi, towards whom he advanced on the 2nd, for the in-

dispensable purpose of reconnoitering his foe. His Majesty had with him nine squadrons of the guard, the 10th of the line, and eight battalions of the second division, in all seven or eight thousand men. He gave orders that the six battalions of the guard, and the other four belonging to the second division should advance to support him; that Lecchi, with seven battalions of the third division, and four squadrons should hold himself in readiness to move on Macerata; and that five other of his battalions, commanded by General Carafa, should occupy Filostrana; finally, that the first division should leave the front of the line in Ancona, and be with the other three regiments at Osimo at daybreak on the 3rd. In this way Bianchi and Neiperg were perfectly separated on the 2nd, and the King decided on attacking one as soon as he should have routed the other.

In the meanwhile, during the rencontre of the 2nd of May, the King had driven back the enemy, although so superior to himself in numbers. Not satisfied with this, he attacked a strong position in front, which was obstinately defended by the Austrians, but which fell into the hands of our troops, who fought with the greatest courage; on this occasion the King behaved like a man bent upon victory or death. General Ambrosio was so severely wounded as to be obliged to withdraw, and to yield the command of the second division to the Major-General d'Aquino. Monteleone, and several other heights were taken by the Neapolitans, the whole line of which advanced towards Tolentino, maintaining most admirable order. The cavalry having charged boldly on the right, cut off a battalion of Tyrolese followed by two pieces of artillery; but not being supported by Aquino,

were obliged to abandon the prisoners and their artillery. It was said that General Bianchi himself nearly fell into our hands at the same time as the Tyrolese. The King took up his position three miles from Tolentino; the 10th of the line was placed in the van, the royal guard upon the high road, and the second division, which had been joined by the other four battalions, on the right, upon an eminence before Monteleone. In this contest, which was auspicious to us, three hundred Austrians were made prisoners, and four hundred were killed and wounded. Our loss was less serious. Joachim animated by the advantages he had gained, and having under his hand fourteen battalions of the line, six of the guard, as well as various squadrons of the guard of lancers, in all twelve thousand men, decided upon attacking Bianchi on the following day, although that General had fifteen thousand men, and the advantage of the strong positions he held. By a strange fatality, the King took more precaution that the corps of Neiperg should not escape him after he had conquered Bianchi, than he did to defeat this General. Indeed, the first division between Ancona and Osimo had nothing for it but to fall upon Neiperg towards Geri, as soon as the King should have obtained the victory over Bianchi, of which he was so very confident. The expectations of the King would infallibly have been realized, as he himself admitted, had the first division been with him on the 3rd.

On the 2nd, at break of day, an encounter took place between the Austrians and the Neapolitans. The nature of the ground was such as to cause our order of battle to threaten the left of the enemy, who manœuvred to strengthen that point. The King, who took this movement for a retreat, did not summon Lecchi

with the seven battalions and four squadrons, stationed at Macerata; he caused the guard to occupy an eminence situated just opposite his own camp, after which he took several others that were well defended, for which he stood indebted to the bayonets of the same brave guard. In the meanwhile, the left of the enemy continued to increase so considerably as to make us fear for our right. The King now despatched orders to Lecchi at Macerata to come and join him. The second division forming our right received orders to advance, so that the centre might not remain detached and unprotected, whilst at the same time it could afford support in case of need. Aquino turned a deaf ear, pretending he was in want of provisions and cartridges, and even Lecchi hesitated to begin his march, saying, that he too awaited provisions. These two Generals remained inert in their camps, whilst the centre and the left of the line were exposed to all the fury of the enemy's fire. The Austrians, conscious of the importance of the positions they had lost, now strove to recover them, and the struggle became most arduous. Four times the columns formed again and renewed the attack on both sides. The field was covered with killed and wounded; amongst the latter was General Prince Campana, who led a regiment of cavalry of the guard with the greatest bravery.

Finally, after reiterated orders, Aquino advanced: in a woody and unequal ground he formed his battalion into squares, despatching towards the plain four companies of voltigeurs, who were charged by the enemy and killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. A squadron sent by the King came to the rescue. He had ordered Aquino to attack the Austrians in their positions, flattering himself that this General would have availed

himself of such an occasion to regain the esteem of the army; but the King was mistaken. The superior force of the enemy, the strong position they held, and the weakness of Aquino, caused the second division which he unfortunately commanded to retreat in great disorder to the hill it had quitted. The son of the Duke of Roccaromana was killed by a musket-shot on this occasion. The Austrians, however, profited little or nothing by our misfortunes and errors.

An hour before this shameful affair, the King had decided upon suspending every offensive movement until the arrival of Lecchi's column. But the loss of the four companies, and the retreat of the second division stimulated Murat to acts calculated to raise the drooping spirits of his adherents. He therefore assailed several positions held by the enemy, with little if any chance of success, whilst he neglected to supersede Aquino in the command of the second division and to prevent his falling into any fresh error. The Austrians continued to remain in a state of inaction; it seemed as if the fortune which had favoured them in a thousand ways would not allow them the triumph of our humiliation. We had lost about a thousand men, the enemy's losses were perhaps even greater than ours, and the fatigue of the two armies had caused the fire to cease. It is asserted, that at that moment General Bianchi thought of retreating, and had even detached a battalion of Croatians, who went to occupy the pass on his flank. During this period of repose, the column of General Lecchi came up; but the close of day did not permit the King to attempt any new manœuvre. Among the French officers who served in our army, many signalized themselves by their bravery. I will particularise the two Colonels, Merliot and Drieux.

Whilst we were occupied in re-forming our line, two couriers arrived: one was from the Minister of War, and the other from the General who commanded the Abruzzi. The minister announced the approach towards Terracina of the Austrian column commanded by Nugent, the proclamations of this General, his intriguers with the English and with King Ferdinand, and the preparations making for the speedy invasion of the kingdom by the Anglo-Sicilian troops. The letter from the Abruzzi stated that the General had been forced to evacuate the city of Aquila and part of the province with the few troops of the line under his command, and that the civil authorities had favourably received the column of the enemy.

On hearing such melancholy intelligence, every one anticipated that the intrepid King would have renewed the assault with the audacity of courage which he had evinced in every arduous circumstance of his life. This was the more expected, that the column of Lecchi would have repaired the loss sustained by the weakness and inability of Aquino, not from any want of spirit in the troops of the second division. But Joachim, operated upon by a false process of reasoning, had persuaded himself that he should be more able to defend his crown in the interior of the kingdom, than by removing out of it. Giving up the only chance that might have saved him, namely, a renewal of the battle, in an evil moment he gave orders for the fatal retreat. Before alluding to this retreat, we recommend all Italians to peruse with attention the description of the Battle of Macerata, in the two volumes written by "an eye-witness," from which we have already quoted. Although the author is an Austrian, he does not attempt to deny that the Neapolitans fought with

the greatest courage, and that they became masters of positions extremely difficult to be taken, and which, moreover, were obstinately defended. It is necessary to state, however, that the author exaggerates at least to double its real amount, the number of our troops who bore a part in this battle. Amongst other things, he says that we had three divisions of the guard, instead of two diminished in number; and adds, that a brigade of the first division was present, while the whole of this division during the three days of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of May, was between Osimo and Ancona, and consequently at a great distance from Tolentino.

The King wrote to the General of the foot-guard to retreat as far as Monte dell' Olmo; but after mature reflection he countermanded this order, and sent a verbal message to the same General to bid him remain where he was until night. The General, however, was obstinately bent upon executing the first order without yielding any attention to the second, although he was advised by the chief of his staff to do so. This officer suggested to him, that before removing the guard, it would be more prudent to crave fresh instructions from the King, who was at a very short distance. The guard began to retreat. Both camps saw this strong position abandoned, the acquisition of which had cost the lives of so many brave men. The retreat of the foot-guard served as a signal to that of all the corps of the line. It took place in the open day under the eyes of an enemy powerful in number and elated with hopes of success. It was, however, executed with admirable order; but unfortunately at nightfall, the inexperience of several Generals spoilt everything.

Night had set in, and the King ordered that the

brigade of General Majo, belonging to the third division, should occupy Petriola; the General of the foot-guard, the bridge of Chienti; Aquino, the nearest crossway; and Livron, the camp behind that of Strongoli. General Arcovito received orders to cause the artillery and equipages to file off along the road of Porto di Civita Nuovo. The following is the mode in which these Generals executed the orders given them. Majo and his brigade entered Macerata after having abandoned the eminence of Petriola; the General of the foot-guard likewise entered that city, after leaving his troops to do what they pleased. Aquino and Medici did the same by their troops. Livron proceeded home to his own house at Macerata, which became the place of meeting of the above-mentioned Generals. It is worthy of remark, that, notwithstanding Livron's absence, the cavalry under his command maintained the most rigid discipline. Arcovito, ill-advised by an officer of engineers, directed the artillery wrongly. Provisions were wanting in Macerata, and those sent by the King into the stations indicated in his orders, did not find those troops for whom they were designed.

During the night of the 3rd of May, a most melancholy scene took place in the apartments of the King; a scene which might serve as a lesson to those Princes who bestow the highest offices of the army from the impulse of caprice. I relate what took place, to show that the misfortunes of the Neapolitan army were occasioned by the brave but unfortunate Joachim, who conferred high military rank upon good and bad officers indiscriminately; nay, who was even more prodigal to the latter. Generals Aquino and Medici enter the apartment of the King, and tell him that in

the darkness of the night, they have lost by death or captivity the main part of their soldiers, and that the others are dispersed. Whilst the King is inquiring the particulars of this disaster, the General of the foot-guard and Lecchi enter. The former says there no longer exists a single company of his regiments that is entire; the latter accuses Majo of not having encamped his brigade at Petriola, and of having forsaken him; just as if Lecchi, who was chief of the division, was not bound to have replaced the incapable Majo. Livron, not knowing what to say, protests that he could not answer for the fidelity of the horse-guard, which guard had always behaved in the most admirable manner, both before and after this event. In the manuscript of that excellent officer, General Ambrosio, these lamentable particulars are fully confirmed.

The unfortunate King, who knew the Neapolitans far better than these Generals chose to know them, gave little credit to their report. He assembled a council of war, and in discussing the facts above narrated, the contradictions which resulted from false statement were brought to light. It became very clear that the absence of the Generals and the darkness of the night had thrown the divisions into a state of confusion; that their provisions had failed, which circumstance had obliged the soldiers to go and satisfy their hunger as best they might, but that they would re-form themselves the next morning.

At break of morning, on the 4th of May, the phantoms with which the Generals had endeavoured to trouble the mind of the King were dissipated. A brigade, still complete and commanded by General Carafa, of the third division, went to occupy Mount

Olmo, on the right of the Chienti. The royal guard had encamped without its leader; the same had been done by the other divisions. The artillery and the pioneers were remarkable for the order which they maintained. But unfortunately, this good appearance could not last. The needless retreat towards the kingdom seemed to confirm the report of the invasion of the Anglo-Sicilians, and made the King's cause looked upon as lost. The sorry conduct of various Generals during the preceding night, and the confusion into which almost all the corps had fallen, tended to weaken the ties of a still imperfect discipline, which was so necessary to resist the adverse state into which we had fallen. However, the troops were formed into two columns, and moved from Macerata towards the left of the Chienti. On reaching the plain, the first column beheld the enemy drawn out in order of battle, upon the opposite bank of the river, with six hundred horse, one battalion, and three pieces of cannon. We attacked the Austrians, and were twice driven back by them. Emboldened by this advantage, the enemy became the aggressors, and turned their artillery against the Neapolitan troops in Macerata, whence they now began to retreat. The brigade of Carafa, which had taken up its position at Monteleone, did not make its appearance, although it was close upon the flank of the enemy; so that the condition of the King became extremely imminent. His Majesty then placed himself at the head of the 8th of the line, which he drew out in order of battle, opposing it to the front of the enemy. Two squadrons were placed on the right of the regiment, and orders were issued to the rest of the column to turn to the left and continue their march. The General of the foot-guard and Lecchi were commanded to

follow the same direction. Carafa appeared with his troops, although late, and our column reached the port of Civita Nuova, having lost only one piece of cannon, which we were obliged to abandon. After crossing the Chienti, the royal guard directed itself towards our frontier. Carafa was no longer obeyed; his brigade was dispersed, and his soldiers marched singly towards the frontier. All the other chiefs saw their corps more or less disbanded. The tardy Austrians, overjoyed at their unexpected good fortune, could scarcely believe their eyes on beholding the dispersion of an army which only the day before had constrained them, at the point of the bayonet, to yield almost their strongest positions.

The first division took no part in all these events. As I have already stated, it reached Osimo at dawn on the 3rd, and Carascosa was made acquainted with the advantages obtained by the King on the preceding day. His Majesty, as if he had been certain of defeating Bianchi, and fearful lest the corps of Neiperg should escape him, instead of calling Carascosa to his support, sent him orders to bid me march towards Ancona with two battalions and one squadron, to reconnoitre the movements of Neiperg, and even to attack him, if he should attempt to retreat. I began my march, elated with the successes gained by the King on the 2nd, as well as by the idea, that at the very moment of my march, we had most probably gained a battle. At our first halt, I addressed my comrades as follows: "Yesterday, our fellow soldiers most vigorously repulsed the Austrians beyond Macerata; at this very moment we have perhaps gained a decisive victory, and it will be said through all Italy, that the first division alone took no part in the glorious work of the last two days.

By heavèns! that shall not be. Let us hasten our march. I trust we shall fall in with the Austrians, and thus win our share of the approbation of our countrymen." I continued to advance rapidly towards Ancona; but not seeing any trace of the Austrian troops, I exceeded my orders and reached the entrenched camp of Ancona, which commands that place. I stopped at their camp, and desirous of obtaining some intelligence respecting the movements of the enemy, I wrote to General Monte-Major, commanding Ancona, who was unable to give me any information. He sent me an abundant supply of provisions for my troops, which I did not refuse, although I had received a distribution the same day in Osimo. During war, to exact from the soldiers that they should support the pangs of hunger in cases of need, is essential, but it is also right to give them more and better food than is prescribed by the rules, wherever it is possible to do so. Night was considerably advanced, when an aide-de-camp of Carascosa arrived, and told me to lose no time in returning to Osimo, for that the accounts received of the battle given by the King were by no means favourable. At early dawn, I had reached Osimo with my column. Carascosa communicated to me all that had taken place, adding that the King was in full retreat, and that we were to join the remains of the army at Civita Nuova on the evening of the same day. My troops had already marched sixteen miles to and from Ancona, and now it was necessary that they should march twenty-four more, to reach Civita Nuova. Our attaining it seemed extremely doubtful, for it was most likely that the Austrians would have descended to the left of the river Chienti, upon the road which borders the Adriatic. As I formed the rear-guard, and Caras-

cosa had left me all the artillery, I had very little hope of escaping being made prisoner. In this uncertainty, and depressed by a consciousness of the misfortunes of my country, I began my march.

Had Ambrosio remained in command of the second division instead of Aquino, and had Lecchi with the third division conformed to the orders of the King, and arrived at the hour he ought to have done, there is no doubt that Bianchi would have been defeated, after which Neiperg would infallibly have experienced a similar fortune. If the King had charged the division of Lecchi to remain between Ancona and Osimo, instead of that of Carascosa, and if he had kept this intelligent General and the first division with him, instead of Lecchi, there is not a shadow of doubt that we should have gained the battle of Macerata. The fact of the Austrian army, composed of veteran soldiers, being defeated in the field of battle by the Neapolitan troops, inferior in number, and young soldiers, would perhaps have been the means of Italy gaining her independence, and would certainly have ensured to her in future times the immense advantage of confidence in her own powers.

In the meanwhile, my rear-guard was not only obliged to accomplish a long march with all the impediments caused by the artillery, but I was obliged to proceed in good order, as I was liable at every moment to be attacked by the victorious Austrians. When I was half way between Osimo and Civita Nuova, I wrote to Carascosa, to beg that he would stop for me at least one hour; for what with the fatigue of my men, and the encumbrance of the artillery, it was not possible for me to advance otherwise than at a very slow pace. He replied that our situation was such, that we must not

mind the loss of the artillery, nor of the men who were unable to follow. Nor knowing what to do, I came to the conclusion of proceeding in good order, resolved to save, or to lose all. Fortunately the tardy enemy kept away, and late at night I reached the right bank of the Chiente. As if a march of thirty hours, and the necessity of crossing the river in the obscurity, had not sufficed to harass my jaded troops, there came on a heavy rain, which every now and then became a hail storm, so that we were nearly frozen in the south of Italy, on the 4th of May. I waited until day-break on the 5th to re-form my troops, who presented to my eyes a sad spectacle, which lacerated my heart. With the exception of the three regiments of the first division, none of the other corps looked like the same troops, who had accomplished a retreat of two hundred miles, and who had shown themselves in every encounter so superior to an enemy who now, without having defeated us, was advancing to enslave our country. I looked upon hundreds of brave officers, many of them of high military rank, sad and dejected, blushing at faults of which they were innocent. The foot-guard, which was dispersed, approached the Tronto; the second and third divisions were in such disorder as not to appear like the same corps. The cavalry, the pioneers and the artillery, although still together, were not the men they had been. But this army was not like that of 1799 and of 1801, wholly without patriotism; now the name of their country was in the hearts of all; they possessed the consciousness of their own strength, which some had acquired in Spain, Germany, and even more to the north; whilst almost all had gained it in the late campaigns of Italy. This made them, overwhelmed by the misery of seeing themselves

on the frontiers of their native country, in so miserable a condition, and all from want of a sufficiency of judgment.

But my soul had not yet experienced the strongest emotion it had ever laboured under, which I felt on first meeting the King. Instead of the beaming smile which was wont to illumine his countenance, even in moments of the greatest danger, the big tears trickled down his cheeks. I could not restrain my own, and instead of speaking, I advanced, took his hand and kissed it. Oh! how touched he was by this act of respectful affection on my part! Who knows, but at that moment he recollected the words that I had addressed to him in his palace, "Whenever you shall find yourself in a situation of danger, you will learn to distinguish your real friends from the friends of your fortune." He told me he was aware that the first division was uninjured, and desired me to exert every effort to assemble together the disbanded battalions. I told him that I had already put a little order into the 10th of the line, which the King directed should remain under my command. All the dispersed troops were sent on towards the Tronto, and things were so disposed, that they might be re-organized in Giulia Nuova.

On going to the King, I found Florestano with him, who after having been to the Isle of Elba with the vessel Capri, had been charged to return with it, with twelve gun-boats and a few troops, to invade and occupy Civita Vecchia. This movement having been countermanded by fresh orders, my brother had returned to the capital, whence he joined the King on the 2nd of May on the field of battle. To accomplish a movement of little importance, Joachim had deprived himself of

Florestano, who of all the generals was the one who had the most experience of war, and who combined theory with practice. Being his brother, I would not speak thus were it not that Marshal Suchet and General Rapp have said so much of him in their Memoirs as to preclude the possibility of my being suspected of partiality. Although Florestano had arrived late on the field of battle near Tolentino, he acted so well that the King promoted him to the rank of Lieutenant-General, and on the following day proposed to confer on him the command of the royal guard. Florestano would not accept it, saying that it was now too late to show that he deserved such an honour. The King from that time kept him near his person until all was lost.

In our afflicted camp, we could not understand the inaction of the Austrians. Instead of pursuing us, the forces both of Bianchi and of Neiperg were assembled in Macerata, and it seemed as though they meant to celebrate their victory in that city. The delay manifested by the enemy was such, that had we not had several worthless Generals and been threatened by the Anglo-Sicilians, we might have succeeded in re-organizing our army. The King was in hopes of assembling the dispersed troops between the Tronto and Pescara, and he told me that he expected eight thousand troops from Naples wherewith to repair the loss he had sustained. It was under such an impression that he crossed the Tronto and fixed his quarters at Guilia Nuova. These hopes of the King were indeed vain illusions. It was not possible that in a short period of time an army so weakened and in such a state of confusion could be restored to its original condition, especially when the enemy was close upon it; all that could possibly be done was to fill up the material gaps which had been

made:—to restore its moral strength was hopeless. I encamped my rear-guard upon the right bank of the Tronto and then went to see the King. A moment before my arrival, a singular scene had taken place between his Majesty and Aquino. This General, by way of justifying his negligence, had declared himself in the hour of misfortune against the King, to whom he had been so obsequious in his prosperous days, and advised him to abdicate the crown. Joachim was about to lay hold of him, but conquering his indignation he merely (though too late) deprived him of the command of the troops which he still retained. When the King related to me, in a voice agitated with emotion, the conduct of Aquino, I kissed his hand, saying, "Sire, every Neapolitan who has a heart will shed his last drop of blood for your Majesty." The King added, "Now I know my real friends." I replied, "Every soldier of honour is devoted to you at this moment. How can we ever forget your disinterestedness and the confidence you have placed in us, of which we are so proud?" I said other things in his just praise which came from the very bottom of my heart. I was no longer the *tribune;* my eyes were bathed in tears, but those of the courtiers were downcast and dry. I was not in the habit of kissing the King's hand, but I did so repeatedly now, as if in testimony of the loyalty of my affection. His Grand Equerry, the Duke of Roccaromana, told me that my conduct had been a source of great consolation to the King.

We continued our retreat without being at all molested by the enemy, to whom we could only have opposed the first division, which was at Atri. I had perceived some symptoms of discouragement, but more amongst the officers than the men; I requested permission of Caras-

cosa to assemble the officers of the whole division, and to address them in a manner suited to the circumstances. After having said enough to strengthen them in their feelings of honour and nationality, by an effort of sudden inspiration I ended my discourse prophetically. "The conqueror himself," said I, in a high voice, "if indeed our evil fortune condemns us to be conquered—will despise those officers who do not now fight to the last against him: I, who now speak to you, and who will never forsake the cause of Joachim, which national honour has rendered the cause of our country;—I shall be called to sit in judgment upon the conduct of the cowards." And this really took place, as will hereafter be seen.

I continued to close the retreat with my brigade, which was now become very weak, for the 1st of the line had remained at Ancona, the second light regiment had experienced considerable losses, and the 10th of the line, which had recently been given to me, was reduced to one quarter of its original number, from the loss which it had sustained in the battle of Macerata and from the dispersion of its men. On approaching Castel di Sangro, I saw the King again, and he presented me to General Billard, who had formerly been chief of his staff, and who had just been sent upon a mission from Napoleon. I was at this interview informed that the King had sent off General Colletta to Naples, that he might conjointly with the minister Zurla establish a Constitution, the publication of which might excite the Carbonari to take up arms. But there were numerous circumstances to frustrate such an undertaking, however laudable in itself. The Carbonari had been cruelly persecuted by the Generals who commanded the pro-

vinces, and this, too, with the King's knowledge; again, there was no time to make the kingdom acquainted with the Constitution; and, finally, the two persons to whom the King had confided the formation of it were held in very little credit. Count Zurlo was regarded as a man devoted to absolute principles, and Colletta had had much to do with the affairs of the police, and had been a reporter in those sanguinary tribunals detested by all parties.

Who would imagine that in such moments of convulsion the promised Constitution was not liberal enough to give satisfaction to the nation? So tenacious is man not to let escape from his grasp the power of which he is possessed, no matter how it may have been acquired! At all events, if the King had only published that Constitution a year before, we might, perhaps, have preserved some degree of liberty, and himself his throne; for had he not declared himself against Austria, he would have been acknowledged by all the other powers.

The first division was left at Castel di Sangro, to oppose the progress of the enemy; the command of a fourth division, which had not yet quitted the kingdom, was conferred upon the Minister of War, General Macdonald. This officer was to repel beyond the Melfa and the Leri, the column of the enemy which was advancing on that side of our frontier. On the 11th of May, the advanced posts of the enemy showed themselves at Castel di Sangro. Our first division, commanded by General Carascosa, now only reckoned three thousand men; out of these were four hundred of the former kingdom of Italy assembled in Bologna, under the orders of General Negri, which was the only assistance the King had been able to

obtain from the Italian people, between the Tronto and the Po. Carascosa withdrew from the city.

On the 15th of May, the advanced posts of the enemy were seen at Castel di Sangro. The first division, commanded by General Carascosa, did not amount to more than three thousand men, for the 1st of the line had remained at Ancona, and the division had experienced much loss in various late battles. Carascosa withdrew from the city, having first ordered me to crown the neighbouring heights with part of my brigade, whilst with the rest of the division, and a regiment of lancers, he placed himself in order of battle, in the plain which is bathed by the Sangro. Our advanced post recoiled, those of the enemy urged forward, and were in their turn driven back. The Austrians now came on with a superior force, especially of cavalry, and amounted to about six thousand men. Carascosa feigned a retreat, then, closely pursued by the cavalry of the enemy between the Sangro and the sides of the mountains, he suddenly turned round, and opened a brisk fire of musquetry from his small squares. The Hungarians were obliged to retreat, the numbers of their killed and wounded being so great. At this moment, I began my descent of the mountain towards the town, with the intention of assaulting the enemy in flank, but on seeing Carascosa retreat, instead of pursuing the Austrians, I did so likewise. Carascosa informed me that our retreat was the effect of an order from the King, to draw back towards Venafro, on account of the demonstration made by the enemy on the side of San Germano. On this occasion, Carascosa evinced great intelligence and bravery. This was our last demonstration, which, however, clearly showed what Italy might have expected from us had we been

more wisely commanded. The Austrians were not a little surprised to see the field of battle covered with their dead and wounded, at a time when our resources had led them to suppose that we were incapable of facing them.

After remaining three days occupied with nothing but plans of war, the enemy finally moved in three columns for Chieti, Aquila, and Ceprano. On the 13th of May, General Macdonald had obliged the Imperial troops to pass the Melfa; but such trifling advantages were unavailing in misfortunes like ours. The head-quarters of the first division were at Sesto. The Austrians sent thither a Major, whose name I do not recollect, to parley with us. He began by complimenting us on the affair of Castel di Sangro, and then proceeded to address General Carascosa, de Gennaro, and myself, in the name of his General-in-Chief. "Leave Joachim to his fate," said he, "and Austria will grant every thing you desire for your country, even the choice of another King." We all three replied, that we should ill serve our country by so base an action, and that it would be a most dastardly act to forsake Joachim in his misfortunes. This Major had brought two letters to Carascosa; one was from an Austrian General, and the other from the Sub-Intendant of Isernia, whose name was Milizia. The tenour of both was to exhort us to abandon the King. It was night, and I requested leave from Carascosa to proceed alone to the King, who was in Capua. I wished to communicate these two letters to him, and to tell him that we would fight in his cause to the last drop of our blood. At the same time, I was anxious to raise his drooping spirits by the proposal of a daring plan of attack against the divided columns of

the enemy, now advancing with the utmost confidence, on account of our late disasters.

The King had quitted Capua, and I found him at San Leuci. I approached his bed-side, and awoke him from a profound sleep, that he might read the two letters. As soon as he had finished the perusal of the Sub-Intendant Malizia's communication, he exclaimed, "I had heaped so many benefits upon that man!" I observed, "Your Majesty can still assemble about eighteen thousand men. You have the first division, the remains of the others, the foot-guard, the cavalry, and the column of General Macdonald. By giving them good Generals, and good superior officers, by paying up to this very day the salary of the subalterns and privates, to prove to them that the Government has confidence in itself; by publishing a proclamation adapted to the circumstances in which we are; in four or five days your Majesty will be able to fall upon one of the enemy's columns. Having attacked and routed the first, by manœuvring with your usual boldness on the rear of the others, you may in a few days drive the Austrians out of the kingdom, and such a victory will infallibly call back the deserters to the respective ranks." The King became animated as he listened to me, and the recent conflict of Castel di Sangro made him look upon the success of my plan as likely. He called Florestano, and we passed about an hour discussing the method of immediately re-organizing our eighteen thousand men into three divisions of infantry, and one of cavalry. I quitted the King in the midst of these designs: and I quitted him for ever!

On my return to Capua, I received through General Carascosa the decree by which the King promoted me

to the rank of Lieutenant-General; the same honour was likewise conferred upon the brave Filangieri, Petrinelli, and even upon Coletta.

On the same day, a little before night-fall, whilst my mind was engrossed by the combinations which had been discussed with the King during the morning, I received the unfortunate intelligence that the column of Macdonald had ceased to exist, or rather that it had been disbanded. I was informed, that when the Queen was made acquainted with this last misfortune, she exclaimed: "Macdonald est allé baisser la toile." This General, although a Neapolitan by birth, was of Scotch origin, and both physically and morally possessed most of the characteristics of that country. He was brave, intelligent, and honest, but cold as ice. He had distinguished himself during the wars of the Emperor, when he commanded a Neapolitan brigade. He was, however, little calculated for the delicate and complicated trust, under such difficult circumstances, of heading singly the column committed to his command, whilst he might have rendered great service in Macerata, had he been there with others. During the night of the 16th, he had been suddenly attacked in his camp at Mignano, from whence it had been his intention to retreat a few hours later. The enemy, whose spies had been of good service to them, took up their position at night upon several hills, surrounding our advanced posts, which they attacked in front, whilst they kept up against us a brisk fire from the hills. Our advanced posts, imagining they were entirely surrounded, took to flight and spread the alarm through the whole column. The General ordered the cavalry to charge the enemy even in the dark. The execution of this command threw us into such confusion, that our

men fought against each other for some time, thinking they were contending against the Austrians. Our column became disbanded, some deserted entirely, and others dispersed, proceeding in the greatest disorder to Capua.

After this disaster to the corps of Macdonald, our whole army was reduced to eight or nine thousand men;—one thousand of the foot-guard, three thousand of the first division, twelve hundred of the second, (the third division, commanded by Lecchi, no longer existed), the fourth division under General Macdonald, with still a thousand grenadiers of the guard, and two thousand five hundred horsemen of the guard, and of the line. The invasion of King Ferdinand and of the Anglo-Sicilian troops was expected by the whole kingdom, for proclamations and promises of a wise and just government had preceded their arrival. Prince Leopold, second son of Ferdinand, accompanied the Austrians, and the civil and military authorities of the different provinces had already sworn fidelity to him. Every hope of resisting this invasion was dead, even in the hearts of those who were most strongly imbued with patriotism. The *Tribune* himself saw no other prospect for his country but slavery and shame.

On the 18th of this unfortunate month of May, Joachim established the quarters of the remains of our army between Capua and Caserta. The command was given to Carascosa; I was made Governor of Capua and Commander of the first division. After having issued these orders, the King proceeded alone to Naples, without even being followed by a piquet of cavalry, as was the custom. The population of Naples received him, as if he had returned the conqueror of all Italy, accompanying him with enthusiastic cries of

"Viva il Re! Viva Gioachimo!" This great, but unfortunate Captain, could not refrain from tears at these heartfelt acclamations, which at such a moment could not be suspected of flattery. These touching demonstrations of gratitude and affection manifested by the population of Naples were the last recompence offered to his virtues at a moment when he was bitterly expiating his great errors. The Austrians came to reconnoitre Capua on the same day; but I drove them back, after a slight skirmish.

On the following day, the 19th May, the King gave orders to treat with the Austrians, and he named General Carascosa and the Duke of Gallo his plenipotentiaries. Whilst the former was occupied with this treaty, I assumed his duty at Capua, and every moment received sad intelligence of the remains of the army. In my capacity of Governor of Capua, I was obliged to turn my thoughts to its defence; yet two sides of the place were so feeble, as to be unable to resist an assault, and no discipline existed, except in the corps of the first division.

On the 20th of May, the Neapolitan plenipotentiaries, the Austrian Generals Bianchi and Neiperg, and Lord Burghersh, the representative of England, concluded a treaty three miles from Capua; and to say the truth, in our conquered state, and with no means of resistance, we could not have expected better; but as I shall show hereafter, the Queen was not satisfied. Gaeta, Pescara and Ancona were not comprised in the treaty. During the night of the 20th, Joachim in disguise, and accompanied by two officers of his military establishment, crossed over to the island of Ischia, from whence he embarked for France. I had a great wish to pay my respects to him once again, before he

quitted the kingdom; but had I absented myself from Capua, even for an hour, the garrison would have fallen into a state of anarchy. As to requesting to follow the King, that would not have suited my principles, for he was going to France; where as a relation and ally of Napoleon, he would never stand in need of support, or even men to pay court to him. My country being now unable to do anything for herself, my entering the French service, even had the army of Napoleon proved victorious, would have been by no means an act of political honesty. Accordingly, I resolved upon withdrawing for some time into Switzerland. The Queen embarked on board an English vessel; she was accompanied by General Macdonald and by Count Zurlo, Minister of the Interior. On the publication of the treaty of Casa Lanza, so called from the name of the proprietor of the house where it was concluded, the soldiers began to desert, saying that they did not like to serve the Austrians. They were so averse to the very name of Austrians, that I could not even keep the first division under their flag. The 2nd light regiment, the soldiers of which I had been accustomed to regard as my children, and who called me their father, could not resist the evil example set them by the other corps. I beheld with great pain, even at that moment, the dispersion of all the military corps; for the recollection of such a breach of discipline was calculated to produce a most baneful effect upon the multitude. The dispersed troops forced the gate leading in the direction of the capital, and went away firing their muskets in the air. I threw myself on horseback just outside the gates, and ordered every soldier whose eye met mine, to place himself on my right hand: none had courage to disobey my orders,

and the troops of the 2nd light regiment blushed as they obeyed my injunctions. As soon as I quitted them, however, they again deserted. I was determined to swallow the last bitter drop, and after every soldier had quitted Capua, I informed the Austrians of the fact, and directed my steps towards Naples, the population of which was maintained in order by the landholders. They had been all formed, and their names had been inscribed in a book, as forming a civic guard, but instead of serving, they paid so much money, and this sum went to pay two thousand of the poorer citizens, who attired in military uniform, performed a daily service. On this occasion, however, the landholders themselves, fearful of the disorders which might ensue, all arrived well armed to maintain good order in the capital. They were supported by a regiment of cuirassiers, which had been only recently raised, and was not yet completed, and by two regiments of lancers. Florestano, who had been made Governor of Naples, experienced no small difficulty in opposing with so small a force as he had at his disposal the risings which the adherents of the Bourbons of 1799 endeavoured to incite in the city.

The Austrians made their triumphal entrance into Naples on the 23d, having Prince Leopold at their head, who afterwards assumed the title of Prince of Salerno. Thus terminated an enterprise which was fatal to the whole of Italy. As mankind is apt to judge of things by their result, on seeing the evil termination of this campaign, in which the Neapolitans were led by a brave and warlike King, renowned for his valour; it was decided that the Neapolitan soldiers were unfitted for war. This was said of a people whose courage had been so celebrated some years before, in the days of

Championnet and Massena. No allowance was made for the inferiority of our numbers compared with that of the enemy; to the almost incredible errors of our brave King, or to the political situation of the whole of Europe.

If the sad result of this campaign which I have related, is calculated to grieve the heart of every true Italian, some comfort may be derived from the great and rapid progress made by our southern populations, in the short space of six years. I have stated in the fifteenth chapter, how much difficulty was experienced by Joachim, in 1809, in maintaining himself on the throne, in consequence of the zeal in favour of the Bourbons manifested by the people, and of their aversion to the liberal party. In 1811, although Murat was obstinately bent on not satisfying the just and wise requisitions of such a party, the multitude beginning to feel the advantages they derived from the Code Napoléon, from the abolition of feudal rights, from the reform of the clergy, and from many other improvements; not only supported Joachim upon the throne, but placed him in a condition to defy, without any great temerity, the Austrian army, so much more numerous and inured to war than his own.

As our recent and humiliating misfortunes compel us to show that they ought not to be directly ascribed to the qualities, or the peculiar character of the nation;—without repeating what has been already stated respecting the times of Masaniello, of Cardinal Ruffo, and of Massena; I will record several important particulars anterior to each of these. In the sea-fights sustained by the illustrious order of Malta, of which history is so full, the Neapolitans

always bore a prominent part; we find in the rolls of the statutes, that the first Admiral of the order was a Neapolitan.

In the army of Charles V. there were constantly Neapolitan troops commanded by Neapolitan officers. The gaining of the battle of Pavia was not only due to the bravery of Pescara, but another Neapolitan corps, commanded by the Marquis of St. Angiolo, performed prodigies of valour. St. Angiolo fought hand to hand with Francis the First, and was killed by him. A band of Neapolitan horsemen, led by a certain Castaldo, attacked the French vanguard, under the command of Marshal Chabanes, whom they took prisoner, after routing his troops.

In the Battle of Mühelberg, 24th April, 1547, when Charles V. subdued the Protestants, and took the Elector of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse prisoners, the fate of the battle was decided by the Neapolitan cavalry which crossed the Elbe in front of a numerous enemy.

Towards the end of the sixteenth century there were eight Neapolitan regiments in the service of Spain. They distinguished themselves greatly in the sieges of Ceuta and of Orano, as well as in the war with Portugal, in 1704, and especially in the War of the Succession, which broke out between Austria and Louis XIV.

Count Francis Saverio Marcelli, of Barletta, who had received seventeen wounds, served in Spain in 1697, and afterwards in the Austrian army, where he acquired the rank of Field-Marshal in 1744. He was the friend of Prince Eugene, by whom he was held in great esteem. All these facts tend to prove that the reverses

charged upon the Italians of the South, are not justly attributed to any national deficiency on their part.

If all the particulars here set forth do not suffice to destroy the calumnies of which the army, if not the whole population of the South of Italy have been the victims, I will end this chapter by producing the opinion of Napoleon of the army of Joachim Murat. Napoleon, in his earlier campaigns in Italy, when he held the rank of General of the French Republic, had seen the cavalry of King Ferdinand of the Two Sicilies fighting against him in the Austrian ranks. When he became Emperor, he could not but know the conduct of the Neapolitan troops of every arm in Spain and Germany, where they had signalized themselves, especially in the battles of Lützen and Bautzen, where he commanded in person. Not to be tedious, we will not pause to admire the bravery of a Neapolitan division during the whole siege of Dantzic.

The great Captain, in the orders which he dictated to General Authonard, aide-de-camp of the Viceroy of Italy, November 1813, at eleven o'clock in the morning, expresses himself as follows. I give his words in the language in which he expressed them, so that no doubts may arise as to their real interpretation. The original document is preserved in the archives of the War-office at Paris.

" Le Roi de Naples m'a écrit qu'il marcherait avec 30,000 hommes. S'il exécute ce mouvement, l'Italie est sauvée, car les troupes Autrichiennes ne valent pas les Néapolitaines.

" Le Roi est un homme très-brave, il mérite de la

considération. Il ne peut diriger des opérations, mais il est brave ; il anime et enlève, et mérite des égards. Il ne peut donner d'ombrage au Vice-Roi. Son rôle est à Naples, il n'en peut sortir."

The reader will remark that the circumstances in which the Emperor was placed when he dictated these words, imperatively obliged him to express his real sentiments.

CHAPTER IV.

1815—1817.

My intention of quitting the kingdom—I visit the Queen on board the English vessel—Challenge from General Lavogoyon—Great progress made in the kingdom during ten years—Death of King Joachim—Prince Canosa, Minister of Police—Origin of the Calderari—Strength acquired by the Carbonari—I spend some time at my father's country-house in the Gulf of Squillace—The Government orders a Militia to be organized—Band of Vardarelli; its origin. The Government forms a treaty with it; its end.

ALTHOUGH I still retain a most vivid recollection of the sorrow I endured on my return to Naples, it is wholly out of my power to describe it. To behold my country overrun by an army which had never beaten us, was a new and painful event; nor did I see without feelings of indignation the troops of King Ferdinand, who, after enjoying peace in Sicily, had assumed, on landing in the capital, all the insolent airs of a conqueror. Many an old man, a former officer of this King, who had attained a high military rank without ever having seen a field of battle, now girded on his unstained sword and attired himself in an old moth-eaten uniform, which hung loosely upon his time-worn person. Rather than behold the misery of my native land, I determined upon quitting it. Instigated by this determination, I wrote

to my good father to grant me an income sufficient to enable me to live in Switzerland.

The Queen of Murat was still on board an English vessel in the Bay of Naples. Although I had never been one of her partisans, I thought it my duty, now that she was under misfortune, to go and offer my respectful homage to her. Florestano accompanied me, and we were both well received. The Queen said that Joachim had spoken to her highly of both of us, and she retained us to dinner. Her Majesty complained greatly of the conduct of Colletta and Carascosa in not having strictly adhered to the orders of the King respecting the treaty of Casa Lanza. Joachim had desired that a stipulation in favour of his family should have been made, and this was not done. I knew not what to say; in justification of Colletta, nor did I care to make any, but I defended Carascosa to the best of my power, recalling many instances of his brilliant conduct during the late campaign: I pleaded his cause so earnestly, that the Queen permitted me to inform him that she would receive him whenever he came to pay his respects to her. This Princess believed, or affected to believe, that she should return to Naples in the course of four months, in the event of the Austrians being driven out of Italy by Napoleon; on the contrary, it was our persuasion that Joachim, once fallen from the throne, would not again receive support from Napoleon, should fortune again favour him.

On the next day, the French General Lavogoyon, whilst dining with my brother and myself, began to speak of Carascosa in the most unfavourable terms, even denying him the military capacity which he unquestionably possessed. I grew so warm in his defence, that the affair ended by our agreeing to meet on the following

day. My adversary's second was the Prince Cariati, and mine, Carascosa himself. We took the buttons off a couple of foils belonging to General Filangieri, who was then confined to his bed by his wounds. Although this officer had killed General Franceschi in a duel, he blamed me greatly for being always ready to seek a quarrel. When we reached the spot, Carascosa and Cariati, who were aware that Lavogoyon was obliged to conceal himself to avoid being sent away to Austria, made every possible effort to prevent the duel. As soon as they had definitively and amicably settled the affair, I joined Florestano in the endeavour to keep concealed Lavogoyon, who was his intimate friend. Some days after, my brother saw him embark for Toulon, as he was anxious to return to France to serve his country. Before he could succeed in effecting his departure, Lavogoyon had lain concealed in the house of the Marchesa Cavalcanti, niece of the Cavalier Luigi Medici, then Prime Minister. This General was one of the handsomest men of his time. Having lived in the intimacy of Joachim and his Queen, he related to me particulars respecting the Court, and especially of the Queen, which I could scarcely credit, although they were quite true. The Princess lived in constant expectation of the death of her husband, though he was still in the prime of life. By virtue of one of Napoleon's extraordinary decrees, his sister, in the event of her becoming a widow, was to inherit the crown in preference to her children.

I had formed the plan of embarking for Genoa and proceeding thence into Switzerland. My father was not extremely generous in his allowance; but I doubtless appeared in his eyes as the most extravagant of men, in renouncing the dignity of Lieutenant-General at the age of thirty-two years. My friends could not

bear to hear of my adopting such a determination; but my repugnance to serve under the Bourbons was extreme; and could I have forgotten the Fossa del Maritimo, I could never have driven from my mind the recollections of 1799. The magnanimous victims of that period were constantly in my sight, and remain so up to the present day. By the treaty of Casa Lanza, all the officers of the disbanded army retained their military rank. I was not averse to the Bourbons out of any dread of their increasing a tyranny which was inconsistent with the times, but because I felt convinced that under their sway we should go back at least a century.

General Ambrosio, whose brother, Paolo, was secretary to the Prince of Salerno, was minutely acquainted with the Austrian policy of the time. I requested him to ascertain for me whether I should obtain a passport for Switzerland if I asked for it. The result of his inquiries was, that were I to manifest any intention of quitting the country I should assuredly be sent to an Austrian fortress; for it would be impossible to make the Neapolitan Government believe that I did not mean to join Joachim, in the hope of returning to the kingdom with him, should fortune favour Napoleon in the war which was then pending. This last circumstance made me give up all idea of quitting my native land.

I was the last but one, and Florestano the last of all *Murattini* Generals—for such was the name given us—who presented themselves to the Prince of Salerno. His Royal Highness was by no means distinguished by any great elevation of mind, but his manners were affable and polite, and his ideas were in accordance with the age in which he lived. No one could have supposed him the son of the King who had reigned in 1799.

Speaking of the wife of Murat, the Prince of Salerno designated her by the title of Queen. We talked a great deal respecting the late unfortunate campaign. He bestowed great praise upon our late army, and promised me that he would get published in London and Holland a memorial, with which he asked me to furnish him, respecting the principal battles which were honourable to the Neapolitan name. I remarked that on this occasion I was admitted to see the Prince before any of the other Generals who had returned from Sicily, and who with me awaited an audience; and, finally, I was informed by Paolo Ambrosio that Florestano and myself had gained the good-will of Prince Leopold of Salerno.

We had made more progress on this side of the Straits within the space of ten years, than our ancestors had done in three centuries. We had acquired the French civil, criminal, and commercial code; we had abolished the feudal system, which was superseded by an administration similar to that of the French Empire; and our army was likewise organized upon the same footing as that of France. We had a National Guard, composed of all classes; the clergy was almost entirely abolished, and probably for ever, as they had been deprived of the ill-acquired wealth they had accumulated. All corruption on the part of magistrates was done away with by a more careful selection of the men raised to so important an office, and by the improved method with which justice was administered. Great fears were entertained, lest King Ferdinand, on his arrival from Sicily, influenced by his unfortunate disposition or of the evil advice of his counsellors, should partly destroy our social amelioration.

On the 6th of June, this King landed at Portici on

his return from Sicily, where all the citizens of every civil class were admitted to pay their compliments to him. All the general officers, including those who had come over from Sicily, and those who had belonged to the late army, also proceeded thither in acceptance of a special invitation addressed to each of us. I went with the rest. The King did not seem to make any difference between his old officers and his new, although the former had been his companions in misfortune, and the latter had made war against him during ten years. Such was not the case with his followers, whom we *Murattini* had styled *Fedeloni;* these did not scruple to manifest their rancour against us, which was all the deeper from originating in a feeling of jealousy of our rank and credit, at which they aimed, not indeed as the reward of their military merit, but of their fidelity to the person of the King.

I had foreseen that when King Ferdinand returned to the throne of Naples, his government would make all those of the opposite party feel keenly that they were endured but not liked; and that such was the case was very soon apparent. The King manifested a great predilection for those who had accompanied him into Sicily; or, who having remained on this side of the Strait had maintained their fidelity to his cause. None but the soldiers who had returned from that island were admitted into the royal guard; all the brigadiers and major-generals who had been there were promoted one or two degrees, to the detriment of Murat's Generals. A great many promotions likewise took place amongst the superior officers and subalterns, who had served beyond the Straits, to reward their fidelity to the Court.

The fortress of Pescara, Civitella del Trento, and

Ancona, surrendered at the first intimation. Such was not the case however with that of Gaeta: General Begani, who commanded the fortress, would not hear of yielding; nor did he surrender until after the battle of Waterloo. He acquired the reputation of a brave and honourable soldier by his conduct on this occasion. It is to be regretted that, five years later, when his country, not a fugitive King, was in question, he did not act in a manner calculated to maintain the reputation he had acquired.

Those persons holding civil employments, and who had been included in the protection granted by the treaty of Casa Lanza, were deprived of their situations, and replaced by men devoted to the new order of things. In the island itself, as well as on this side of the Straits, all the citizens of the more intelligent class, were far from sharing this devotion; accordingly, a very notable deterioration in the army, the civil administration, and even in the judicial branch was now perceptible. The army, instead of being governed by a Minister of War, was now in the hands of a Supreme Council, which was a mere parody of the Aulic Council of Vienna. The nominal president of this council was the Prince of Salerno; the vice-president a certain Marquis de Saint Claire, an old French, *émigré* and a great favourite of Queen Caroline, (this Princess had just breathed her last at Vienna), who from a subaltern standing in the army had attained the rank of Lieutenant-General, without ever having been in a field of battle. Four other Lieutenant-Generals were likewise elected members of this Council; two had come over from Sicily, and two had served under Joachim. These last were Generals Filangieri and Ambrosio. The selection of these officers was a good one, only that, being both

equally anxious to prove themselves more Bourbonian than their colleagues, they fell considerably in the public estimation. During the reign of Joachim, the population of Naples had found much to criticise in his conduct, as well as in that of his civil and military officers. But now, when instead of this Prince, Ferdinand and his followers assumed the command, the people perceived to their cost the sad exchange they had made, and all the popular feeling was in favour of the *Murattini*.

My days passed sadly, and the only comfort I experienced was derived from the company of my brother, the Cavalier Alvito, and of my companion in exile, Gaetano Coppola. Our friendship was strengthened by the liberty with which we could converse together respecting the unfortunate state of the times in which we lived. To my great astonishment, I was made by the Supreme Council of War, president of a commission, composed of generals and colonels of the dissolved army, who were to sit in judgment upon about two hundred officers, who were accused of misconduct and incapacity during the late campaign. At first I was inclined to believe that this was a jest of Ambrosio and Filangieri; but upon examining more attentively my appointment, and the instructions accompanying it, signed by the vice-president, I perceived that it could not be a joke. The King evinced much good sense by resorting to this measure; for, constrained as he was by Austria and by circumstances, to maintain under his banner the officers who had fought to keep him from the throne, he was at least certain of retaining only the good ones. I now recalled to my mind the prophecy I had pronounced at Atri in the Abruzzi to the officers of the first division.

The commission over which I presided might have rendered a great service to the army by making public its judgment upon the conduct of all the officers who had behaved ill. But unfortunately none were submitted to the judgment of the commission, but those against whose conduct there existed an accusation from the commander of a corps, or from a general. Thus, many officers who richly deserved to be brought before the commission, escaped with impunity, because in the hurry of the campaign, no impeachment had been brought against them. Amongst such may be classed several generals. It must be observed likewise that in the list of officers who had come over from Sicily, many were more worthless than those brought to judgment.

I accepted the charge entrusted to me, reflecting that although it might not be within the scope of my power to purge the army of all the bad officers it contained, I should at least succeed in diminishing their number. The desire to acquit was so prevalent with men accustomed to feel more pity for individuals than interest in the public welfare, that I was obliged to address my colleagues more than once to induce them to prefer justice to an ill-advised sentiment of misplaced lenity. The first sentences pronounced having been severe and just, the others were necessarily so; for those who had not succeeded in saving their *protégés* would not allow partiality to be shown to any others. A circumstance occurred which disarmed those who had accused me of severity, and won for me much public approbation. Major Patrizio, accused of having surrendered the castle of Aquila, was brother to the Marquis of the same name, extremely attached to the King, and who was greatly beloved by that Prince.

The Marquis intreated Ferdinand, not only to exercise his elemency in behalf of his *Murattino* brother, but not to allow that a stain should fall on any member of the Patrizio family.

Whilst I was sitting, I received a letter from the President of the Supreme Council, enjoining me to suspend the judgment of Patrizio until further orders. As this officer had many protectors in the commission, without saying anything respecting the letter, I set aside for the present the other judgments, and called for that of Patrizio, who was declared guilty of all that had been charged upon him. I immediately forwarded this decision to the President of the Supreme Council, to whom I wrote that Patrizio had been condemned before his letter arrived. Everybody saw clearly enough how the affair had been managed, and even the King himself approved of the result.

The commission over which I presided was likewise instructed to verify the legality and the titles of the ranks conferred by Joachim during the late campaign, as a reward for distinguished conduct, which necessary process, owing to lack of time, had not been duly confirmed by regular brevets. King Ferdinand showed much equity on this occasion; for he might easily have refused to recognise promotions not yet warranted by a brevet. The commission as in duty bound, acted up to the intentions of the new Government, and after terminating its labours, was dissolved. I now found myself for the first time after so many years, entirely free from business of any kind; and I might have enjoyed the charms of leisure, had not my soul been tortured by the wretched condition into which my country had fallen.

Ferdinand's return had brought with it the most un-

fortunate change in the mode of government. The immense sums of money paid into the hands of Austria tended to impoverish the nation, the more so indeed from the excessive avarice of the Austrian troops then in the kingdom, who spent no more than they could possibly help. The magistracy had ceased to possess its former integrity. Many worthy magistrates had been superseded by sordid, ignorant men, who from having been fugitives in Sicily, or out of employment for many years, were now bent upon enriching themselves all at once, and at the expense of their honesty. In consequence of the weakness of the administration, the whole kingdom was overrun by banditti, and the National Guard having been disbanded, it was extremely difficult to remedy this evil and destroy the malefactors. Military commissions were revived in the provinces; but these caused more disturbance to the peaceable than to the offenders.

As much doubt was still entertained respecting the result of Napoeon's struggle against the Allied Powers, the Government mistrusted the officers who had served Murat, and could draw no advantage from the *Fedeloni* because of their great incapacity. Such conduct on the part of the King and ministers had made the people dissatisfied with the present, and alarmed for the future. Things were in this state when the Battle of Waterloo took place. This new triumph of the allied armies calmed the fears of the King, who continued to manifest his affectionate feelings towards his own followers, and his aversion to us of the opposite party; thus deviating at once from the principles of politics which the Allied Powers had pointed out to him.

The leisure I now enjoyed was a most painful one,

which experienced no relief from reading or philosophical reflections. However, as if the troubles which harassed my mind were insufficient, I was afflicted by a new and more acute blow, the effect of which, though rendered less intense by time, will never be erased from my heart. Towards the 12th October of the year 1815, I went one evening to visit the Duke of Campo Chiaro, who said to me, "Joachim has committed his last act of folly; he has landed at Pizzo, and has been arrested, and they will inevitably put him to death." I was overwhelmed by this intelligence: during the whole course of the night the image of Joachim was constantly before my eyes. The following day, Campo Chiaro corroborated the intelligence he had already given me, and two days later it was known that the brave and chivalrous Murat had been shot. This event plunged me for a long time into such a state of profound sadness as may be felt, but never described. Florestano, greatly affected likewise, advised me to keep my chamber. The death of Murat has been variously related, and it casts as deep a stain upon the name of King Ferdinand, as the no less infamous death of the youthful Conradin did upon the brother of St. Louis, Charles of Anjou, King of Naples.

The tragical and undeserved death of Joachim has, as I have already said been often described; what I have to say upon it is exact and incontestable.

Murat sailed from the Island of Ischia and landed at Frejus on the 28th of May. Many have said that, uncertain how he might be received by Napoleon, he did not proceed to Paris. This does not seem at all likely, seeing that Joachim had been in constant correspondence with Napoleon during all the time of his stay at the Isle of Elba. It is, however, extremely probable

that the Emperor, being aware how greatly his Marshal and the whole of France blamed the alliance which had been formed by Murat with Austria the previous year, would not dare to confer upon him one of his first commands, such as that of the French cavalry. Joachim stopped therefore at a village in the neighbourhood of Toulon. On learning the loss of the Battle of Waterloo, he exclaimed to his principal equerry, the Duke of Roccaromana, "had I led the cavalry, the battle would have been won." The same opinion was likewise expressed by Napoleon at St. Helena; and many years later at Paris, I heard General Flaxo assert a similar conviction. So useful in the field was this brave Prince under the command of a man of genius!

When the Bourbons returned to France, the inhabitants of Provence showed the most cruel animosity against all who were, or had been devoted to the Empire, so that the life of Joachim was placed in great peril. To avoid the fate which threatened him, and to evade the strict search set on foot by an old *émigré* who sought his life, the unfortunate King was obliged to conceal himself. The conduct of this *émigré* was the more atrocious, that during the time of the Empire Joachim had saved him from the guillotine. The Duke of Roccaromana and the Prince Ischitella, neither of whom had quitted the King from the moment of his departure from Naples, hired a vessel, on board of which they lay in waiting for him during the night in the neighbourhood of an isolated shore. By some misunderstanding the ship did not come to the place where the King was expecting it; after passing the night on the borders of the sea, Joachim was obliged when it became light, to enter a vineyard, where he found a temporary refuge in the hut of a peasant.

This man had been a soldier; he recognised Murat and saved him—for the moment, at least—from the savage fury of his enemies, who in that province were so blood-thirsty, that about the same period they inhumanly murdered Marshal Brune at Avignon. The terror inspired by the Bourbons was not such, however, as to prevent three naval officers from attempting, at the peril of their lives, to ensure the safety of the hunted Prince. For this purpose they purchased in the neighbourhood of Hyères a large boat, with which they immediately put off to sea. Joachim sat in the fore-part of the ship overcome by sorrow, and driven by sad experience to mistrust even his three saviours. To protect himself against them, he held his loaded pistols in his hands, and even feared to partake of the food they offered him.

These young men, painfully affected by such a want of confidence, were heard to exclaim against their cruel fate, which caused them to be dreaded as assassins by the man for whose safety they were exposing their lives and liberties. Murat, moved by this touching exclamation, threw down his pistols, and embracing his generous deliverers asked to share their food. A violent hurricane arose, placing the little vessel in great danger whilst it was still at a considerable distance from Corsica, which was its destination. The storm so increased that they must inevitably have perished, had they not been taken up by a courier vessel proceeding from Marseilles to Bastia, which landed in the capital of Corsica.

The Bourbon Government was not yet well-established in this island. The civil and military authorities were the same as had been appointed by Napoleon, and they neither durst nor desired to arrest Joachim. The Prince, for his greater security, first

proceeded to Vescovado and then to Ajaccio, accompanied by the acclamations of several thousand of the inhabitants, most of whom had formerly served either as officers or soldiers in the Corsican regiment in the service of the King of Naples. The reception he met in Corsica, and the recollection of the more touching one which had soothed his sorrows, when he had entered his capital alone and friendless, awakened in the mind of the Prince the idea, that if he only presented himself again in the kingdom, the whole nation would take up arms in his cause in defiance of the Austrians who were still there, and in possession of all the fortresses; forgetting in the delusion of his imagination that the whole of Europe was in arms to support the Bourbons. The realization of such a dream became a fixed idea in his mind. In the meanwhile, the Minister, Medici, who directed everything at Naples, having learned the favourable reception given to the King in Corsica, as well as the intentions which he had conceived, sent a Corsican of the name of Carabelli, who during the reign of Joachim had been employed as vice-prefect, to endeavour to dissuade the Prince from making so desperate an attempt. At the same moment, a certain Maceroni, an Englishman by birth, although of Italian origin, was sent to Murat with a despatch signed by Prince Metternich, granting to Joachim and his family a safe asylum in the Austrian States, on condition that he would give his word not to quit the residence allotted him without previously obtaining the Imperial consent.

After perusing the paper, the Prince turned towards Maceroni, and said, "You come too late. A small, but faithful and brave band, has sworn to follow my

fortunes: all these men are, more or less, compromised for my sake. On the other hand, my Neapolitan subjects only await my arrival to take up arms and drive out of the kingdom the Austrians and King Ferdinand, who threaten the entire nation with a second 1799. I intend to set sail immediately." And he did so.

His little fleet, composed of six small vessels, with two hundred and seventy men, sailed from Ajaccio on the 28th of September. The Minister, Medici, dreading the consequences of such an invasion, put his whole marine forces into action to capture, if possible, the vessels which had sailed from Corsica. The troops stationed along the coast between Falerno and Calabria received orders not to spare such citizens as should attempt to join Murat's followers. I recollect that a certain Captain Spadea, who had returned from Sicily a few days before the 28th of September, came to inform me with the greatest secrecy, that before long much blood would flow in the kingdom: Spadea said nothing more. I did not give much heed to his words.

After six days of tolerably favourable weather, a violent storm dispersed the vessels of Joachim. The ship in which he sailed, and another, were driven into the Gulph of St. Eufemia, and separated from the others. They soon came in sight of Pizzo. The population of this place, composed of about seven thousand inhabitants, and living entirely by the coasting trade had been reduced to great misery during the ten years of the French reign, on account of the war kept up by King Ferdinand and the English in Sicily, so that the restoration of this Prince had opened their hearts to the hope of more prosperous days. The

commander of the ship of which the King was on board, was a Maltese, of the name of Barbarà. He was originally a corsair, but had been raised by Joachim to the rank of a superior officer of the Royal Navy. This man declared that he was in want of water and provisions, and expressed his fears of being taken by the enemy. Irritated by the man's talk, the King ordered thirty of his followers to equip themselves in their uniforms, and landed with them upon the shores of Pizzo. Causing his banner to be unfurled, he began to ascend towards the more inhabited part, his followers shouting, "Long live King Joachim!" It was the 8th of October, and a holiday. The soldiers of the Custom-house, under the command of a Lieutenant of the name of Barba, a native of Catanzaro, immediately received him as their King. Barba told me, some time after this event, that at the moment, himself, his soldiers, and the inhabitants, were as if under the influence of magic, so great was their surprise. Joachim and his followers next directed their steps towards Monteleone, which was then the principal town in the province, the inhabitants of which had long enjoyed the reputation of great courage and liberal principles. Just as the Prince had quitted Pizzo, a captain of gendarmes, named Trentacapillo, who had returned from Sicily, having originally been a follower of Cardinal Ruffo, assisted by an agent of the Duke of Infantado, summoned the people to arms, and followed by them, proceeded to attack the King. From their knowledge of the country, they easily surrounded him, and opened a brisk fire upon himself and his soldiers. The Prince gave orders not to return the fire of the enemy, and, with his usual intrepidity, he braved the danger which threatened him, and advanced

to address his assailants. The latter, however, far from lending an ear to what he said, continued hostilities, killed one of the King's officers and severely wounded another. Joachim's only chance of safety now lay in the shore, whither he hastened, precipitating himself from lofty rocks. When he had succeeded in reaching the sea-shore, he beheld the two vessels standing out to sea, instead of coming to his assistance. This treachery of the ungrateful Barbarà arose from his desire to appropriate to himself the money and other valuables the unfortunate King had on board. The intrepid Prince, nevertheless, continued to struggle against his fortune, and casting his eyes upon a small boat which lay on the shore, he endeavoured to get it afloat. Whilst he was making vain attempts to accomplish this, he was overtaken by the barbarous inhabitants of Pizzo, and their worthy leader, Trentacapillo. This rapacious band deprived him of every thing of value about his person: whilst the unnatural women of Pizzo began to insult him in the coarsest and most opprobrious manner, scoffing at his luxuriant head of hair, which so greatly enhanced the personal appearance of Murat.

I have not the heart to say more. Five years previously, when forming one of his staff, I had accompanied Joachim along this same shore in the midst of the fire from the English fleet, the danger of which never even for an instant displaced the serene smile upon the countenance of our brave leader. He had, at this same time, lavished his bounty upon this barbarous people, destined to become the eternal shame of the opponents of Massena.

Joachim and his followers were conducted to the small Castle of Pizzo. The Calabrese were com-

manded by General Nunziante, formerly an officer of Cardinal Ruffo, and one of those who had returned from Sicily. He resided at Monteleone, and not suspecting that Joachim was amongst the prisoners, he sent a Captain, named Stratti, who, surprised at recognizing the King, gave him the best room in the fortress, and omitted no occasion of paying him all due respect. Nunziante himself soon arrived, and like Stratti, evinced the utmost respect for the misfortunes of the illustrious captive.

A telegraphic despatch informed the ministers of the landing and arrest of Joachim. A council was immediately assembled, in which the British Minister, A'Court, took part. He joined Medici in asserting, that the peace and safety of King Ferdinand and his dynasty were incompatible with the existence of Joachim. Nor did Medici scruple to say, in support of his opinion, that if the Pope had advised the brother of St. Louis to put to death the royal infant, Conradin, the ministers might surely counsel the King to take away the life of a low-born soldier, who, after having profaned the royal throne, had the audacity to seek to trouble the peace and security of the Sovereign and of his beloved subjects. This eloquent speech of Medici, which his colleagues repeated to their confidential friends, with other reasons urged by the English minister, decided the fate of Murat.

To ensure the prompt execution of this decision, orders were sent by telegraph to assemble a court-martial to condemn Joachim to death: a sentence which was to be immediately carried into effect. As an anxiety to satisfy the desires of King Ferdinand was a predominant feeling in the minds of his ministers, they sent the Prince Canosa into Calabria, with orders

to put Murat immediately to death, should he, on reaching Pizzo, find that the Prince was still alive. Canosa arrived too late to acquire this fresh glory, having been deprived of such an opportunity of manifesting his devotion by men as contemptible as himself.

On the night of the 12th of October, General Nunziante, who was destined to execute the orders sent by telegraph, assembled a court-martial. With an excess of baseness hardly credible, it was exclusively composed of officers who had served Murat, who had been benefited by him, and who owed the very rank they held in the army to brevets signed by his hand. They might have refused to obey so cruel and infamous an order, which would only have entailed upon them the loss of their commission, and three months' imprisonment; but, to the eternal shame of the Neapolitan army, not one amongst them had the courage and the conscience to approve himself an honourable officer or a right-minded man.

On the morning of the 13th, Captain Stratti awakened Joachim from his last sleep, to announce to him that he was going to be tried as an enemy and a disturber of the national peace. The King replied, "Mon cher Stratti, je suis perdu; l'ordre d'être jugé est un ordre de mort." He then requested permission to write to his wife, and with a firm mind and a steady hand he immediately traced the following lines:

"Ma chère Caroline,

"Ma dernière heure est arrivée; dans quelques instans j'aurai cessé de vivre; dans quelques instans tu n'auras plus d'époux. Ne m'oublie jamais, ne maudis jamais ma mémoire; je meurs innocent. Ma vie ne fut

tâchée d'aucune injustice. Adieu, mon Achille! Adieu, ma Létitia! Adieu, mon Lucien! Adieu, ma Louise! Montrez-vous au monde dignes de moi. Je vous laisse sans royaume et sans biens, au milieu de mes nombreux ennemis. Soyez constamment unis; montrez-vous supérieurs à la fortune; pensez à ce que vous êtes et à ce que vous avez été, et Dieu vous bénira! Sachez que ma plus grande peine dans les derniers momens de ma vie, est de mourir loin de mes enfans. Recevez la bénédiction paternelle, recevez mes embrassemens et mes larmes. Ayez toujours présent à votre mémoire votre malheureux père!

Pizzo, 13 Octobre, 1815.

After having written this, he cut off a lock of his hair, which he enclosed in the letter, warmly recommending it to the worthy Captain.

Another captain, of the name of Starace, who had been solicited to defend Joachim before the court-martial, as was the custom, presented himself before the Prince. The illustrious prisoner received him with dignity, saying, that Kings are not to be judged either by their inferiors or by their peers; that the people and history are alone competent to pronounce upon them. Starace, with his eyes suffused with tears, entreated the King to allow him to undertake his defence, but the Prince replied, "You would vainly attempt to save my life; let me at least preserve my honour." A legal official now entered, and according to the usual form, demanded the name and condition of the prisoner. Murat replied, "Joachim, King of the Two Sicilies," and bade him quit the room. Then turning towards Stratti, he complained of the senseless exultation of the inhabitants of Pizzo at his misfortune, and continued to pass in

review all that he had done for the Neapolitans, even to spending upon them his private fortune, and showing himself ungrateful towards France.

In the meanwhile, the court passed sentence of death upon Joachim, grounding their verdict, with an excess of cruel malignity, upon the very law established by Murat himself against the disturbers of the public peace. When they read to him the iniquitous sentence, he heard it with calmness and a smile of contempt. He was then conducted to a retired spot, and placed in front of a file of twelve soldiers. Disdaining to allow his eyes to be bound, and holding the portraits of his wife and children in his hand, he said in a firm voice, "Aim at my heart, and spare my face." His orders were executed: and thus perished, pierced by twelve bullets, at forty-eight years of age, the brave soldier who had come scathless out of so many battles, and who, when seated on the throne, had never known how to refuse to pardon. A few days after, his head was severed from his body, enclosed in a glass vessel filled with spirits of wine, and sent to Naples, where it was preserved in the royal palace. His body was interred in that very church of Pizzo, for the erection of which he had given, years before, the sum of two thousand ducats. At that mournful ceremony, General Nunziante behaved nobly.

Out of the sudden reverse of that fortune which had so long favoured Murat, arose the various circumstances which led him to this unhappy end. If, when he was wandering along the shore between Toulon and Hyères, he had discovered the vessel on board of which Roccaromana and Ischiletta were seeking him, he would have succeeded in reaching England, or the United States of America. Had he not been received with such un-

bounded and affectionate enthusiasm by the inhabitants of Corsica, he would never even have conceived the daring attempt which was the cause of his death. Had not the tempest dispersed his vessels, he would have landed with two hundred and seventy brave Corsican mountaineers accustomed to warfare. This force would have increased as he proceeded through the different provinces, and enabled him to maintain the campaign until he should have obtained advantageous conditions from Austria to enable him to retire into Germany. Finally, if, instead of landing on the savage beach of Pizzo, he had disembarked with his thirty followers in any other part of the kingdom, he would have increased his followers, or at all events, have obtained means of putting to sea again. The history of some remarkable men seems to show us that nothing can resist the tide of untoward fortune.

The tragical death of Joachim plunged me into the deepest grief, which I only mastered after a long lapse of time: the whole country was horror-stricken by this sad event. Even to this day, when the inhabitants of Pizzo have occasion to travel the kingdom, they carefully conceal the place of their nativity, so great is the stigma it casts upon them. As if this one vile act were insufficient, many others of a purely fictitious nature are recorded. Amongst other things, it was reported that several *Murattini* Generals had written to Joachim, enticing him back that they might betray him to the Government, whose favour they aimed at obtaining. Amongst these were named all those Generals who seemed most anxious to ingratiate themselves with the Prince, and who paid the greatest court to the Minister, Medici. General Colletta, owing to the circumstances of his earlier life, was first amongst those who were

suspected; so much suspicion, indeed, attached to him, that five years later, at the period of the Constitution, he published a pamphlet upon the unfortunate death of Murat, in justification of his own conduct.

In the month of November of this year, the officers of the late army, as well as those who had returned from Sicily, were employed in concert upon a work tending to the welfare of the whole of Italy, as well as of our own kingdom. They acted with great unanimity and much good sense on this occasion. They formed a *cordon sanitaire* around the small city of Noja, where the plague had appeared. They exerted the greatest intelligence and activity in executing the orders they received; each and all braving the dangers of that terrible affliction which had first appeared on the 23rd of November, and only terminated on the 7th of June of the following year. Of the inhabitants attacked by the plague, about eight hundred perished, and as many recovered. Universal fear existed that the horrible pestilence would spread over the whole kingdom, and thence through the rest of Italy; but fortunately such fears were not realized, for this visitation was restricted to Noja.

It was now 1816. The kingdom was sufficiently quiet: the Carbonari perceiving that the fulfilment of their hopes was more remote than ever, evinced no sign of their existence, when great excitement was awakened by the appointment of Prince Canosa to the post of Minister of the Police. He was a man of a restless temper, and of a vivacious mind, but by no means well informed. Being of a noble family, he had taken his seat at the municipal council of Naples, which had been convoked when the army of Championnet was at the gate of the city. This patrician council was divided

into partisans of the Republic, and upholders of a fugitive King, who had sought his own safety, leaving the kingdom without a government, or any military force to protect it. Canosa alone dissented from both parties, proposing the establishment of an aristocratical government. Such a position only excited laughter at the time; but as an aristocratical form of government was equally opposed both by the Republicans and the King, the result was that Canosa was thrown into prison by the former. On recovering his freedom at the fall of the Republic, he was again incarcerated by King Ferdinand, and only regained his liberty at the peace of Florence. In 1806, perceiving that the royal family were about to furnish a second edition of their flight, he proposed to the Queen to accompany them to Sicily. His request was granted by the Princess, who seemed to delight in being surrounded by men notorious for their turpitude. It would require a whole volume to relate all the means set afloat by this man to prolong the civil war in the country. At once to satisfy his own grovelling ambition and the wishes of the Queen, he vomited forth upon us at different periods, either from the island of Sicily or the rock of Ponza, a Fra Diavolo, a Ronco, and other such wretches who had distinguished themselves for their cruelty under Cardinal Ruffo, and had followed the sanguinary Court of Sicily. Not satisfied with this, he gathered together all the galley slaves who were paying the penalty of their crimes in that and the other small islands which surround it, and putting them on board British vessels caused them to be landed all along our shores, granting them an unbounded license to sack and pillage, but exposing them to dangers which he carefully avoided sharing.

It was said that by evincing his gratitude for so much zeal, Ferdinand had promised to appoint him to the post of Minister of Police, should Providence restore him to the throne of Naples.

Amongst the many vile acts committed by Canosa during his stay in Sicily, he had established, by means of his emissaries beyond the Straits, a sect denominated Calderari. The object of this institution was to support despotism and to resist the recognition or maintenance of every liberal principle. I cannot affirm that whilst Queen Caroline was exciting the Carbonari of Calabria to fight against the French, by promising them the Constitution which had been bestowed upon Sicily, she was aware of the machinations of Canosa to found a sect, the principle of which was diametrically opposed to that of the Carbonari. At all events, owing to the great progress made towards the civilization of the nation, the Calderari never amounted to any considerable number, and reckoned amongst them none but men of bad character, the sorry refuse of the crusade of Cardinal Ruffo. Canosa, now made Minister of Police, detesting not only every principle of liberty, but even the tolerance which the allied Sovereigns and his own King showed towards those who had served Murat, or who had belonged to the Carbonari, laboured to give extension to the Calderari by furnishing them with arms and permission to use them, and by promising to reward them with employments either administrative or judicial, to be taken for such a purpose from the Murattini and Carbonari. The provinces of the kingdom were in a state approaching anarchy and civil war. The evil-disposed acquired strength under the protection of the Minister of Police;

the Liberals maintained theirs by their number and fortune, for they reckoned amongst them the most estimable of the landholders and citizens. It happened that the Carbonari, who, yielding to the influence of the times had hitherto kept quiet, now fearing some reaction on the part of the Calderari, strove to strengthen their own power by the increase of their number, the more so, that they feared Canosa was acting in concert with the other Ministers and the King. In the meanwhile, the daily increasing disorder in the provinces opened the eyes, not only of the Ministers of State, the colleagues of Canosa, but of the Ambassadors of Russia and Austria, who demanded of the King that Canosa should be deprived of the office of Minister of Police, and sent into exile as a disturber of the peace of the State. The King, by nature timid and fond of tranquillity, obliged Canosa to quit the kingdom, having first settled upon him a very large stipend.

The departure of Canosa quieted, but by no means destroyed the effect of all he had done to excite the cupidity of the wretches incorporated in the sect of the Calderari, and aroused the Carbonari from their torpor. The latter, having become suspicious of the conduct of the Government, and beholding the fall of their bitterest enemy, the Minister of Police, became extremely audacious. Another circumstance occurred which was extremely favourable to the Carbonari. On the fall of their chief, the Calderari openly declared themselves against the Ministers of the King, and finally against the King himself, upon the plea that his Ministers were traitors, and that the Prince, under the impulse of fear, had thrown himself into the arms of

the Murattini and Carbonari, who were equally enemies to the throne. Besides the Calderari, all those who had accompanied the Court into Sicily, and even their relations, never thought themselves sufficiently recompensed for the sacrifices they pretended to have made; indeed their pretensions could not have been greater, had they with their own hands restored the King to his throne. The Prince could not satisfy their cravings with money, on account of the impoverished condition of the treasury, neither could he bestow lucrative situations upon them, as they were really incapable of filling them. This was so notorious, that Ferdinand was wont to say, "My *fedeloni* are fit for nothing but eating, sleeping, and drinking." The mutual discontent which existed between the King and his *fedeloni*, daily acquired strength. The latter talked of nothing less than of taking the crown from Ferdinand, to bestow it upon his son, the Duke of Calabria, who had remained in Sicily with the title of Viceroy of that kingdom.

A short time previous to the disgrace of Canosa, the theatre of San Carlo, so celebrated for its beauty, was destroyed by fire. The drums beat the alarm, as if the enemy had been at the gates of the city: I hastened with the rest, in my uniform. Although it was painful to behold the ruin of so magnificent a structure, it was laughable to see the zeal evinced by the Minister of Police and various Generals, amongst them several of Murat were seen galloping about in various directions to prove their devotedness to the King, who, although there was not even a shadow of danger, had abandoned the royal residence. I saw the theatre entirely consumed by the flames; and an artist might have derived great advantage from the magnificence of such a spectacle.

The theatre was reconstructed in the course of a year, and is even more beautiful than that which was destroyed.

We were in 1817. The condition of the army proceeded from bad to worse, and the public, in derision of the Supreme Council of War, had bestowed upon it the title of Supreme *Scompiglio*. As if on purpose to widen the breach which unfortunately existed between the officers of Murat and those who had been in Sicily, the latter received a bronze medal, bearing on one side the effigy of Ferdinand, and on the other the motto "ever Faithful." Now, as this vaunted fidelity had been shown by men, most of whom had been condemned to the gallies for the crimes they had committed, before and after they had followed Cardinal Ruffo, this medal became at once a brand of shame, the symbol of a party and a cause of discord. There is no folly of which an absolute government is incapable. The disorder in the army became so great that the Council of War was abolished, and the entire command of the army and the task of re-organizing it, was entrusted to a stranger, to an Irish General of the name of Nugent in the service of Austria, who received the title of Captain General. This selection was made by the same King who in 1799 had entrusted the command of a large army to another Austrian General, who was defeated in the course of a few days. Nugent was an able officer, extremly courteous in his manners, and generally well disposed. But to re-organize an army which had been ill-managed during so long a period of time, and which, from the inertness of the Government and the incapacity of its chiefs had been thrice defeated, and had consequently lost all feeling of self-confidence, required another mind, a higher authority, and more

than all, was not to be accomplished by a stranger. But, had a second Hannibal come amongst us, he could not have improved our army, whilst it was subjected to such a minister as Medici, who had so little knowledge, prudence, or dignity, as to say that it required no greater force than that of the *sbirri* to keep the people of The Two Sicilies under proper restraint, and that the kingdom was protected from all external enemies by the policy of the Allied Powers, especially of the Bourbons of France. Between the contemptuous opinion of the minister and the Sardinapalian disposition of the King, our army would have been composed exclusively of the troops landed from Sicily, had not Ferdinand been bound by Austria, when she restored him to the throne, to keep an army of twenty-five thousand men at the disposal of that power.

We had attained the latter part of the winter of 1817. My father was thrown into deep affliction by the death of the only son of my deceased brother; notwithstanding the number of his children, he was still without a grandchild: and he feared, too truly as it proved, that he should never have any. I was the youngest of my four surviving brothers, and my father was anxious that I should pay him a visit in the hope of persuading me to marry, and to obtain my assistance in the settlement of our family affairs, the estate having returned to his disposal by the death of the child to whom I have alluded. My three brothers urged me likewise to return home, giving me full authority to regulate our respective interests according to my own sense of equity. I obtained leave to go to Calabria, and some gensdarmes on horseback to accompany me during my stay in that province. It was not possible

to live in the country with any degree of security, on account of the banditti who infested it, especially of a band of twelve men under the command of a certain Calagiuri.

When I entered Calabria, I could not advance a step without being assailed by painful recollections. The Casa Pallone, at Scigliano, recalled to my mind the siege I had undergone; my subsequent imprisonment and the fury of the armed populace; a little further, my eyes encountered the field where the French and Calabrese had fought so fiercely against other Calabrese. From the heights of Nicastro, I beheld Sicily, the Straits, and nearer still, Pizzo. Next in succession, the Fossa del Marittimo, the threatened invasion, and the fatal end of Joachim presented themselves to my mind, and on descending into Nicastro another of my prisons was before my sight. I was aroused from this melancholy reverie by the appearance of my brother Ferdinand, who accompanied by several friends of my family, had come to meet me. We were passing through the valley in which Crassus had cut a ditch, twenty miles in length, which connecting the Tyrrhene Sea with the Ionian, confined Spartacus in the extremest point of the Italian Peninsula. In this delicious region, the contrast between the beauties of nature, and the miserable government which inthrals the inhabitants, must afflict every mind of sensibility. At length I found myself in the bosom of my family. They were settled at a country-house we possessed close to the Gulf of Squillace, about three miles from the small city of the same name. I was a stranger in the midst of those nearest to me, having rarely been at home but for a few days at a time since the age of

six years. This country-place is named la Coscia, although Cassiodorus would be a fitter appellation, as this illustrious Calabrese terminated his career within its walls.

My father had read the works of Cassiodorus, and when speaking about him, was in the habit of calling him that "Signorone" (great lord). The estate reaches to the sea; on its left runs a small river, and on the right a richly wooded branch of the Apennines, affording great abundance of game. The ground, which lies opposite the sea, rises gradually between the sides of the mountain and the river. I never before had beheld such abundance of every kind of food. The friends of the family in that neighbourhood sent quantities of every possible kind of game, and in such profusion that we could not consume it. We had a boat with six fishermen, who drew up enormous fish, which, added to those taken at the mouth of the little river, were more than we knew what to do with. Truffles were brought to the house by sacks full. My brother Ferdinand, whom I used in jest to call the miser, possessed about fifty cows: one of my servants who had been with Florestano at Dantzic during the siege, had learned how to make butter from the milk of a cow, which in that besieged place was accounted a perfect treasure, and thus we had plenty of butter, which at that period they were not accustomed to make in Calabria.

The oranges were better than those either of Malta or the southern part of the Spanish Peninsula. My visit was a source of great expense to my father, for besides the open house he was obliged to keep for all who came to see me, and others whose principal object

was to amuse themselves, he had likewise to board a detachment of cavalry and another of infantry. The latter was for the defence of the habitation, and the former escorted me when I rode abroad. I did not keep this guard out of ostentation, but as a security against the banditti infesting the country, into whose hands we might easily have fallen, had I omitted such a precaution.

When we came to discuss business matters, I entreated my father, in making a fresh will, to divide his fortune into four equal parts, one for each of his sons. To this proposal, he replied, that he wished to leave me every thing that the law allowed him to dispose of, in order that I should settle and marry. As I renewed my entreaties that he would accede to my plan, he exclaimed that his family had ceased to exist. My excellent father, although well informed, and endowed with more than an ordinary share of good sense, nevertheless retained all the prejudices he had imbibed during his infancy. He was proud of his descent from the Normans who had settled in the kingdom. He showed me one day a parchment, attesting his dignity, as one of the patricians of the city of Messina. This patrician spirit had not vitiated his morals, or relaxed his principles; he had spared neither care nor expense for the welfare and education of his children, and his heart and hand were open as day to every demand of benevolence. His will was made in accordance with my proposal, I having assured him, that in the event of my marriage, my brothers would leave all their property to my children. Having made up my mind to remain a bachelor all my life, it cost me a great deal to be obliged to deceive my worthy parent;

but it was necessary that I should do so for the preservation of his peace of mind, since I could not conquer my aversion to matrimony. My father had reached his eightieth year; with the exception of a slight weakness of the digestive organs, he still enjoyed the most excellent health. It was his custom to recline upon his bed every day as soon as he had dined, and I used to go and sit by his side, with a sentiment of heartfelt pleasure. He listened to me with attention, when I made known my principles upon various subjects, but he found my political opinions too strong for the times and the situation of our unhappy country. When I discoursed with him respecting my views of military discipline, which were, as I conceive, founded upon reason, kindness and true national principles, he would exclaim, that a holy father could not have spoken better than I, although I was, and professed to be merely a soldier. He desired to know how I had acquired the information I possessed, having been imprisoned and exiled at so early an age. Once, when I had been talking to him with great animation upon some subject, he seriously told me that it was a pity I had not embraced the ecclesiastical career, as I should have made an excellent preacher. I replied to the good old man, that it required greater eloquence to induce men to expose themselves to all the hardships and dangers of war, than to direct them into the road leading to heaven.

I was so delighted with this country residence, that more than once I made up my mind to settle there for the remainder of my days. It was situated at a distance of two miles from the village of Staletti, three from Squillace, and nine from Catanzaro. There were two great obstacles, however, to my executing such a

scheme; one was, its being continually exposed to the attacks of the banditti; and the other (and far the greatest in my eyes) was the necessity of marrying. One day there arrived amongst us a priest belonging to a half jesuitical order. Although this man was a decided charlatan, he was held in high veneration by the whole family; and instead of contenting himself with fulfilling the religious duties of his office, he was a persevering match-maker. He had discovered for my especial benefit, a young and beautiful heiress, with a very large fortune. Had it not been out of respect to my father, I should have had this sorry priest conveyed out of the neighbourhood by my gensd'armes; as it was, I was obliged to tolerate him during some days, and not being able entirely to prevent discussion about my marriage, I confined myself to the most vague promises in the matter.

I remained in this delightful spot, which is still ever present to my mind, during three months, at the expiration of which time I was obliged to return to Naples. The Honourable Keppel Craven, brother of Lord Craven, went there about a year after my departure on a visit to Florestano, who was then staying there. Craven gives a description of this residence and of the surrounding country, in a work he published in London in 1820, in which he relates his journey to Sicily. All my family, and especially my father, saw me return to the capital with much regret.

On my arrival at Naples I found several innovations. The King no longer bore the title of Ferdinand the Fourth of Naples, and Third of Sicily, but of Ferdinand the First of the United Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The hereditary Prince, according to the custom of all dynasties, above that of Viceroy had

assumed the title of Duke of Calabria. A Council of Chancery had likewise been established, but as its vote was only suggestive, and not judicial, and its deliberations strictly private, it was not of any great utility to the State; nevertheless, on this side of the Straits we looked even upon this as a progress in the right direction. The inhabitants of Sicily, however, did not concur in such an opinion. They found themselves deprived of the Constitution granted them in 1812, through the intervention of the English, and in despite of Ferdinand. Previous to that period, Sicily had enjoyed during seven centuries a Constitution, which, vitiated by the feudal system, and far less liberal than that granted by the British, had been consolidated by time. On the return of Ferdinand to Naples, they were deprived both of the old and the new Constitution. Unfortunately for the United Kingdom, no less than for the whole of Italy, this was the only occasion upon which the English were ever led to abandon a people on whom, for their own political ends, they had bestowed freedom. Great Britain will yet have cause to lament such an error, and the results likely to arise from it.

Nugent, actuated by a pardonable self-love, as well as by a desire to give satisfaction to Austria, bent his whole mind on the improvement of the army. He looked forward to the chance of a war between Russia and Austria, in which event he would have held the chief command of twenty-five thousand Neapolitans. Perceiving that the only way to accomplish his purpose was to make use of the officers who had served Murat, he always spoke advantageously of them to the King, who listened with satisfaction, harassed as he was by the continual complaints and pretensions of his *fedeloni*.

At the suggestion of Nugent, a decree was published ordering the formation of a militia. There was to be a regiment for each province, composed of as many battalions as there were districts, and each battalion was to contain as many companies as there were cantons. This arrangement, of which I shall have to speak, would have been most excellent had it been well carried out.

During this year an occurrence took place which disgraced the Government at the same time that it manifested its weakness, and which would scarcely be believed were it not most notoriously certain. Amongst the numerous malefactors who had followed Cardinal Ruffo in 1799, and who six years later, imitating the example of priests, friars, and brigands of high standing, instigated by the Sicilian Court to hasten to the defence of the throne, was a certain Gaetano Vardarelli. This man had been included in an amnesty under the reign of Joachim, and had served as a soldier in the cavalry of that Prince. He deserted, and roamed through the country well armed. A short time after this, he went over to Sicily, and availed himself of the depredations he had committed beyond the Straits to ensure a favourable reception. He fled from that island on account of fresh offences committed there, and returned into the kingdom, where he resumed his profession of robber. When he had perpetrated crimes enough to be certain that he would not only be pardoned but rewarded in Sicily, he returned there again, where he was not only admitted into the army, but was promoted to the rank of sergeant, in which capacity he served in the royal horse-guard after the return of Ferdinand to Naples. Vardarelli, who was restless

and ambitious by nature, deserted anew, and chose for the execution of his new exploits, the province of Capitanata and Molise, of which place he was a native. He formed a band of about fifty men on horseback; two of his brothers joined him, and the other brigands belonging to him were all stained by many and various crimes, and without the pale of the law. These men were not only first-rate horsemen but such good shots, that they rarely missed their mark when they discharged their long muskets from their horses. Gaetano Vardarelli, at the head of his band, became truly formidable. He governed it with the greatest address, maintained the severest discipline amongst his men, never allowing them to steal; but remunerating them most liberally. He acted the same by the peasantry and keepers of the neighbouring estates, attacking only the wealthy, and threatening either their lives or their properties by way of levying contributions from them. Such arts were by no means new amongst men of this class; but what insured to this band the sympathy of the multitude, was, that it attacked and put to flight in the vast plain of Capitanata a detachment of Austrian dragoons, who were driven to seek a refuge in a neighbouring farm. Several Carbonari, seduced by the satisfaction they experienced at seeing the Austrians obliged to fly, pursued by a small number of banditti, received Vardarelli as a *buon cugino*—such was the appellation adopted by the Carbonari amongst themselves. They incurred thereby the censure of all the rest of the sect, the foundation of which was sincere and pure moral sentiments. I shall soon relate what I extracted from them some time after by way of purification from this stain.

In the meanwhile, the Government began to feel alarmed, or at least looked with concern upon three provinces, one of which was the wealthy Capitanata, ransacked with impunity by this band. The audacity of the banditti not only exposed the weakness of the King, but supplied a pretence to Austria not to evacuate the kingdom. Who would suppose that a Government, maintaining an army of about thirty thousand men, could find no other means of putting a stop to the scandalous proceedings of these banditti but of stooping to form a treaty with Gaetano Vardarelli, a notorious robber and murderer?

This treaty contained the following four articles:

1. That a free pardon should be granted to Vardarelli and his followers for all the crimes of which they had been guilty.

2. That the band should form an armed squadron in the service of the King, charged with the maintenance of the public peace.

3. That a monthly stipend of ninety ducats should be paid to Gaetano Vardarelli; one of forty-five ducats to each of three chiefs under him, and thirty to each of the men.

4. That the said squadron should swear before the royal commissary fidelity to the King and obedience to the Generals commanding the provinces, and should consent to be employed in putting down and exterminating all public malefactors.

Naples, July 6, 1817.

Neither was this ignominious treaty deficient in a secret article, promising that this band should not quit the provinces of Molise and Capitanata, or be obliged to enter fortified cities or castles, the banditti being by no means disposed to place much trust in

the royal word. Nevertheless, Ferdinand was idiot enough to suppose, that by granting a Constitution to his people he would have lowered himself more than by thus forming a serious treaty with a handful of highwaymen. This disgraceful conduct on the part of the King and his ministers had not yet reached its height. Vardarelli having got these terms, served the Government, but without a spark of zeal; he mistrusted it so much, that he took precautions which proved him to be like the *Condottieri* of the middle ages, ever ready to break with the power in whose service they might be employed. The ministers were not long without fully justifying the mistrust existing in the minds of the banditti. Ashamed of the treaty they had concluded, and the concessions they had granted, they thought to efface the blot by resorting to the vilest treachery. The brothers Vardarelli and their followers were not without enemies, having awakened so much animosity whilst scouring the country. To these the ministers had recourse, promising to reward them if they would take vengeance for the injury which had been done them by the brigands. Once, after a long march, undertaken in the service of the Government, the band was resting in the small village of Uncri, situated in Sannio, when all on a sudden several musket-shots were discharged from the windows of the houses. The three Vardarellis and some of their companions were killed; the others quickly mounted their horses and fled. One of the men who had fired, bathed his hands and face in the blood of the corpses lying around him to revenge an outrage upon his sister which had been perpetrated by one of the band before the amnesty. As he did so, he exclaimed: "I have now washed away the stain I had received." The Government

did not stop at this base and iniquitous act. Rather to destroy the remains of this desperate band than from any sense of justice, a mock prosecution of the murderers of the Vardarellis was set on foot, and several persons were thrown into prison. The Government was abetted in such ignominy by Lieutenant-General Amato, who commanded the third military division comprising the province of Capitanata. The General declared that he was bent upon punishing those who had killed Vardarelli and his companions; then he persuaded the forty who had effected their escape to assemble at Foggia in order to elect their new chiefs by votes. Thirty-one proceeded to Foggia, and shouting, "Long live the King!" they formed themselves in order of battle in front of the residence of General Amato, who saluted them with a benevolent smile. They stood on foot by the side of their horses, and a Colonel Lido, returned from Sicily, reviewed them.

At a signal given by General Amato, by raising his cap from his head, the soldiers of a battalion of the army, who had lain concealed close to the habitation of the General, rushed forward with their arms in their hands calling upon the band to surrender. Eleven of the banditti sprang resolutely upon their horses; nine were killed and two succeeded in escaping. The other twenty, almost stunned by surprise, left their horses and precipitated themselves into a neighbouring building, in the cellar of which they concealed themselves, determined to make it their tomb rather than yield. They began to fire upon the soldiers who attempted to take them, and two met their death. The troops abandoned the attack, but they gathered together straw and other combustible substances, which they introduced, in an ignited state, through the loop-holes of the cellar.

The fire and smoke obliged the unfortunate men to abandon their place of refuge; seventeen surrendered, the other three having put each other to death. They lost little by this bold deed; their companions, after being tried by a military commission, were immediately executed. After this atrocity, all the persons who had been arrested for the murder of the Vardarellis were set at liberty. General Amato, who had the reputation of an honest man, and who on this occasion had been induced by great facility of disposition so to degrade himself, obtained great praise from the Government. I recollect that when I was made acquainted with all these disgraceful circumstances, my first impulse was to snatch off my uniform and cast it out of the window. The small remains of this band were increased by all the malefactors of Sannio, Capitanata and of the other contiguous provinces. I shall have occasion to speak of them hereafter; for a year later I succeeded General Amato in the command of the third military division.

I have nothing more to state respecting the conduct of the Government, except that Keppel Craven who was travelling through the kingdom, entered Foggia, at the very moment when the troops were firing upon the banditti, and that he was received by an old woman, who lodged him and his suite in her house. What could an English gentleman have thought of the Neapolitans and their Government at such a spectacle? I do not recollect what he says upon the subject in his published travels. If he did not depict us as a nation of barbarians, half base and half brave, he must have been extremely indulgent in his judgment.

I have already stated that by virtue of a most disgraceful treaty, the band of Vardarelli had entered into the service of the kingdom on the 6th of July

1817. The month after, the Austrian troops, amounting to twelve thousand men, evacuated the kingdom. The King was now free in the midst of his people, and no longer humiliated by the presence of a foreign army. Had this Prince been endowed with a higher mind, and possessed different ministers, he might have acquired glory, and the unfortunate inhabitants of the Two Sicilies would have enjoyed the blessings of tranquillity. The scandal occasioned by the circumstances attendant on the case of Vardarelli, revealed to the King, to his ministers, and to Nugent, the little affection felt by the people towards the Government. Nugent availed himself of every possible opportunity of dismissing from the army the worthless officers who had come over from Sicily, replacing them by the more active and intelligent Murattini. Knowing that Florestano was extremely reluctant to serve, he appointed me to assume the command in the Abruzzi, in the place of General de Gregorio. This officer was a native of Messina, and although worthy and intelligent, he had the mind and manners of a monk, and was far better suited for a bishop or the abbot of a convent, than for the turmoil of a military life; but being a Fidelone, he had been put in possession of the command he held. Nugent was always extremely courteous towards me; so not to leave me in idleness, he said that the first military division, composed of Molise and Terra di Lavoro, was so extensive, that for the advantage of military order, it was requisite that there should be two Lieutenant-Generals, so that one might always be at the head-quarters of the vast division. Such a plan met with no obstacle, because of the good intelligence which existed between myself and Carascosa, who commanded this division.

On the occasion of the solemn feast of Piedigrotto, many regiments left their garrison to proceed to Naples. Amongst the corps which suffered more or less from desertion, a regiment commanded by Colonel Labrano, who held Gaeta, was remarkable, of which many hundreds forsook their flag. I was sent to Gaeta by order of the King. The governor of the place was Lieutenant-General Acton, an officer senior in rank to myself, and brother of the celebrated minister. I was to review the regiment, examine the cause of the desertion, and point out the best means of restoring it to its proper discipline.

My mission could not be satisfactory to Acton, and Labrano had served under me as major in Spain, where he had received several severe wounds in the breast. He was a brave officer, but it requires higher qualities than are generally reckoned to make a good colonel. Napoleon often promoted a colonel to be major-general, merely to remove him from an office he could not adequately discharge; the remedy was a strong one, but it avoided the exposure of three thousand men to the consequences that might befal under a bad commander.

General Acton, who had returned from Sicily, and who cordially hated us *Murattini,* insisted nevertheless upon my dining with him; but the awkwardness of a *tête-à-tête* between two persons of such opposite ways of thinking was diminished by the presence of his two charming daughters, the elder of whom was Lady Acton, widow of the celebrated minister, who was extremely amiable whenever she chose to be so.

On the following day, I was in front of the regiment, drawn out beyond the esplanade. I soon perceived that it wanted instruction, and was in a state of great

disorder. I assembled the officers into a circle at a certain distance from the battalions, and addressed them in a long and seasonable discourse. To put a stop to the desertions, they had had recourse to the ill-judged remedy of confining the troops within their quarters, thus punishing those who had not deserted for the offences of those who had. I formed the regiment into a square, and thanked the soldiers in the name of the Government for not having followed the example of those who had forsaken their duty. I told them that they were free to go about and out of the fortress, and I threatened to bring such officers as ill-used, or abused the soldiers before a court-martial to answer for their conduct. Acton, who was accustomed to a Vandal-like discipline, thought that I was only nourishing insubordination and desertion, but experience proved the contrary. In that regiment a single new case of desertion did not occur. One great advantage of the southerns is, that much may be obtained from them by kind words, care and affection. Nevertheless, the results obtained by such means, are neither solid nor permanent, since really good and unflinching discipline can only be the fruit of wise institutions.

CHAPTER V.

1818—1819.

The command of the third military division is conferred upon me —I organize ten thousand militia—My conduct towards the Carbonari—The mounted band of the brigand Minotti puts to flight a detachment of cavalry—The band is destroyed: other banditti are dispersed—The two provinces of Avellino and Capitanata enjoy as much tranquillity and security as is felt in England—The Emperor of Austria and the King of Naples determine upon inspecting my Militia in Avellino—They are dissuaded from fulfilling their intention at Salerno, by the envious historian Colletta.

THAT part of the command of the first military division which had devolved upon me, gave me so little occupation, that during the latter part of that year and the ten following months—in 1818—I gave myself up almost entirely to the study of the history of my native land, and with such success and ardour, that I am sure I could have written an abridgment of it without referring to a single book. In fact, I did write one for my own use, extracted from the historians contained in Gravier's Collection. The ministry appeared to be firmly established, Medici being in fact, if not nominally, its chief, and all his colleagues entirely dependent upon

him. Unfortunately his system of government was a wavering one. The Calderari were equally detested by the ministers and by the King, because finding themselves neglected and being instigated by ambition, and often by misery, they conspired against the King, boasting that they had at their head the Duke of Calabria, who resided in Sicily, where he held the office of Viceroy. Later, I became extremely well acquainted with the Duke, and I do not believe that he had courage enough to adhere to the Calderari sect; for although insincere by nature, he was no less timid. Nevertheless, the discord which reigned between the Duchess of Calabria and the Princess of Partanna, wife of the King, gave probability to the rumour spread by the Calderari. Their adversaries, the Carbonari continued to gain ground, and the ministers, whether to raise the belief that they tended towards liberalism, or because they did not look upon the Carbonari as inimical to themselves and to the King, manifested great sympathy towards them and the most decided aversion from the Calderari.

General Amato, who was at a very advanced age, had shown himself incapable of destroying the bands of malefactors and banditti that devastated the provinces of Foggia and Avellino. On this account he was appointed to succeed Carascosa in the command of the first military division. Carascosa was created Inspector of the Infantry, and I replaced Amato in the command of the two before-mentioned provinces. The decree conferring this post on me was destined to bring on me a series of misfortunes for the remainder of my life, which from first to last has been doomed to be of the same sombre hue. My country was in a state of misery which could not increase, and through this decree,

had fortune only favoured me, it might have acquired that liberty which is the source of all national welfare.

I quitted Naples on the 1st of November, 1818, and on changing horses in the province of Cardinale, I said to myself, "Under this poplar, in 1799, Jerocades harangued my companions-in-arms and myself, exhorting us to contend bravely against the enemies of freedom." An hour later I had reached Monteforte, where at the age of sixteen I had rejoiced under the banner of my free country. Thus chewing the cud of all the bitter reflections which arose in my mind upon the fickleness of fortune, I reached Avellino. In this province and the neighbouring one of Capitanata, more than two thousand warrants of arrest had been issued and not executed. Besides the number of delinquents concealed within and about the towns and villages, a considerable number of banditti overran the country, so that an escort of a thousand men was necessary to guard the mail which twice a week proceeded from Naples to Apulia. A certain Minotti had collected together the remains of Vardarelli's followers which had escaped from the treachery of Uncri and Foggia, and at the head of a large band of banditti on horseback, he compelled the landholders to contribute for his use money, clothes, arms, and even tobacco. It is true that the other provinces of the kingdom were likewise infested with such delinquents, and that between Terracina and Capua the high-road was lined with troops to protect travellers from the depredations of these malefactors: thus the knowledge of our miserable condition was spread over Europe. But the two provinces of the third division, under my command, were in a worse condition than all the others, being in a perfect state of anarchy,

particularly in Capitanata, where the large and small herds of cattle from the Abruzzi are brought to pass the winter; the banditti concealed themselves amidst the herdsmen, who were very numerous, and who living constantly in the open country, were obliged to feign themselves devoted to these men.

On talking with the most considerable of the landholders upon the condition in which they lived, their language was plain and positive. They stated that they paid their taxes regularly, and that it was the duty of the Government to destroy the banditti. I was not long in perceiving that both the Carbonari and the Calderari exulted in the feebleness which was only too visible in the authorities of the State.

I could not hit upon any other means of radically remedying this disorder—which seemed almost incredible in the 19th century—than by awakening sentiments of nationality in the minds of the younger landholders, and forming them into militias, not upon the plan which had been hitherto adopted, but according to my own method. But would the Government allow me to proceed in my own way? Would it permit me, instead of employing weak and degrading means, to act with impartiality and to awaken vigorous sentiments of patriotism in the hearts of the citizens? As will be seen hereafter, the Government permitted me to do exactly what I liked, and Nugent was ever there to support me. The authority granted by the law to the Lieutenant-Generals employed to organize the militia was very extensive, and I designed to ask for even greater powers than were usually allowed.

It was in the first instance necessary that I should make myself known to the population of these provinces,

or rather to the men of property in them. These, on learning my arrival, thought that they were utterly ruined; for if they had suffered so much from the zeal of an aged General, who had not been educated in a camp, what were they to anticipate from a younger and more active commander? In order to make myself understood by the reader, it is necessary that I should explain, that the Generals commanding the military divisions had the right of imprisoning persons of every condition, who were suspected of holding communication with the malefactors in the country; that they could bring them at once before a court-martial, and if condemned to death, execute them without any revision of their sentence. These military commissions were presided over by a superior officer, and the judges were a Major and the others Captains and Lieutenants. The landholders were exposed to be judged by such a court, if they did not remain deaf to the exactions of the banditti, who on their part could set fire to their barns and carry off their cattle. The better to show the barbarous stupidity of my predecessors, I will merely state, that I found in the archives of the commandment of the third division a document proving that upwards of two thousand ducats had been expended in the purchase of poison, and in the remuneration of those who poisoned the banditti, not one of whom in reality met his death by such means, whereas more than one person wholly innocent of their dark intrigues fell victims to the poison. Besides this, impunity was allowed to banditti stained with blood, on condition that they would put the accomplices of their own evil deeds to a treacherous death. It seemed difficult to decide whether it was not better to remain exposed to

the depredations of the malefactors, than to be subjected to those who, with so little chance of success, attempted to effect their destruction.

To assuage the fears awakened by my arrival, I published an order of the day, stating that as soon as the militia should be organized, they would execute all the warrants of arrest, and put down the marauders. That in the meanwhile, no proprietor who from a fear of losing his property might have yielded to the banditti would be arrested; for he who possesses something must ever be the enemy of the robber. I added, that I should be ashamed to allow impunity to any banditti upon condition of their destroying their comrades, and that one and all must equally suffer for their misdeeds. This order of the day, which displeased the ministry, was received with acclamations by the landholders, and was looked upon by all as strange; however, they allowed me to proceed.

As the province of Foggia was the most infested by marauders, I immediately proceeded there to organize the militia. Before beginning my operations, I was informed by persons worthy of confidence, such as judges of the tribunals, and other official men, that the Carbonari had acquired so much extension and power amongst the population, that an officer of militia who declined to become a Carbonaro would be a mere cipher, and that fortunately there was not a single honest man amongst the Calderari. On looking closely into this circumstance, I observed a fact which obliged me to lose no time in deciding upon my future system of operations. A gendarme of the cavalry had fallen into the hands of the ferocious chief, Minotti, and whilst I was riding from Troja to Foggia, this gend'arme, armed and mounted, presented himself to me. I was of course

induced to look upon his capture as a fable; but the officers of my suite, amongst whom was a Captain Gannone, Major of Gensd'armes and Valia, a Captain, told me that they would clear up the mystery at the first halt we made. They accordingly explained to me, that having had recourse to several Carbonari signals, he had obtained his liberty, and was neither deprived of his arms nor his horse. I thought to myself, here is a sect now verging on immorality, containing within it men of the highest probity, and professing to have a moral object in view. The destruction of this sect would be difficult; and with so weak and absurd a Government perhaps impossible. At all events it would have been wholly repugnant to my feelings to oppose myself in the field to a society which demanded liberal institutions for its native country. Half-measures would have been utterly unavailing in the situation in which I found myself, even had they not been foreign to my inclinations. After mature deliberation, I decided upon assuming the direction of the Carbonari sect in the two provinces under my command, and of organizing them into military order, so as to put them in a condition to break down the absolute power which, during so many centuries, had degraded our beautiful country, in which freedom was indigenous, and where it had existed longer than in any other land in Europe. Here arises the question, whether a General, obliged to decide between an absolute King or a depressed and miserable country, ought to abandon the interests of the latter to submit to the will of royalty. I leave to casuists the pleasure of reasoning upon the point. I decided upon following the dictates of my own conscience. Being of the highest rank in the army, I could not be accused of espousing the cause of patriotism to better my own

private interests. I therefore disdainfully set at nought and for ever, the abuse likely to be cast upon me by the envious and the courtly. However, then as now, I looked upon secret societies as an immense evil under a liberal government: they are so likewise under a despotic one; but in such a case they act as an antidote to poison, and may therefore be regarded in the light of a remedy which is not without inconvenience, but is still the remedy for an immense evil.

X., my fellow-prisoner in the Sicilian Islands, of whom I have made mention in the earlier part of these pages, was now sub-prefect of the district of Borrino, in Capitanata. From him I learnt the minutest particulars respecting the real influence and position of the Carbonari throughout the kingdom. They were extremely numerous, but feeble and disunited, owing to the jealous ambition which reigned amongst them; so great indeed was their weakness, that they were at one time on the point of admitting Vardarelli to their society. I was convinced that by organizing in military order ten thousand Carbonari, in my own division, and presenting myself at their head in my own native country, liberty would be the undoubted result.

I began my operations by assembling at my own house the principal authorities of Capitanata, and the citizens most noted for their morality, wealth, and intelligence. I presented for their inspection a list of the officers of the militia, telling them that it was necessary to separate all such as were poor or incapacitated for the service, and especially all such as were not of good morals, so as to make the uniform of an officer be respected throughout the two provinces. The meeting was numerous, and I could perceive by their countenances that many were influenced in the disposal

of their votes, by the fear of compromising themselves with regard to their connections of friendship, of relationship, or of gratitude. Amongst others were several priests, who were prevented by Christian charity from speaking the truth. I kept my eyes fixed upon the faces of several honest landholders, that I might read in them their opinion upon the selections to be made. After much difficulty and perseverance, I succeeded in obtaining the names of about two hundred honest, wealthy, and active citizens, who were to command the militia. According to the organic decree, the Lieutenant-Generals themselves proposed the officers. When my report reached the ministers, they perceived that I had consulted many respectable persons, and even priests. They extolled my wisdom, and approved every thing that I proposed, even the nomination of the Marquis de Rosa to the rank of Colonel. This young man was honest, active, accustomed to command under Joachim, and above all, a warm Carbonaro. By means of X., and the chief officer of my staff, Deconcili, I made arrangements for all the militia officers who were not yet Carbonari to be received into that sect; amongst those who became Carbonari, was a rich landholder of Sansivero, named Di Sordo, whom I had made a Major. In this first and most important operation, I at once perceived that the Calderari had no influence in the kingdom, and far from being annoyed at them on account of their anti-liberal feelings, I would gladly have seen them more numerous, that they might attract the attention of the Government, and consequently divert it more from the Carbonari.

The second operation which remained to be performed, was the selection of the militia-privates and their non-commissioned officers, who either did not exist at all,

or else had been ill selected. The other Generals in the kingdom had entrusted this selection to their subordinates, or the prefect; the result of which was that the choice fell upon the poorer or less substantial citizens, whilst the young men of more wealthy or influential parentage escaped through the usual bribery and corruption employed in such cases. I was determined upon personally enrolling them myself in the middle of the public square, to which, however, two difficulties were opposed. In the first place, there existed no other lists of the citizens in their communes, but that of the curate and the civil list of the *Code Napoléon* adopted by us. The former were inaccurate, and the latter having been so recently brought into use, comprised only the citizens who were too young for the purpose. Secondly, the law states that such citizens only as pay a certain yearly land tax shall serve in the militia. Now, it often happened that those who did pay this amount of taxes were mendicants; whilst others who did not pay any, not possessing any landed property, were wealthy. Without heeding the question whether taxes were paid, I made myself acquainted with the actual degree of fortune of the different citizens in each commune.

In the great square, surrounded by the curate, the local authorities, the principal citizens and all the population, I often executed this task in the midst of a pouring rain. These assemblies were called by some witty persons the *Comidj*, which name was subsequently applied by the population, who did not exactly understand the signification of the word. After a month of uninterrupted labour, I succeeded in selecting in these provinces five thousand militia, beginning with the richest. The least wealthy were to possess means,

however, of providing their full uniform at their own expense, and of sparing two or three days in the month to the drill, without suffering much by such a sacrifice. Let the reader imagine a circumference containing ten or fifteen thousand inhabitants, with a company of militia of about a hundred and fifty men, composed of the citizens of wealth, birth and strength of limb; how in such a space could I have done otherwise than succeed in obtaining all I wished? One company formed a *Carboneria vendita*, and the Carbonari not belonging to the militia, formed another, which was called *Pagana*. The companies were incited to execute my orders with precision, from an *esprit de corps* and of sect, from their conviction of the patriotism of my intentions, and finally from the hand of iron, and yet of affection, with which I commanded them. I said to the Captains, in my orders of the day, "Delinquencies will disappear if the delinquents are imprisoned when they commit them. If, when a crime has been committed you do not succeed in giving up its author into the hands of the gendarmes, you must immediately present yourselves at my head-quarters to justify your conduct."

My orders of the day were printed, numbered, and plainly and briefly drawn up: if they were not models of style, they were filled with morality and patriotism. I should have been ashamed to say, "such a thing must be done for the service of the King and country:" my words were, "for the country and the King." On several occasions I wrote in these orders of the day: "We must thank the King for having granted the institution of a militia: thanks to which our country will soon see happier days." My friends were often alarmed at the boldness with which I expressed myself. Before I quitted Capitanata, the Intendant, Intonti,

invited me to a grand dinner. On this occasion, I addressed myself to the guests, saying, that for the rarity of crimes, and internal security, the province in the course of a few months would surpass the rest of Europe. They all smiled at my words: but six months later, at another dinner given me by the same Intendant, Intonti, the smile no longer appeared on their lips. It must not be supposed that I did all this quietly: if a man acts with justice, where such a sentiment has never been known, those who are punished look upon him as a tyrant. Florestano, my eternal pest as an adviser, wrote to me, "you will be recalled upon the plea of madness!" to which I replied, that if they only allowed me to proceed a few months longer, they would entreat me rather to keep the command. I had sent several young men of the first families prisoners to the Castle of Manfredonia, because, proud of their birth and fortune, they had refused to assume the uniform, and serve as private soldiers.

On my return to Avellino, I went through the same course of operations as at Capitanata. The Carbonari of Avellino were more ardent than those of Foggia, so that I was obliged to tighten rather than relax my hold of the bridle, having many eyes bent upon me; but fortune was then favourable to me. The King was taken seriously ill, and his life was looked upon as in danger: the Liberals, who formed the intellectual portion of the nation, showed great sorrow at this, as they looked upon the Duke of Calabria—the intimate friend of Canosa, and the Calderari—as heir to the throne. On the restoration of the King to health, the ministers and his courtiers imparted to him all the affectionate demonstrations evinced towards him by the Liberal party, so that the King, by way of manifesting

his gratitude, had his hair, (which he had hitherto worn in a long tail) cut short.

It is necessary it should be known that before 1799, many young men of good families had been imprisoned for having cut off this said tail, and then condemned to serve as private soldiers: it was even at that period looked upon as a badge of the blindest obedience to the monarchical principle. The courtiers all hastened to follow the example of the Prince, and had their hair cut on the same day as his Majesty. This farce made so much noise, that the Liberal party thought they already held in their hands the charter of free institutions; the more so, indeed, that the ministers showed so much indulgence towards the Carbonari, as to awaken the idea that they approved of them. A chamberlain of the King cut the *queue* from one of his colleagues, who made a complaint to his Majesty, but the mutilator was not punished.

The year 1819 had begun, and I was again in Capitanata, examining the result of what I had already done there. By way of trial, I arranged that the different companies from the surrounding neighbourhood should assemble at Foggia; they amounted to about two thousand well-dressed men, with an excellent military band. I had exacted that all should wear gloves, which prevented the appearance of any difference between the young men of family and the sons of wealthy husbandmen. Many years after, I saw the French soldiers wearing gloves, a spectacle which excited my laughter. I look upon what is allowed to the militia as totally unfit for the regular soldier: in the latter, I like to see cleanliness, and elegance of uniform and arms; but he should avoid every thing which renders a man effeminate. According to Taci-

tus, the Romans were used to laugh at those legions which, having been in Germany, had been constrained by the rigour of the climate to wear drawers. The militia, being assembled at Foggia, now began to feel confidence in its own power; and the landholders, seeing in it an established protection, instead of providing the banditti with arms, clothes, and money, received them with musket shots. All the warrants of arrest were now put into execution, and the certainty of falling into the hands of justice for every delinquency, however trifling, caused none to be perpetrated. The only banditti who were not taken, were those who had repaired to the boundary province of Molise, which was not under my command: amongst these was the band of Minotti. As most of these men were natives of Capitanata, which is the far wealthier province of the two, they made constant marauding expeditions from one into the other. They never staid, so that it was necessary to stop them on their passage, which was by no means easy to execute, as they were well mounted, and inured to warfare. When alone with the militia officers, I used to observe that the honour of the Carbonari demanded that all these robbers should be destroyed to wash away the stain inflicted upon them by the reception of Vardarelli into their sect. Amongst the several officers whom, although Carbonari, I punished severely, as they were wanting in energy in the proper execution of my commands, were a Captain Torio, a rich landholder, whom I arrested and sent to Viesti, in Gargano, and another wealthy captain, whom I sent to the Castle of Manfredonia.

The inhabitants of Apulia, on their way to Naples, were obliged to pass through the famous valley of Bovino, where they were often attacked, robbed, and

obliged to pay a ransom before they could recover their liberty. On my arrival there, I found pillars of brick supporting the heads of brigands who had been executed. I immediately used my authority, and caused those pillars—the material signs of unavailing barbarity—to be pulled down, and the valley to be guarded by a body of militia, until the plunderers scattered about Molise should be destroyed. Alarmed at the active vigilance of the militia, several of these wretches, through the agency of their wives, sought to obtain their pardon, offering, in return, to murder their companions. I replied, that laden as they were with crimes, they must all be put to death. The ministers approved of all that I did, and were satisfied to learn that I had already reviewed two thousand militia at Foggia, well clothed and equipped at their own expense. Nevertheless, I soon received a circular letter, designed exclusively for the Lieutenant-Generals of the army, stating that without an express command from the Minister of War, no Lieutenant-General had a right to assemble more than two companies of militia, whether to review them, or for any other reason. I was made aware by this, that the militia was looked upon with suspicion by the government as a kind of two-edged sword. It happened one day, that twelve men and a sergeant deserted from a regiment of cavalry quartered in Aversa: they proceeded towards the province of Avellino, with the intention of forming a large band. On receiving intelligence of this, the King exclaimed, "The sad doings of Vardarelli are renewed, and God only knows how long they will last!" The Minister of War immediately despatched an officer of the staff with a letter to me, which stated that the maintenance of discipline, and the public

tranquillity demanded the arrest or destruction of these deserters; and that the King was extremely anxious that the one or the other should be forthwith set about. I replied briefly, that in the event of these deserters setting foot upon the territory under my command, they should be arrested and put to death. In my capacity of General, and chief of the Carbonari, I had taken such measures as rendered it impossible that they should escape me. The minister daily repeated his letters through the medium of other officers, and I continued to reply in the same curt manner. After a couple of days, I was enabled to inform them, by means of the telegraph, that two of the thirteen deserters had been killed, and that eleven had been arrested by the militia, which was likewise in possession of their arms and horses. The ministers now began to perceive that a moral revolution had taken place in the public spirit of these two provinces.

A few days afterwards, the mounted band of the sanguinary Minotte, having been driven into Sannio, entered into Capitanata. The telegraph spread this intelligence, and the militia in the surrounding country, united in companies, lay in wait as though in expectation of a furious lion. The banditti rushed out from the woods of Serra Capriola, threw themselves into the Gargano, beat the militia of San Nicandro, several of whom were wounded and three fathers of families killed. This band inured to the use of the musket on horseback, had the audacity to enter the extensive plains of Foggia. Colonel Rocco, who commanded a regiment of cavalry, stationed in that city, immediately sent one squadron to Troja, whilst another, commanded by Major Basile was sent in pursuit of the brigand's band. Basile was an extremely brave officer, and I

recollect Murat saying to me one day: "Ce Basile me fait rappeler les aides-de-camp de l'Empereur." For the better chance of falling in with Minotti, Major Basile divided his squadron into several detachments, retaining only four and twenty horsemen with him. It having been reported that the band, fatigued by long riding, had sought shelter in a farm forming a triangle with Foggia and Troja. Basile advanced in that direction. Before long he perceived the banditti about to attempt to escape, but a woman standing by said to them, "the soldiers are not more numerous than you are, and yet you would fly!" Hearing these words, they immediately prepared to defend themselves. Basile sounded the charge, and on reaching the farm, he found it surrounded by a kind of moat, bordered by hedges, which served to carry off the rain water. The fire of the enemy was most murderous, and it soon became necessary for the detachment, in which several men and horses were wounded, to retreat. Basile himself was the last to execute this movement; as he did so, the plunging of his horse caused his helmet to fall off, stooping to pick it up with the point of his sword, he leant too much to the left; his weight caused the saddle to turn and he fell to the ground. His men durst not come to his assistance under the sharp fire kept up by the enemy; the banditti seized upon the Major, whom Minotti wished to keep as a hostage. One of his followers, however, a lad of scarcely eighteen years of age, to whom bloodshed was a pleasing pastime, and who had already stained his hands in many murders, killed Basile with a musket shot. The brigands finally terminated their murderous expedition by retreating through the woods, which rise above Troja. I was extremely grieved at the fate of Basile,

and I warmly recommended to the Government his unmarried and unprotected sister. The Government was not, however, generous either towards this poor girl, or towards the families of the three men who had lost their lives at St. Nicandro. If these events afflicted, they likewise caused me the satisfaction of feeling, that the militia of Capitanata, unsupported by the regular troops, had on various occasions bravely attacked the bands of Minotti composed of men rendered desperate by my order of the day, which said, that for the honour of humanity they must one and all perish without the most distant hope of mercy. At my request, the Minister of War sent troops into Sannio to drive them thence, and oblige them to take refuge in Capitanata. They did return, but it was for the last time. They found the militia all up in arms, between Nocera and Troja. They were assaulted by the same squadron, which had been commanded by Major Basile, and were entirely destroyed; for the banditti who were not killed on the spot, were executed in conformity to the sentence of the court-martial, which was only obliged to verify that the malefactors taken were upon the list of outlaws.

The moment was now arrived in which I was able to forward to the Ministers of War and of Justice, the report which I had been so long anxious to send. My report stated that two thousand warrants of arrest had been executed in the two provinces under my command, and that no more remained to be put in force. That the two provinces were now cleared of robbers and banditti; that travellers might freely pass without escort and in the most perfect safety, and that these provinces would continue in the same state without the aid of troops. This report, which was in perfect

unison with those forwarded by the administrative and judicial authorities, surpassed the warmest hopes of the King and Ministers. Before long, there occurred another circumstance calculated to confer additional reputation on the organization of this militia. A despatch reached me stating that an armed band had appeared in the province of Avellino. I gave no credit to such intelligence, which would have confounded my convictions, and what was far worse, destroyed the result of all my long and arduous labours by contradicting, in a great measure, my special report to the minister. However, renewed information of this circumstance obliged me to my great chagrin to believe it, although it seemed difficult to understand how an armed band of malefactors could have formed itself; for not even the most trifling delinquency remained unpunished. Without awaiting my orders, the militia was immediately up in arms, and on the third day I received information that the band had been formed upon the territory of Benevento, and that they had advanced into the province of Avellino, from whence they had fled on learning that the militia was in arms. A captain of the militia attacked them at the head of his company near Benevento, and killed the eleven bandits; the bodies of whom were placed upon two carts, and brought to the nearest judicial authority to have the fact certified.

This event made great noise, and gratified both the King and the ministers. I caused the Benevento territory to be surrounded by troops and militia, which I obstinately maintained there, until Medici sent thither, as Neapolitan resident, a Captain of the militia selected by myself. He was a well known Carbonaro, and received for this post a salary of forty

ducats a month. When I went to Naples, the Ministers Medici and Tommasi embraced me in testimony of their satisfaction, saying that my militia would serve as a model to that of the remainder of the kingdom, which would change the public spirit and tend to civilize the population. "For," added Medici, "the system of clothing the small landholders in elegant uniforms, showing themselves every Sunday in church, in good order and accompanied by a band of music; and the practice of military exercises, these are all means of increasing civilization." Medici spoke truly; and both he and the other ministers enlarged in such warm terms upon the necessity of promulgating a system of civilization, that one would have thought they had a Constitution in their portfolio about to be published on the following day.

In fact, I was in the habit of making the militia attend mass regularly every Sunday in full uniform. On quitting the church they were exercised in the management of their arms, and in the *Ecole de Peloton*. At first they executed their exercises in a listless, careless manner, but they soon found a pleasure in showing themselves in their uniforms to the female portion of the population, whilst the latter evidently gloried in beholding their husbands and brothers, thus brilliantly accoutred. Several of my friends asked me why I compelled others to go to church whilst I never went there myself. I replied, that the King being, or affecting to be extremely devout, whilst at the same time he showed himself extremely tolerant of the religion of those about him, it did not accord with my principles to play the courtier, instead of availing myself of the spirit of tolerance manifested by the King. Although during the preceding year the King had signed an

agreement with the Pope, for the advantage of Rome, to the detriment of our rights, to assuage, as he said, his remorse of conscience, he nevertheless did not interfere with the belief of individuals. Upon this point, it must be said, that he was seconded by his ministers, who aware that during the ten years of the reigns of Joseph Buonaparte and Murat, the clergy had been entirely crushed by the sale of their property, it would have been an act of folly to attempt reviving the former spirit of intolerance. As an instance of the progress we had made, as far as regards religious superstition, I must relate what took place in the village of Gioja in Cilento, a district far less civilized than the others on this side of the Strait. The command of the militia was held here by a certain Captain Salati. He was eminently moral and inclined to do good; but far from being a devotee, he avoided all religious observances. A superior of friars taxed the Captain with irreligion, and even went so far as to excommunicate him. This officer laughed at the friar, who one Sunday caused the altar to be covered with black cloth, and in a loud voice read the excommunication of the Captain in presence of the whole congregation. But the season of anathemas was over. The people tumultuously rose, and in their indignation would have inflicted immediate death upon the friar, whose name was Padre Ambrogio di Attavilla, but for the Captain who generously interfered to save his life.

The February of 1819 had now arrived, and gratifying had been the result of my indefatigable labours. I had succeeded, out of a population of more than eighty-thousand inhabitants, in forming ten thousand of the most wealthy landholders into companies and

battalions, full of enthusiasm for the sect to which they belonged, and adhering to the most rigid discipline. A trite Italian proverb says, " L'abito non fa il monaco," (the cowl does not make the monk), but the elegant uniform of the militia produced a great effect by exciting their imagination; and as they received continual instruction, they acquired thereby confidence in their own military power. I myself kept the roll of the different companies. Each militia-man had his number and description, stating his age, his reputation, whether he was a family man, his fortune, whether he was a good rifle, &c. I had similar descriptions of the officers, who amounted in number to about four hundred, besides which, observations written in my own hand, stating the degree of influence which each exercised in the Carbonari. In my orders of the day I praised them highly, now for one merit, now for another, and thanked them, in the name of the country, just as if our country existed under a state of slavery. I avoided as much as possible all mention of the King; but when obliged to do so, it was never in servile terms, and this dignity of manner tended perhaps to lull all suspicion. In my circular letters, exclusively addressed to the Colonels and Majors, I offered to serve such militia-men and officers, as might stand in need of my recommendation with the ministry. I had already procured favours from the Government for several officers, and, thanks to my intercession, X. had been advanced from sub-prefect of the third class at Bovino to that of a first class at San Severo. I had requested to have as the head of my staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Deconcili, who had been recommended to me by Carascosa, and who was a brave soldier and a liberal-minded man. Being a native of Avellino, he

was minutely acquainted with the entire province, and used to remark to me: "You have morally intoxicated the militia, and it will blindly follow you whenever you think it time to act." This was corroborated by a great Carbonaro, Giuseppe Marini, who had been Procurator-General under Joachim at Avellino; and afterwards exercised the profession of advocate. He was a man of high respectability and great knowledge. The same observation was likewise made to me by Pietro di Lucca, a young man of high character, a native of Montefiore, and Counsellor of the *Intendance* of the same province of Avellino.

In the month of March of the same year I undertook a survey of the whole division in order to review the militia by company in their different stations. It was a noble sight to behold in wild regions which, during times past, had been as it were separated from all social communion, a militia clothed with the greatest care and elegance, and many amongst them well versed in military exercises. It did not meet my views to enter into the *Baracche* of the Carbonari (for thus did they term the places of their meeting); but I was well informed of all they did. Their morals were extremely pure, and differed but little from those of the Freemasons, leaning, however, more towards the evangelical. My orders of the day prescribed severe punishments to such militia-men as should be found in a state of drunkenness, or detected in the habit of frequenting wine-shops. If a militia-man was found guilty of intoxication the second time, he was pronounced unworthy to wear the uniform of his comrades, and was condemned to do duty in plain clothes. After this, all who had at first refused to procure themselves an uniform were now ashamed to be seen without one.

I had suggested to the officers the expediency of causing such militia-men as were not already possessed of the knowledge to be taught to read and write, and like good cousins (for thus did the Carbonari term each other) to give them instruction and show them the horrors of servitude, and the moral and social advantages of liberty. The officers were enjoined to pay especial heed to the cleanliness of their soldiers, as being a source both of health and civilization, and to do so in minute detail, as in those times the virtue of cleanliness was little known in that country, even amongst the more wealthy classes of citizens. When I arrived in the district of Monte St. Angelo, in Gargano, I found the militia of that part of the country composed of a race of men admirable for their stature and warlike appearance, although the having cut off their long black curling hair, according to my orders to preserve an uniformity of appearance, did not set off their natural advantages. I next descended into Manfredonia, the militia-men of which city differed as wholly from those of Monte St. Angelo, as if they had belonged to two countries separated by several thousand leagues. Those of Manfredonia were so refined and good-looking, that I at once termed them the "Cadet Militia."

At Foggia, on account of the wealth of the population, I had organized two companies instead of one; both of these were in remarkable good order. Before quitting Capitanata, I told the Marquis de Rosa, that the militia of the provinces of which he was Colonel, had done much by destroying the banditti and imprisoning the delinquents, but that the country expected from them another service of a different kind and of a higher order, and that I knew all would be executed

by them, thanks to their discipline and morality, which although generally enough diffused, ought to have a still stronger hold on the hearts of the young organized and armed Carbonari. I recommended him above all, to send me a list of such of the militia as had disgraced themselves by any dishonourable action, that I might efface their names from the company's list, indicating the reason in my order of the day. The times were now changed. A year before, such an order, instead of acting as a salutary restraint, would have served to instigate the men to misconduct themselves. I have already stated that the Intendant of Capitanata was an advocate named Intonti, who afterwards became Minister of Police: he was distinguished for his wit and intelligence; nevertheless, he had not yet penetrated into my views, and in a letter which he wrote from Avellino, to his friend Marini, he said that I was devoured by the ambition of being talked of, and of acquiring the favour of the King and Ministers. His opinion of me was extremely suited to my purpose, although unfortunately he did not long preserve it.

I returned into the province of Avellino, where my survey proved more gratifying to my feelings than had been that of Capitanata. Here I soon perceived that the militia was conscious of its power, and that it would not abandon me when the time came to act for the public weal. I had scarcely finished the review, when I received a despatch from the Minister of War, enjoining me to assemble, within the space of three days, at Avellino the militia of that province, amounting to about five thousand men, to be reviewed by the King and the Emperor of Austria, who had arrived at Naples within the last few days. The despatch went on to state, that these Sovereigns would be accom-

panied by the Empress, Prince Metternich, the Minister Medici, and the Minister of War, Captain-General Nugent.

The King had conducted himself after his return in a manner which evinced his desire that all the horrors he had perpetrated in 1799 should be forgotten. He committed no arbitrary act; although, to the detriment of the public interest, he manifested his gratitude towards the most conspicuous of his *fedeloni*, by rewarding them with places, the duties of which they were utterly incapable of performing. At the same time he looked with a favourable eye upon the Murattini, who *à tort ou à raison*, were regarded as liberals. Many of them belonged to the Carbonari, and by reason of their capacity were daily put in possession of employments in judicial and military offices. The ministers were upon such good terms with the liberals, and talked so much about liberalism, that they were termed Jacobins by the Calderari. In the midst of all this, however, there did not exist a shadow of hope of obtaining a Constitution, or even such liberal institutions as might have ameliorated the condition of the people who were in a state of extreme misery, under the weight of which no progress in civilization can possibly be obtained. Moreover, the Austrians were in Italy, and the King of Naples might justly enough be termed, the first vassal of Austria. All the civilian classes of the nation were anxious to effect the downfal of despotism; the people were disposed to second them; the same feeling existed in the army; I with ten thousand landholders, well organized under the name of militia, and several bodies of the line, was ready to form the nucleus of a revolution, either in the immediate kingdom or all over Italy.

Having, although rapidly, related the condition of the south of Italy, the question was, having that knowledge in my mind, whether, should these precious personages fall into my hands, I ought to arrest, and make them serve as hostages for Italian freedom. There is much to be said on this point; but I will merely record what were my intentions, and how my plan, which has all the appearance of romance, was frustrated. Before I had quite finished the perusal of the minister's letter, I was in a state both of moral and physical fever. I thought that I already held the fortunes of the whole of Italy, from Trapani to the Alps, in my own hands. The attempt was of a daring nature, but not sufficiently so to divert my patriotism. I decided upon arresting the King, the Emperor, the Empress, Metternich, Medici, and Nugent. Their guard would be confided to a hundred officers and subalterns of the militia, who were Grand-Masters of the Carbonari. It was my intention to send them, thus escorted, to the city of Melfi in Basilicata. Accompanied by a thousand militia, the other four thousand, and the five thousand of Capitanata, two battalions of the line, who were in Avellino, and a regiment of cavalry stationed at Foggia, the whole would have formed a camp around Melfi, sufficiently distant from the two seas. It is needless to relate all the projects which I hoped to effect after this illustrious capture. I do not think, however, that there will be a single reader who is not convinced that some great consequence, beneficial not only to the Two Sicilies, but to the rest of Italy might have resulted. The King and Emperor were both so timid that they would have conceded every thing. It may be said, that the powers of Europe would probably have sent an army against Naples, as had been done by

Louis XVIII in Spain, when the Cortes had all the Royal Family in their hands. But it is a very different thing from dealing with a whole congress, to have to do with one resolutely determined man.

I issued the necessary orders to assemble the five thousand militia, not one of whom failed to appear. Had the sovereigns come, I should infallibly have carried my plan into execution, leaving the rest to fortune, who seemed to make a jest of me and my projects.

The King, the Emperor and their suite from the chase of Persano arrived in Salerno, where they changed horses before continuing their route to Avellino. General Colletta, who commanded Salerno, presented himself to pay his homage to the royal travellers. The King inquired of him his opinion of the state of the cross-road leading thence to Avellino. The General made them believe that it was in so deplorable a condition as to render it utterly impossible that they could proceed thither in safety with post-horses. On hearing this declaration of Colletta, the King and Emperor abandoned the idea of the review, desiring Nugent to despatch an officer of the staff to tell me that they could not come, but that they would do so another time; adding, that after reviewing the militia myself, I was to dismiss them to their respective villages. Colletta had been actuated to exaggerate the badness of the road by the corroding jealousy which lacerated his soul on finding that my militia so attracted the attention of the King as to make him wish to show them to the Emperor of Austria, whilst he (Colletta) in Salerno, and in the rest of the military division under his command had not been able to organize a single battalion which would bear inspection.

During the three days in which I expected the arrival of the sovereigns, I never closed my eyes. I did not communicate my plans to a soul, lest they should tend to compromise anybody; but chiefly from my certain conviction, that whatever orders I gave would be blindly and implicitly obeyed. I simply informed myself through the advocate Marini of the names of the militia who were Grand-Masters of the Carbonari. The five thousand militia and two battalions of troops of the line were ranged in order of battle in the great square of Avellino, when instead of the sovereigns, I saw an officer arrive, bearing the despatch to which I have already alluded. Thus were dissipated all the delightful hopes I had cherished, and which were by no means without great probability of success. One of the battalions of the line was of riflemen, commanded by Major Astuti, who had fought with such valour under my command both in Spain and along the Po. Ferrari, who twenty years later became Colonel of the foreign Legion in the service of France while in Spain, and whose praises were sounded by the public press of the day, was adjutant-major in the same battalion. He was an excellent Carbonaro, and I remarked his manner of directing one of the militia battalions under the order of their commander. I caused the militia to execute several evolutions conjointly with the troops, and I found them far better trained than I had anticipated. After the militia had withdrawn, I was informed by the advocate Marini that they had all their pouches full of cartridges, in the expectation that together with the two battalions of the line, and followed by the militia of Capitanata and the cavalry regiment from Foggia, we should have marched upon Naples. The militia Carbonari corresponded with the military Carbonari,

so that these two bodies mutually inflamed each other in favour of freedom. Greatly chagrined at thus losing an opportunity of overthrowing despotism, I consoled myself with the idea that another time fate would prove more favourable to my designs.

A few days later I was in Naples. General Nugent told me that the Emperor of Austria wished to learn without delay the arrival in Manfredonia of one of his small vessels of war. Having received intelligence of its arrival I went to impart it to Nugent, who was with the Emperor and Empress of Austria, in the royal academy denominated La Nunziatella, from the terraces of which they were watching the ascent of a balloon. Not being in uniform, I sent in word to Nugent that I desired to speak with him. He came out, and ushering me to where the Emperor and Empress stood, he presented me to them. Their Majesties received me with the greatest courtesy. Fain would I have repaid it to them with interest at Melfi in Basilicata, in which case they would never have given Silvio Pellico so much occasion to become celebrated.

CHAPTER VI.

1819—1820.

Count Capo d'Istria—The King bestows upon me the Grand Cross of St. George—I decide upon commencing the revolution —My contest with Prince Pettoranello, Intendant of Avellino, and Gentleman of the King's Bedchamber—The Spanish Ambassador, Labradore—Revolution in Spain, where the Constitution of 1812 is proclaimed—Colletta is deprived of the command of his division—I concert with Colonel Russo and with the cavalry regiment of Bourbon—Conduct of the Intendant Intonti at Foggia—The Chevalier Marcelli—I refuse to receive in my division Lieutenant-Colonel Lanzetta.

The King hated every thing which recalled to his mind the reigns of Joseph Buonaparte and of Murat; he therefore looked with an evil eye upon the order of the Two Sicilies founded by Joseph. Accordingly, he abolished this order; but not to act unjustly towards the army, which had been favoured by the treaty of Casa Lanza, he created another as a substitute for it. This was the order of St. George. It was exclusively a military decoration, and was given by a chapter of Generals for service rendered to the State. At the first chapter it was conferred on all the officers of the dissolved army who had obtained the order of the Two Sicilies, as well as to those who had accompanied the

King back into the kingdom. A decree declared the King to be Grand Master of the order; the hereditary Prince to be Grand Constable; the Generals-in-chief to be Companions; and the Generals most renowned for their military services to be Grand Crosses; then followed other and lower grades to the number of eight. I was Commander of the order of the Two Sicilies, and was made a Grand Cross of the new order of St. George, as a testimonial of the satisfaction of the King with my services. For more reasons than one, I could have wished that the King had overlooked me on this occasion.

Not for a single moment did I lose sight of my great work for the regeneration of my native country; but I daily felt the responsibility which rested upon me increase. I was no longer the turbulent and rash *Tribune* of the days of Joachim Murat. Then, many other Generals shared, or affected to share, my sentiments; then two of the Allied Princes were up in arms; the Colossus Napoleon was not yet fallen in the early part of 1814; and when he did fall, and was sent to the island of Elba, the Allied Sovereigns were not perfectly in accord; and we had not yet been humbled by the invasion of Austria; nor was the army divided into Murattini and Fedeloni landed from Sicily. Had we at the first compelled Joachim to grant us a Constitution, the other Princes of Europe would never have hastened to his assistance to undo the good work. But now our situation wore a totally changed aspect. It might be said that the internal state of things was improved, for the Carbonari had extended itself considerably in the corps of the army and in the nation, and had gained a powerful standing in my well-

organized militia, and in a young General, who had given every possible guarantee for his love of liberty. But with regard to foreign nations, our position was more disadvantageous than ever. After the fall of Napoleon, the potentates were closely united. The Italian population beyond the Tronto was in a state of torpor; the excellent Generals of the fallen kingdom of Italy assumed the Austrian uniform without any signs of repugnance, and our army composed of the Fedeloni returned from Sicily, and the Murattini were divided by disputes and contentions. Many of Murat's generals were excellent officers, but few of them had the hearts of good citizens, uncontaminated by the servile spirit of true courtiers.

In such a state of things, precipitation would have been unworthy of a chief who had his country's welfare strongly at heart; but on the other hand, to temporize until an opportune moment should arrive was a most difficult thing; for not only was it necessary that I should restrain the ardour which I had excited in the Carbonari, but I was obliged to keep my eye upon those of the neighbouring province of Salerno, in which the Carbonari were numerous, disorganized, and without any chief of known reputation; so that several of less pretensions, from an immoderate ambition of elevating themselves above their brethren, were ready to risk the safety of the whole design. Lastly, I might have been removed from my post at any moment, which last powerful reason was urged by many citizens of sense and honour, as an incentive to me to act at all hazards. In the midst of so many difficulties, and contrary reasons, I decided not to waver, but to pursue my purpose with a true Calabrese spirit of firmness and

perseverance; and if doomed to be wrecked, to be so by my evil fortunes, not through weakness or ignorance.

The Prince of Pettoranello, Intendant of Avellino, was extremely devoted to the Court, and to this devotion he stood indebted for the post he held. He was exceedingly grieved at finding the population of the province so much attached to me; all the inhabitants of Avellino were either militia or Carbonari. Not knowing in what way to vent his dissatisfaction, the Prince wrote to me officially desiring that I would recal from the town of Monteforte a detachment of infantry which I had sent thither upon the plea that there were no quarters in which to lodge them. I immediately doubled the number of the soldiers forming the detachment. On his renewing his complaint, I increased the number to four times its original standing, to prove to him that he was interfering with what was solely my business. The Intendant upon this hastened to Naples, and throwing himself at the feet of the King, he entreated his Majesty not to allow him to make so sorry a figure in the province under his administration; accusing me at the same time of caprice, and of having the most stubborn head ever produced in Calabria. The King enjoined the Minister of Justice, Tommasi, to arrange the affair. The minister wrote, and desired me in the King's name to present myself at his office, when I made him read the article of the law, by virtue of which the lieutenant-generals, responsible for the peace of the provinces, are free to dispose according to their own will and pleasure of all the armed force stationed in them. Tommasi asked me, whether, to please his Majesty, I would consent to give the trifling satisfaction to the Intendant,

of withdrawing the troops from Monteforte. I replied that I was ready to render satisfaction to Prince Pettoranello with my sword, but not at the expense of my personal dignity, which I valued far higher than my rank. The minister repeated what I had said to the King, who arranged it that the Intendant should return to Avellino, and endeavour to live on a better understanding with me.

A few days after this, the militia of Sena Cupriola, a town of Capitanata, threatened the lives of two gensd'arme and of a land surveyor, sent thither by the tribunal to measure a piece of land which the Duke of Sena Cupriola claimed from the parish. The judges of the criminal tribunal thought that on such an occasion I would certainly favour and protect my beloved Carbonari militia; and both the judges and ministers of State were amazed when they heard, that by way of punishing them, I had sent them to a provisional battalion in Gaeta, where the most incorrigible soldiers of the army were forwarded by way of punishment. The organic law of the militia gave to the lieutenant-generals the exorbitant power of punishing the inhabitants in this manner. It was a most iniquitous power, since the flower of the citizens, being in the militia, were exposed to undergo this humiliating punishment upon the individual judgment of a general. Before these militia could reach Gaeta, I had written to the commander of the battalion, enjoining him to treat them well and keep them apart from the other soldiers, for I had had recourse to such a punishment merely to make a strong example. By an order of the day, I informed the militia, that the public security and peace, as well as the preservation of property being confided to them, their abuse of power would destroy all social

order, and their institution instead of a blessing, would become a curse. Some days later, after the above militia had by my order returned to their homes, seeing them pass before my quarters, I called them into my house and said to them, that the affection I bore the militia constrained me not to leave a single fault unpunished, for that without the most severe discipline their institution could be of no avail to the country. This circumstance produced a considerable sensation, and was variously judged. The Minister Tommasi himself remarked to me that he should never have expected to find me defending the Lords of the Manor in their quarrels with the parishioners. I replied that, thanks to heaven, there no longer existed anything but the empty title of baronial barbarism, and that my object in inflicting such a punishment had been the strict maintenance of discipline. It is very certain that the Ministers of State, who had distant misgivings of my intentions, and who looked upon me as devoured by the thirst for popularity, could not conceive how I had ventured to punish so severely the militia of Sena Cupriola. This act of rigour was of much avail, by lulling, for the time at least the suspicions of the ministry. They were ignorant that by the most rigid discipline, maintained with justice and kindness, popularity is acquired, not lost.

At the same time there occurred another affair which I relate merely to show what was the state of the government at that period. The office of the Director of the Police was held by the Marquis Patrizio, brother of the Lieutenant-Colonel of the same name, who had been, as I have already stated in a preceding chapter, dismissed by a committee at which I presided, for having yielded up the Castle of Aquila. This Director wrote

to the Commander of the Province of Capitanata, Colonel Russo, to order the Captain of the Militia of Vierti in Gargano to proceed to Naples, there to defend himself from the accusation of being a violent Carbonaro. The Colonel without consulting me, directed the Captain to depart, and to present himself to me at Avellino, to receive my orders relative to the requisition forwarded by Patrizio. As I was at Naples the Captain continued his way thither and came to me. I complained to Medici of the conduct of the Director of Police, who, instead of writing to me directly, had addressed himself to the Commander of one of the provinces under my orders, and I added, that if the government was desirous of summoning to the capital all the Carbonaro Militia, I would summon thither nearly the whole ten thousand of the division under my command. This frankness of speech on my part was much approved. The Director of the Police was treated as a fool by the minister, who requested me to send the Captain in question to him to thank him for the protection granted to him. The officer went, accompanied by my aide-de-camp, Cirillo: he was extremely well received by Medici, who even shook hands with him in testimony of regard. The Captain, who was one of the wealthiest landholders of Viesti, on his return home spread the report that I was acting in accordance with the minister to oblige the King to grant us a Constitution. This anecdote will clearly show how the Carbonari were tolerated by the Government, and why I was not deprived of the command of that division. It is possible that the King and ministers looked upon my orders of the day, upon my frequent addresses, and the partiality which I manifested for the Carbonari, as means which I employed

to bring the militia to the greatest degree of perfection, and as being useful in many ways to advance the civilization of my native country. But I am convinced that they supposed I was far either from desiring or daring to bring about a revolution; and as in the province of Salerno, contiguous to Avellino, the Carbonari were far more turbulent than in my provinces, being without any one to direct or restrain them, the Government had now reason to be satisfied with me. They ought, however, to have been conscious, and to have recollected what had been my conduct under Joachim, and how I had conspired to induce him to give us liberal institutions.

At this period, the Spanish Ambassador, Labrador, requested the Minister Medici to imprison the most openly professed liberals of the kingdom, and even went so far as to furnish a long list of them. Medici replied, that neither himself, Labrador, nor his Government had any right to interfere with the interior affairs of the King of the Two Sicilies, and the whole diplomatic corps openly disapproved the pretensions of Labrador.

Such was the political situation of our kingdom towards the end of 1819, when a great and unexpected event attracted the attention of all Europe. This was the revolution in Spain which broke out in the beginning of 1820. It scarcely seemed possible, that a people among whom the Inquisition still existed, as well as a clergy, extremely powerful, by reason of their immense riches, should have succeeded in throwing off the yoke of despotism. As the Spaniards constrained the King to swear to the Constitution of Cadiz, which granted as much liberty as could be desired, they acquired the sympathy of all the liberals of

Europe; and especially in the kingdom of Naples, they excited the warmest sympathy and admiration. Our King, as an Infant of Spain, having sworn fidelity to this Constitution, and its recognition by the powers of Europe, were two circumstances calculated to spur on the Carbonari to a movement; and, indeed, not only the Carbonari, but all the honest citizens of the kingdom who, without belonging to this sect, abhorred the weak absolute government which ruled us. Few in the kingdom were acquainted with the new Spanish Constitution, but all were aware that it had been dictated at Cadiz to a King who was a prisoner in France, and by a Congress wholly free, and therefore not exposed to the seductions of the Cortes. These circumstances caused every one eagerly to desire the Spanish Constitution.

In the month of March, when definite intelligence of the triumph of the Spanish Constitutionalists reached Naples, I was confined in the city to my bed with fever; I was scarcely recovered from this attack when another and a more violent one succeeded. It was a moral fever urging me to give freedom to my country, which was so much more advanced in its civilization than Spain; for there existed no Inquisition amongst us, nor a clergy powerful by their wealth, nor the remotest possibility that the Court could raise a sufficient number of citizens favourable to its interests to resist the Constitutional party for a single day. I returned to my quarters at Avellino, where I was better able to see the excitement produced amongst us by the revolution in Spain. Many persons employed in public capacities, and who did not belong to the Carbonari, revealed to me their ardent desire for a Constitution similar to that the Spaniards had acquired. Had the revolution burst

forth in France instead of Spain, I should not have hesitated a moment in hoisting the constitutional banner in some point of my division; but that nation not having moved, and Austria being ever ready to act against us, were circumstances to make great caution necessary. The fervent Carbonari of Salerno kept sending to urge me to move; I replied that they must first ascertain exactly the dispositions of the Calabrese and Abruzzi Carbonari, without revealing to them whether or not I had decided upon moving immediately. This business was transacted by persons incapable of treachery, with whom I only conferred alone and in secret. The liberals in Spain had fought for three months, and with dubious success, before the Constitution was proclaimed in Madrid. With us, had the King been able to stand out against the revolution only for one month, he would have had time to receive assistance from his beloved Austrians. Under such circumstances it was indispensable that our revolution should be accomplished in a few days, and without any disorder.

General Colletta, who commanded the military division, the head-quarters of which were at Salerno, alarmed by the attitude of the Carbonari, demanded extended powers and a large increase of troops to effect their destruction. Medici durst not consent to this proposal of Colletta, who on his part protested that he could not answer for the maintenance of further order in his provinces. He was consequently deprived of his command, and remained in bad odour both with the liberals and the Government. The ministers hesitated between the adoption of rigorous means of repression, and yielding to some extent to the liberal institutions so ardently desired by the kingdom. In the former event they

must have called in the Austrians; in the latter, they must increase the members of the *Cancelleria* (a species of council), one-half of which would be elected by the King and the other by the Provincial Council. This Cancelleria would have been divided into two houses of legislature, and no law could have passed without their consent. If the King had not been afraid of breaking the promise he had made at the Congress of Vienna, not to give liberal institutions to his people, he might have conceded to us a limited Constitution. Therefore, Ferdinand at the period of which I speak, and Joachim in 1815, being both urged by public opinion to give liberal institutions, declined to grant them in consequence of the insinuations and menaces of Austria.

According to the usual custom of Princes and weak ministers, ours did not dare hazard the granting of the limited kind of Constitution to which I have already alluded, and feeling reluctant to call the Austrians into the kingdom, they adopted a middle course suggested by General Nugent. This consisted in forming a field of instruction at Sepa, where the King was to exert himself to gain the hearts of the troops, and in particular to conciliate the affection of the Murattini officers. This blindness of King Ferdinand reminds me of that of James II. of England, who, fearing his people, got his troops together, a step which assisted his downfal at the very first appearance of William of Orange. Place men and nations in the same situations, and they will invariably commit the same errors. But without going so far back in search of examples, it was only six months previously that the Spanish revolution had been effected by the troops assembled by the King near Cadiz. In order to get together an army, it became necessary to weaken the garrisons and to call back the

troops from the different military stations. The Generals commanding these wrote to say that they did not dare to diminish their forces, and it was with the greatest difficulty that the Minister of War succeeded in recalling part of the troops stationed in the provinces.

When King Ferdinand addressed himself to me, I replied, that I would not only send to the camp the troops in my division, but a force of six thousand militia. My offer was on the point of being accepted, when a spirit of economy caused it to be rejected, and the six thousand militia remained in their homes. The King was, however, gratified at seeing that I did not stand in need of troops to maintain order in the provinces under my care. Nothing new occurred in the field of instruction, save that the Carbonari of the different regiments had occasion to establish a more intimate understanding between each other, and to see that they were not few in number, as I intend shortly to show.

I was now about to review, and for the last time, the militia of the two provinces under my command. I entered into Capitanata, and found the Valley of Bovino, which for many years, nay, for centuries, had been the resort of thieves and murderers, now as safe for the traveller as the most civilized parts of the kingdom. The inhabitants of this valley, mostly of the race of Albanises, and still speaking the dialect of their forefathers, had been, previous to my arrival in the division, wild and inclined to robbery and rapine; now, organized into a militia, they presented themselves in elegant uniforms, and were the most zealous protectors of public order and property. As I have already stated, the militia of each district formed a *Carbonaro Vendita*, styled a military one; the Carbonari not belonging to the militia formed another, which was called Pagana, who were in

the habit of assisting at my reviews for their own gratification, and always assembled around me to listen to my military addresses to the regular militia. At night, they lighted great bonfires upon the summit of the mountains, and displayed the Carbonaro flag in honour of my arrival amongst them. Even the municipal officers of the villages, when they came to meet me, used to salute me with the signals of the sect, to which I responded by my smiles. Russo, Colonel of a cavalry regiment of riflemen, commanded, under my orders, the province of Capitanata, and accompanied me on my tour through it. I recollected the conduct of this officer to me at Sinigaglia, and yet I excused it, flattering myself that he had revealed to Carascosa my intention of hoisting the standard of revolt at Geri, from an apprehension that the fact of the other generals not in union with me at the moment, would have been rather prejudicial than otherwise to our country. Now, this Colonel was the first to speak to me of a movement. Knowing his courage in the field, I opened my heart to him, but alone and in secret. He manifested the greatest satisfaction, and swore to support me to the last with his regiment, which was a fine one, and every other means of which he was master.

The country regiment of Bourbon commanded by the Duke of Lavrano, was quartered at Nola, not far from Avellino. In this corps were two subalterns Sub-Lieutenants Morelli and Silvati, both Carbonari; and Colonel Russo sent one of his officers, named Flessinga, to them to learn how far we might depend upon the co-operation of the regiment of Bourbon when the constitutional standard should be raised; the reply was most favourable. Besides my ten thousand militia, I could now, at the first outbreak of the revolt, have two

regiments of horse, a squadron of gensd'arme, and four battalions of infantry at my disposal. This force was more than sufficient to overthrow a very feeble government in a country where both the citizens and the army desired the downfal of absolute power. In a country where there is freedom of speech and writing, it is my opinion that these means only should be employed to ameliorate their social order, and not to further conspiracies; but when a nation is subjected to the galling yoke of an absolute power, where there does not exist the possibility either of writing, speaking or resorting to legal means to support public opinion, I look upon any and every means of shaking off such tyranny as justifiable.

Continuing my tour in Capitanata I reached the populous city of St. Severo, where the sub-intendant, at the head of the civil authorities and followed by numerous carriages, came out to meet me. Such a demonstration was painful to me, but I could not help it. When I was alone with the sub-intendant in his study, he spoke to me of the hatred manifested by the population of his vast district against absolute power; and he concluded by saying that the liberty of the whole united kingdom lay in my hands. He made me preserve a letter written to him from Foggia, by his superior and friend Intonti, wherein he exhorted him to open his eyes to the progress of the Carbonari, and especially of the Carbonari militia. After recommending him to exercise the greatest prudence, I revealed to him my intention of overthrowing the power of absolutism, and that the constitutional standard would most probably be hoisted in St. Severo, one of the cities under his care. On account of the vicinity of Avellino to Naples, where the government would be able to assemble the royal guard

and several thousand other troops against me, I should have been forced to have turned my back upon this force, a step which ought to be avoided by those who begin a revolutionary movement. In truth, San Severo was a city in every way adapted to commence the revolution, having in its front the valley and woods of Bovino, on its left Lucera, a populous city in a condition to offer some resistance; behind lay the extensive mountains of Gargano, on the right the woods of Sena Cupriola, from whence one passes into Sannio. X— promised me that he would act with discretion, and faithfully execute what I should thereafter enjoin him to do.

I went to Foggia to continue my review. Here I had to deal with the Intendant Intonti, who was a friend of the ministers and an extremely cunning and insincere man. I was informed afterwards that he had written to the Government that I ought not to be trusted. He received no answer at the time for this, but it served to promote him to the place of minister of the police by the King, after the ultimate fall of liberty. Although I mistrusted Intonti, my addresses to the militia were not less warm and patriotic than they had been before. The colonel of the militia, the Marquis de Rosa, said to me that he and his troops were ready; I exhorted him to persevere, but without revealing to him what were my plans. Intonti invited me to a grand dinner, where as usual he had assembled the chief authorities of the country, all of whom began to praise the quiet which existed in the province, and the excellent condition of the militia. Intonti on this occasion let fall the following words: "were they only as faithful as they are brave!" words which I affected not to hear.

On proceeding from Foggia in Ascoli, I was overtaken with my suite by so violent a storm of hail, that we all expected to perish from its effects. The people of the country told us that sometimes the hail there was of such size that it killed the oxen. In Ascoli di Capitanata I received a visit from the Chevalier Marulli, brother of the Duke of Ascoli, a great friend of the King, and one of his suite when he fled to Sicily. I was very much surprised when in presence of Colonel Russo and of Deconcili, Marulli said to me that it was high time that we should imitate the example of Spain, and that it would be easy to do so with the assistance of the militia. Russo, Deconcili, and other officers of my suite, declared the Chevalier Marulli to be a spy; but afterwards I ascertained that he was an honest man, who really desired the abolition of absolute power, notwithstanding the protection afforded by the King to his family.

From Capitanata, I entered into the province of Avellino, at Lacedogna. The municipal authorities, the militia and the clergy received me with Carbonari symbols; I smiled and said: "now indeed we are all of the same colour." At night there were fireworks, which likewise represented Carbonari signs. In the village of Frigento, which is built upon a somewhat high mountain, I might have thought myself in a republic. The young women of all classes had assembled there to behold their brothers and lovers in their handsome uniforms; and the ribbons which adorned their gowns and hair, manifested by their colours that the wearers were *giardiniere*, for thus do the Carbonari term the women admitted into their order. A corporal of the militia desired to be struck off the list, on account of his bad health, when all his companions

unanimously exclaimed: "Wretched man, you have lost your life as a citizen." This circumstance gave me inexpressible pleasure, and I said to myself, "they are now as intoxicated with patriotism as I could wish." Nevertheless, in the midst of the joy and hopes of all, a superior officer whispered into the ear of my good Pietro de Luca, "This General with his liberalism will send us all to end our lives on the scaffold." At Serino, a certain De Filippio, Intendant of another province, who was there by chance, on business, talked to me of the Constitution, as did likewise at Mereagliano, a Bishop named Abate. At Mirabella, the Canon Cappuccio, of whom I shall have to speak hereafter, came to meet me; I was obliged to request that he would moderate his zeal, not to compromise me with the Government more than I was already.

Whilst I was terminating my tour, of which many reports had been forwarded to the ministry, the camp of Sessa had been broken up, and I was informed of every particular. Everything in the camp turned out as might have been anticipated. The best and most numerous part of the army was composed of the Murattini. Instead of the valiant Murat, they had before them an old man notorious for his repeated flights and blood-thirstiness, and utterly incapable of command; a man who had introduced amongst them corporeal punishment which they regarded as infamous and degrading. Besides which, they saw shining upon the breasts of those who had returned from Sicily, the medal which they styled "*peace's fidelity.*" Even the officers of the dissolved army, with as pleasant feelings, observed rewards prodigally bestowed upon those officers who had accompanied the Court beyond the Straits. These circumstances tended to make such

soldiers as during ten years had fought in every part of Europe, zealous Carbonari of men who had not even belonged to the sect previously. The Generals of Murat wishing to ingratiate themselves with the King, and yet not entirely to lose the good opinion of the troops, were, as we say in Italy, neither fish or flesh.

As the military division, submitted to my care, had been the only one left entirely without troops, and yet enjoyed the most perfect tranquillity and security, I availed myself of the circumstance to laud the militia in a printed order of the day, where the name of country appeared more often than that of King. At this moment an unlooked for circumstance placed me in so difficult a predicament, that I was obliged either to precipitate things, or to count myself a lost man; but my good star still upheld me. Gennaro Lanzetti, a Neapolitan youth, had exercised the profession of advocate in 1799; by the fall of the Republic he became my fellow-prisoner in the public granary, and on board the corvette Stabia. I do not recollect how he first entered the army; perhaps when driven into exile he served in the corps of engineers. I met him afterwards in 1810, at Cotrone, where he was captain in the engineers whilst I was colonel. King Joachim raised him to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, decorated him with the order of the Two Sicilies, and if I do not err, gave him a grant of land. Being selected as one of the judges of the Court destined to sit in judgment upon Murat, not only did he accept the ignoble employment, but committed the infamy of voting the death of his benefactor. I do not know if the pain I experienced at the death of Murat was equal to the humiliation I felt at seeing the selection made of his own officers to sit in judgment upon him in preference to those come over from Sicily,

whilst those unnatural beings had not the heart to refuse so vile an office, or to hesitate to the death-warrant. As soon as the camp had been broken up, the Minister of War wrote to tell me that Lieutenant Colonel Gennaro Lanzetti would be sent to my head-quarters, as sub-director of the engineers of my division. On reading this despatch, I said to myself, "If they roast me alive, as they did St. Laurence, I will prove to my country that there are still officers of honour to be found in the army." My aide-de-camp, Cirillo, came to inform me that Lieutenant-Colonel Lanzetti was come to present himself to me to receive my orders. I replied, "Tell Lanzetti, that as he has rendered himself subject to the opprobrium of having been one of the judges of his King and benefactor, Joachim, he shall never serve under my orders,—never even speak to me."

The worthy Cirillo was astonished; he turned pale and said, "How! is it possible, General, that you should give me orders which must cause you every kind of misfortune?" I replied, that I had well weighed every consideration, and that I was determined. Cirillo came back to say that Lanzetti wished to be heard in his justification. I answered, that I would not hear what he had to say, unless he could declare that he had never signed the iniquitous death-warrant. Lanzetti returned to Naples, and my friends as well as the officers of my staff said to me, "The least we can expect is that we shall lose you." The militia of Avellino was in great consternation at learning what had occurred, and as they were aware that Murat's head was kept preserved in spirits of wine in the royal palace, some predicted my dismissal, some my exile; and what was still worse, Florestano was grieved at the occurrence; and when I

arrived in Naples, he told me that it would be better to quit the service altogether, than to commit acts of so imprudent a nature.

On presenting myself to Nugent, he said to me, "Vous me placez dans un très-grand embarras." I replied, that I was ready to suffer all; that somebody must uphold the outraged honour of the officers of the dissolved army, and that I should feel extremely grateful to him, if, without compromising himself, he could say to the King, that if by the caprice of fortune he should be driven from the kingdom, and that on returning he should fall into the power of his enemies, I would have my hand cut off before I would sign his sentence of death. Nugent repeated my words to the King, and as the Prince was aware of my continual contests with Joachim, the affair passed off. Lanzetti was sent to Gaeta, where he was well received by the General who commanded there. It will scarcely be credited that such a fact, far from injuring became of service to me, for the ministers thought that a General who was at the same time a conspirator, would have shown himself humble and devoted. As it was, they looked upon me as full of liberal and romantic ideas; but as one very far from having a revolution in his mind.

CHAPTER VII.

1820.

I decide on proclaiming the Constitutional Government in June—I hesitate between beginning the insurrection at Avellino or San Severo—My conversation with the Duke of Campo Chiaro, Count Zurlo, Carascosa, and Filangieri—The Minister Tommasi informs me that I am to have the command of the Calabrese—I determine to proclaim the Constitution on the 24th of June—Departure from Naples for Avellino—Plan of the insurrection—Russo and the Carbonari of Salerno fail me—I defer my movement until the month of July.

It was now the month of May, and I came to the resolution of commencing the revolution in the following month. In my own country, I was generally regarded as rash; but on this occasion if I erred, my error was on the side of prudence. It was my unalterable opinion that it is the duty of a man under such circumstances not only to attempt the destruction of despotism, but to bring about that great event without any pernicious acts or consequences, and with as little effusion of blood as possible. The difficulties which I encountered in the execution of my project, in spite of all the means at my disposal, may serve for an example to those who reading this work, and inspired by a love

of his country, may be induced to follow my example. I entrusted my plan to Colonel Russo, and to the chief officer of the staff, Deconcili; both advised me to defer its execution. Russo had been one of the first to offer me his support; Deconcili was already greatly compromised, having executed with zeal and patriotism all that I required of him. Not only had Russo assured me that he would be ready to execute my orders at any time with the regiment under his command, but through the medium of Lieutenant Flissenga, of his corps, he had obtained positive assurances from Lieutenants Morelli and Silvati that they would quit Nola at the head of their squadrons, and proceed to Avellino as soon as I should forward them my commands to that effect. I became aware at this time that it is much more difficult to induce a superior officer to embark in a revolution than to persuade a wealthy landholder to do so. After much hesitation, Russo and Deconcili promised to assist me.

'In the province of Molise there lived a certain Valiante, who, although no longer young, was yet vigorous, and had formerly served as a Colonel under Murat. As he was known to be a warm Carbonaro, the Director of the Police, Patrizio, gave directions to have him imprisoned. He was informed of this, and came to seek refuge at my head-quarters, offering me the assistance of the Carbonari of Sannio. As the presence of Valiante, in Avellino, tended uselessly to compromise me, to relieve myself of him I sent him to San Severo, where he was to be concealed by the sub-intendant, X—. I was desirous of knowing the progress the Carbonari had made, or rather the extent of increase of the spirit of patriotism in the kingdom; but I was not guilty of the folly generally committed by conspirators, of seek-

ing to extend the branches of an insurrection through all the provinces of a State, in the expectation that they would all rise simultaneously. If the desire of shaking off absolute power be general, it is quite enough that the movement take place in one particular spot, and with sufficient force to resist the first attack of the royal troops; the other provinces will then spontaneously follow the example set them. If, on the other hand, the feeling is not universal, the sending letters backwards and forwards only serves to betray the intentions of the conspirator, whence follow exiles, imprisonments, and executions, which have the effect of damping the energy of those who might be disposed to strike for their country.

I was still unsettled as to when I should begin my great work, whether at Avellino or San Severo. I have already stated the advantage in favour of San Severo. Avellino was too near the capital, from whence I might be attacked by the whole of the royal guard, before I could bring together the best part of my forces. In the midst of these considerations, I was obliged to go to Naples, to attend the celebration of the anniversary of the King's *fête*, which took place on the 30th May. I talked with Count Zurlo upon the situation of the kingdom, and the events of Spain; but without exposing my intentions to him. It was his opinion that, as Austria was upon bad terms with Russia, she would not dare to advance towards the South of Italy. I had some conversation likewise with the Duke of Campo Chiaro, who pressed me very closely, saying that he knew I was not a man to remain idle under such circumstances. He went on to observe that it was not Austria I should fear, but rather my brother Generals, who were not at all likely to risk the station they held

for the sake of realizing fine theories of patriotism. I replied that as to the internal affairs of the kingdom, they could do me no harm, since they had not a single soldier who would obey them. Campo Chiaro had recently obtained the post of Counsellor of the Supreme Cancelleria; nevertheless, he incited me to put my designs into execution, and his advice was not to be disregarded.

From his youth he had filled the office of minister, or of Ambassador, at almost all the Courts of Europe, besides which he had been Minister of the Police under Joachim. He shared in the opinion of Zurlo, that Metternich would never dare to send the Austrians across the Po, his fear of the ambitious Czar being too great.

My brother Florestano deplored the state of degradation and misery into which the State had fallen. He had refused to accept the employments offered him; but at the same time he earnestly exhorted me not to raise the standard of revolt. He dwelt upon the weakness and corruption of men, and above all, upon the tendency of the Generals to seek their own advantage only, instead of that of the State. He spoke to me of the duty of a soldier towards his King; as though my duty to my country should not be more present to my mind. On this subject my ideas differed so widely from those of Florestano, that I was obliged to conceal from him my projects. Yet I could not listen with indifference to this opinion from the lips of a man who was ambitious of nothing, who feared nothing, and who had fought with the utmost bravery for the national honour, which was profoundly impressed upon his heart. However, I replied to him, that the situation of our country was so bad, that it could not be made worse

by an attempt to better it, even should it prove abortive. As many other of his reflections were undoubtedly full of good sense, and such as I could not well oppose, I evaded them by saying, "Be it so; but is there not more merit in hoping against hope, and in attempting at all hazards to retrieve our country from the degradation in which she is plunged?" He answered that such sentiments were noble; but that many of those expressed by the hero of La Mancha were not less so. Not to leave any thing unattempted, I turned to Carascosa, who always felt the same friendship for me that had been established during our last campaigns.

Some time before I had revealed to him my intentions, faithful to his usual system, he demanded time to consider, and told me that he must wait until he had received the command of Sicily, but instead of bestowing it upon him, to whom in fact it was due, it was given to the Irish General, Church. Carascosa very naturally was indignant at finding an officer who, during the late campaign only held the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, preferred to him on this occasion. Hoping to profit by his anger, I informed him that every thing was prepared, and that union was necessary more to maintain than to execute the revolution; that on this account, and for the sake of our long friendship, I was desirous to see him, the senior Lieutenant-General, place himself at the head of the revolution, and that for my own part I had no other ambition than to see our country free. He thanked me, saying that he had always believed in the disinterestedness of my patriotism, and ended as usual, by advising me to wait for a propitious moment. Perhaps he said so to induce me to relinquish my intentions. Having long since satisfied myself that when men arrive at a certain age, they

never change, I gave up all hopes of him, and avoided speaking to him of my intentions. As he suspected that I intended to execute my project, and did not look upon the time as favourable, he often came to see me, and one day told me that he had heard that the ministers meant to arrest me, adding, that were such to be the case, he would immediately rise in open rebellion. Upon this, I exclaimed: "And why not do for the sake of liberty, what you would do for the freedom of your friend;" but all was in vain. As before in Ancona, he was opposed to my movement.

I have already said that by dint of activity and perseverance, the Carbonari of Salerno had caused itself to be recognized by many others in the kingdom, as the principal body of the sect. Notwithstanding this prominence of position, it soon became aware of its inability to act, for the most conspicuous of the Carbonari landholders had by no means the intention of rushing to arms at the call of inexperienced and obscure men. The Carbonari of Salerno foreseeing that I should begin the movement without their co-operation, concealed their feelings of ambition and wounded pride, and took the most idiotic step conceivable, which only seemed to compromise me, and injure the public cause. Without even informing themselves whether I was at my head-quarters in Avellino, they sent off to me a most ardent Carbonaro, named Macchiaroli, bearing a proclamation, about twenty thousand copies of which they had printed. This proclamation announced that the principal body of the Carbonari of the kingdom, resident in Salerno, had constituted me Captain-General of all the forces of the State, and that with it I was charged to destroy the absolute Government. Not satisfied with this, they gave Macchiaroli a kind of

diploma, on parchment, of this said Captain-Generalship. Not having found me in Salerno, Macchiaroli gave several of the proclamations and the diploma, to Lieutenant-Colonel Deconcili, who after some hesitation, received and carefully concealed them underground. Much grieved at seeing me thus exposed to danger by these people, and although suffering under an attack of fever, this officer immediately set off for Naples to inform me of what had occurred. In this dilemma it became a question with me, whether I should start for Avellino and there precipitate my plans, or remain quietly during some days at Naples. I decided upon adopting the latter course. My readers will be inclined to think that I placed too much confidence in the weakness of the government; but I felt certain that they would not dare to arrest me: first, because they had no proofs that could inculpate me, or reveal my intentions; and second, because they could not have attempted my arrest without calling in the Austrians, the ministers being doubtful whether they would be able without other assistance to keep down the Carbonari and militia. It is hardly possible that the ministers were not aware of the proclamation of the people of Salerno; in fact, they did know it, but they unanimously declared that the Carbonari wished to implicate me, and the more readily was this declaration made, that on the very day the proclamation was printed and published, I was in Naples. I am not so sure that the Government was informed of the circumstance of the diploma forwarded to me by means of Macchiaroli. The object of this silly demonstration of the Carbonari chiefs of Salerno was to encourage the idea that they had been the authors and directors of the revolution, which, when it really did occur, found them silent and inactive. From

this example, let conspirators learn never to place any confidence in men noted for their frivolity and vanity, for these moral maladies are of an incurable nature.'

To lull the suspicions which might hang over me, I used from time to time to see the Ministers Medici and Tommasi. The latter mentioned to me the necessity in which the Government found itself, of sending me to assume the command of the Calabrese, where there existed about three thousand warrants of arrest, which had not yet been carried into execution. As I supposed they meant to give me this command by way of detaching me from my militia, I endeavoured to find out by means of the chief of the division of the ministry, Cirillo, brother of my aide-de-camp, what were the intentions of the ministry, and I learned that in fact they thought of recalling General Nunziate from Calabria. Had I exerted myself during twenty months in those provinces as I had done in Avellino and Foggia, it is certain that a year later, neither the fifty-two thousand Austrians, the weakness of the Parliament, nor treachery itself, would have brought about the destruction of freedom in my country; or if it had, we should at least have fallen with honour. But I was so much compromised by the preparations made in the third military division, that I could not absent myself with any degree of security.

Once, while conversing with the Minister Medici, we fell upon a most ticklish theme. He told me that he had always praised my militia, and every thing I had done in the provinces under my command. "But," added he, "if your militia desire a Constitution, all the good you may have done is converted into evil." Without seeming disconcerted, I replied, "that were I

to conceal that they ardently longed for a Constitution, I should withhold the truth." Medici quickly resumed: "All that would be very well if you and I were King; but his Majesty is by no means disposed to give them what they wish." I answered "that it was no fault of mine, though the doctrines of the Carbonari had overspread the whole country, and that the affairs of Spain had rendered them bold. That I had certainly not been able to prevent that contagion from infecting my militia, but that I was very certain I should never see my authority over them weakened, and that if Generals might find themselves obliged to call in the assistance of the troops to maintain order in their respective provinces, General William Pépé would certainly not be one of them." Medici found nothing to reply to this, and I deceived him by means of the truth.

All loss of time now became an error on my part. We were in the middle of June, and I decided upon beginning my undertaking upon the 24th of the month. As this day was the anniversary of my patron saint, I could, upon such a pretext, invite to dinner several of the officers in my confidence. Amongst others I invited the brave Colonel Ligueri, who in 1814 had commanded a battalion of the first of the line under my command, but I did not communicate my design even to him. At this time a certain Firao di Mujda, of Calabria, came often to see me, telling me of his intimacy with the Carbonari of Salerno, and of the warm desire of these "good citizens" to be amongst the first to fight in their country's cause. Firao was a trustworthy man of mature age. I charged him to tell the Carbonari of Salerno to send three hundred chosen men, well-armed, to the top of a mountain which stands between Avellino

and Salerno, and bid them light several large fires upon it, at sunset, on the evening of the 24th of the month. The good and inexperienced Firao offered three or four thousand men, instead of three hundred. I replied that three hundred men were enough, adding, "May it only please God, that the small number I ask for come." I returned in the meanwhile to Avellino, and wrote officially to Colonel Russo, at Foggia, of which province and of a regiment of cavalry he was commander, telling him to come on the 23rd to my head-quarters, where I had to communicate with him upon official business. My letter was put into the post by the chief of my staff, Deconcili. In the division under my care, both the troops and the militia obeyed me with the greatest exactness, so much so, that they were wont to call me the *Old Man of the Mountain.*

My plan was extremely simple. As soon as Russo should arrive in Avellino, it was my intention to have ordered Major Florio, who commanded fifteen hundred militia in the district of Ariano, to occupy several telegraphic posts upon the route of Apulia and Calabria. He was to write to me officially upon the pretence that the district of San Severo was in a state of open revolt, and then to march with his men in that direction. I should then have sent orders to Colonel De Rosa to join the five thousand militia of Capitanata, and to march towards San Severo with them. Major Pisa, who commanded the cavalry in the absence of Russo, would likewise have received orders to follow De Rosa. I should have written to Naples to say, that I had marched with the militia of the province of Avellino, a battalion of riflemen, and the squadron of the regiment of Bourbon which was at Nola, to put down the insurrection which had broken out in San Severo. Whilst

they were holding council in Naples, I should have found myself on the morning of the 25th in Ariano, and two days later in San Severo, with forces more than sufficient to withstand the royal guard and any other body which might have stood by the King. The gensd'arme, both on foot and on horseback, were devoted to me. The Constitution would have been openly proclaimed at San Severo on the 27th or 28th of June. If the Carbonari of Salerno had appeared upon the mountain I had indicated to them, they would have attracted the attention of Government, and if attacked, were to retreat upon Bovino. I looked upon the arrival of Russo at my head-quarters as indispensable; for, in spite of all his promises, he was a man not unlikely to frustrate all the orders I had issued in Capitanata, where he commanded. He would not have done this out of any aversion to the revolution, but from being, like almost all military men, afraid of losing his rank in the army. By obeying my orders and joining me he by no means exposed himself: obedience being his duty. By not obeying my official summons, to come to my head-quarters at Avellino, he fully proved that I had not deceived myself in regarding his departure from Foggia as necessary. He afterwards excused himself on the plea that he had not received my letter. Neither did the Carbonari of Salerno appear, according to their promise on the night of the 24th. Had they done so, I should have been obliged to execute the movement with the Nola squadron, the troops and militia of Avellino. At the same time I should have written to Naples to announce the appearance of the Salerno Carbonari, taking care to exaggerate their number. Although the cavalry of Nola was not under my immediate command, I should have called it

out, pleading the urgency of the case. Now, on beholding the indecision or insincerity of the Salerno Carbonari and the weakness of Colonel Russo, I did not wish to precipitate, under anything less than an extreme necessity, the execution of my design. I was, besides, anxious to learn what had prevented Russo from coming to me, intending to act only after I should have heard from him. I did not ask the reason which prevented the Salerno Carbonari from keeping their promise, but more and more I had reason to see that little faith should be placed in the boasts and offers of sectaries and conspirators. To my guests I had not revealed my intentions, which were known to none but Deconcili; therefore this 24th of June, which was the most anxious of my whole life, passed off without any extraordinary occurrence. To lull the suspicions of the Government, I thought it as well to go and pass a few days in the capital.

CHAPTER VIII.

1820.

The Carbonari of Salerno being put to flight, seek a refuge at my head-quarters—A squadron of the Bourbon regiment revolts—My critical situation—It is decided that I am to put down this first movement—Carascosa is charged to go against the insurgents, who repulse the column of General Campana—The Government openly manifests its mistrust of me, but dares not order my arrest—Situation in which I find the militia at Avellino, the Carbonari, and the troops who had pronounced for the cause of liberty.

I reached Naples on the 27th of June, having first given directions to the chief of my staff to write me full particulars of everything that might occur in the division to which I decided to return as speedily as possible. Arrived in the capital, I visited the different ministers, who began to suspect me, but whose misgivings were somewhat baffled by seeing me far from my head-quarters. I had scarcely been two days at Naples, when I received intelligence that General Prince Campana had entered Salerno at the head of his troops to arrest a great number of Carbonari, the most implicated of whom, with Macchiaroli at their head, had sought a refuge in Avellino, where they were concealed by their fellow sectaries. Although I was in the capital,

the fact of my head-quarters having become the asylum of the fugitive Carbonari of the other provinces caused such suspicion to fall upon me, that I was upon the point of returning immediately to my division, effecting the first junction of my forces composed of militia, gensd'arme, and troops in Ariano, and then proceeding immediately to San Severo.

I had intended quitting Naples on the 3rd of July; but on the morning of the 2nd, Nicholas Staiti, Major of dragoons, came to me saying, that the squadron of the Bourbon regiment composed of a hundred and twenty horse had quitted Nola with the Carbonaro banner unfurled, and were directing their course towards my quarters at Avellino. I have already mentioned that Russo had charged Lieutenant Frissenza, of his corps, to ascertain the disposition of the Bourbon cavalry regiment at Nola. He had discovered two Carbonari chiefs in the second Lieutenants, Morelli and Silvati, both of whom promised to march at the head of their respective squadrons at my first summons. Morelli, who was a native of Calabria, animated by what Frissenza had said to him, entered into correspondence with the Carbonari of Nola; afterwards, when we heard that those of Salerno had been obliged to fly, regarding himself as seriously compromised in the eyes of his Colonel, Luviani, he assembled on the evening of the 1st of July the Carbonari of his squadron; greatly exaggerated the danger in which they stood, confided to them what Frissenza had told of me; and ended by saying that they ought all to ride off to my head-quarters, and that as I would not see them sacrificed, I should be obliged to begin the revolution. Having unanimously decided upon this step, they started at one o'clock on the morning of the 2nd. The officer on duty was

locked in the room at the quarters where he was asleep. He was a certain Borgia, who had come over from Sicily, and the whole squadron composed of all the soldiers and non-commissioned officers, and having only the two subaltern officers, Morelli and Silvati, took horse and quitted Nola, followed by eleven Carbonari of that city, amongst whom was a priest named Minichini.

The squadron displayed the Carbonaro flag, and was increased on its way by some few more Carbonari until it arrived at Mercogliano, a short distance from Avellino. On learning that I was at Naples, Morelli was thunder-struck; but recollecting what Frissenza had said to him about Deconcili, he wrote to him to request an interview. Although extremely perplexed, Deconcili consented, and unknown to the civil and military authorities he saw Morelli, whom he taxed with imprudence. He sent off immediately my aide-de-camp, Cirillo, to me at Naples, bidding him not to spare the post-horses. Meanwhile, he gave Morelli directions to keep with his squadron at a certain distance from Avellino until the return of Cirillo.

When intelligence of this movement at Nola reached Naples, the King on board a man-of-war was sailing to meet the Duke of Calabria, his son and heir, who after quitting Palermo with his whole family had just entered the Bay of Naples. In the absence of his Majesty, the ministers decided that General Nugent should call into the Council the General Duke of Ascoli, an intimate friend of the King, General Fardella, who had formerly followed the Court to Sicily, Ambrosio, Carascosa and Filangieri, that they might decide upon the best military measures to be adopted. At the same time, the ministers were deliberating as to the best means of commu-

nicating this unpleasant intelligence to the King, whilst they wanted to know what remedy had been hit upon by the Council of Generals presided over by Nugent.

It will be easier for the reader to imagine, than for me to describe, the agitation I experienced on learning the movement of the squadron of Nola, which had entered my division during my absence from it, and at a time when the militia were without me. Florestano said, that, before long, emissaries of the Government would arrest me. I replied that he was wrong, for the ministers were so frightened that they would rather avail themselves of my services. Florestano resumed, that I always looked upon things under the most favourable colours, and just as he uttered these words, my servant entered the room with a letter from Nugent, begging me to call upon him without loss of time. As I was going away, I said to Florestano, "had they intended to arrest me they would have sent a company of grenadiers of the royal guard;" and he answered, "you are lucky to live in a kingdom of fools." The Council of Generals had concluded that General William Pépé could alone, in such delicate circumstances, quell the rebellion and save the State. Let it not be supposed that these Generals thought that I should arrange this business according to the King's pleasure or interest: every act of my former life precluded the possibility of such a supposition; but they might have believed that I would act for the welfare of the nation and the Prince, nor would they have been wrong. A fool or a knave would have been that citizen, who would have had recourse to extreme measures either in favour of the nation or the King, the spirit of the times being against extremes either way, and the close alliance of the European powers forbidding them. The decision come to by

these Generals was arrived at in a great measure from a remembrance of the events which had taken place in Spain, and from their repugnance to behold their country plunged into all the horrors of a civil war. Again, if they were not as well acquainted as myself with the strength of the liberal party, they knew quite enough to make them pause. Nugent, without making any allusion to the Council of Generals, over which he had presided, related to me the movement of the squadron, and how it had been reinforced on its way, and ended by asking me whether I hoped to be able to remedy the evil. I replied without hesitation that I was ready to proceed immediately to my head-quarters; and that with the militia and the few troops left at my disposal in the province, I would cause every trace of the disorder to disappear. Nugent and the ministers, who were accustomed to see me keep my promises, believed that I should do so now, and it was accordingly decided that I should depart. I returned to Nugent to receive his written instructions. I had left my drosky with post-horses at his door, and was conversing with him in his study when an accident occurred bordering upon the romantic, and which by increasing my difficulties, gave another turn to the first revolutionary impulse. I was informed that my aide-de-camp, Cirillo, had just arrived post-haste from my head-quarters, and desired to speak to me. I left the room to meet him: on seeing me alone, he exclaimed, "If you do not come immediately everything will be lost." I reassured him by signs, and without speaking ushered him into the next room to Nugent. The latter asked a thousand questions, and ended by wishing to know how the insurgents and deserters had allowed him to come away. Without losing his self-posses-

sion, Cirillo replied, "General Pépé is so well obeyed and beloved by the militia, that they would never have allowed the rebels to arrest me." Nugent desired me to delay my departure for an hour, and to send back Cirillo to Avellino with my orders for General Colonna, commander of the province, assuring him of my speedy arrival there. I wrote to Colonna as follows:

"On receiving this despatch, arrange things so that the companies of militia of Mercogliano and Monteforte shall take their station upon the high road between this village and that of Cardinale. Let the two companies of Atripalda and Avellino keep under arms in the capital of the province. You will likewise issue orders for the remainder of the militia to assemble in battalions in the chief village of each district, and there be in readiness to march. Inform them that I shall soon be amongst them, and that the services they have already rendered make me rely upon them as an unfailing support of the throne."

Nugent read this letter and expressed his satisfaction at the contents. Four hours after, Cirillo delivered it to General Colonna, and informed Deconcili and Morelli that I should very soon be with them, and that I would immediately proclaim the Constitutional Government. Thus, the first orders I gave for the commencement of the revolution of 1820 were written under the very eyes of the King's Minister of War. It seemed almost as if a favourable destiny directed the first steps of our long-desired political regeneration.

Nugent wished me to delay my departure for an hour, that he might first see the ministers who were in continued deliberation that he might make them acquainted with what he had heard from Cirillo, and with the letter I had written to General Colonna, and

that he might receive the instructions he was to remit to me. Nugent returned and told me that the minister durst not either send me away, or give me any instructions in the absence of the King, adding that it was his opinion that the King would not oppose my departure. I was afterwards told, that on learning that my aide-de-camp was allowed to come and to go freely, Medici had said, that rather than assume the responsibility of sending General Pépé to oppose the rebels, he would assume that of having him loaded with irons. Had they arrested me, they would at least have acted consistently with their suspicions; but to mistrust me and still to leave me at liberty was indeed an act bordering on idiotcy. Had I proceeded to Avellino that day, I should have compelled the King to give us a Constitution, avoiding if possible the adoption of that of Spain, which always appeared to me an extremely absurd one; at all events, I should have spared the King those fears and acts which compromised the regal dignity.

It was now impossible to arrive at any decision as to the General to be sent to put down the rebels before the return of the King. In the meanwhile I returned to my own house, where I found several respectable citizens of Avellino, amongst whom was a judge. They were all Carbonari, and about to return to their own city. I charged them to inform the militia that in any event, they would soon see me amongst them. If, when Major Staiti came to inform me of the movement of the Nola squadron, I had immediately departed for Avellino, I should not have found myself in so awkward a position; but how could I have supposed that Nugent would not have immediately sent thither the royal guard, as well as all the other troops then in Naples?

And yet not a single military corps was despatched in that direction before the following day. Could I have foreseen such tardiness and indecision, I should have proclaimed the Constitution a month earlier at my head-quarters.

As soon as the King was made aware of what had happened, his first impulse was to remain on board his ship, and it was with great difficulty that he was prevailed upon to come to Naples, on an assurance that he ran no manner of danger. When he did arrive, the charge of putting down the rebellion in the direction of Monteforte was given, after a long deliberation, to Carascosa, whilst General Campana was to do the same in the direction of Solafra. On the evening of the 2nd, after he had received his command, Carascosa came to pay me a visit: he did not speak to me of his intentions, or question me upon mine, although we sat in the same room in which we had so often warmly discussed the means of destroying despotism. I did not, however, refrain from telling him that he had received a ticklish charge. It was not before the next day, that preceded by various regiments he went to Nola. from whence he wrote to Avellino offering in the name of the King pardon, rewards, money and passports for foreign countries to the most compromised in the affair.

On the arrival of my aide-de-camp at Avellino, my orders were promptly carried into execution. The militia was assembled, the squadron commanded by Morelli entered the city, and the Carbonari, termed *Pagana*, well armed followed the militia. On the same day, the 3rd, Cirillo met General Campana near Solafra, who retreated on seeing the neighbouring hills covered with the militia. The Commander of the

province, General Colonna, had given up the command to the chief of my staff, who sent intelligence to the province of Foggia by telegraph, that the constitutional form of government had been proclaimed at Avellino, and that consequently the militia was to take up arms and declare itself in favour of the new system. The Constitution had in fact been proclaimed at Avellino, and had been solemnly sworn to in the church by the civil and military authorities as well as by the Bishop.

It was rumoured at Naples that I was to be arrested; but I saw that the Government was so undecided, that I believed it incapable of such an act of rigour, although I knew that the King had been advised to imprison me in the castle of St. Elmo. Neither did I experience the least fear that Carascosa would succeed in putting down the revolution, either by force, or by means of seduction, for my militia, amounting to ten thousand men, were already up in arms followed by numerous bands of Carbonari. I was much grieved to think that there was not a single person in those two provinces, who by reason of his rank, or of his previous life, was calculated to secure the obedience of the militia and Carbonari.

Deconcili was fully cognizant of all my plans of operation in those parts, but his rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and his want of experience in the exercise of an extensive command, did not fit him to maintain in a state of strict discipline forty or fifty thousand armed men. It was not to be expected, that such men as Colonel Russo, de Rosa, and various others should yield obedience to him.

On the morning of the 3rd, the good Pietro de Luca came to see me. He said that a relative of his

named Tanuzzi, an old Major, and a native of Avellino, offered to conduct me during the night on horseback, by means of a mountain path familiar to him. The great difficulty was to quit my own house without the knowledge of the numerous spies, by whom the Government had of course surrounded me. We thought that I might succeed in embarking and going by sea as far as the shores of Salerno, whence I could proceed to Avellino. A liberal, and one of my friends, named Englen, who was inspector of the customs, would not only have assisted my embarkation, but prompted by his patriotism, would have gone with me. In the meanwhile, the relation of De Luca, Tanuzzi, a wealthy landholder offered to proceed immediately to Avellino; I gave him a ring well known both to Deconcili and Cirillo, by means of which they would credit every thing he should tell them from me. I enjoined them to keep at Monteforte, for that the Government were extremely slow and uncertain in their hostile operations, and I concluded by promising soon to be with them. Tanuzzi arrived in Avellino on the 3rd. Between what he said to them in my name, and the advantage gained by the Constitutionalists at Solafra against General Campana's column, the insurrection had assumed a very favourable aspect. During the two subsequent days, the 4th and 5th, Carascosa was losing his time in vainly concealed negociations, carried on by means of a judge in Avellino. This man, having been promised a large reward, exerted himself to induce the most considerable of the armed liberals to desist from the undertaking, and to quit the kingdom, promising them passports and money to do so. Carascosa relates in the Memoirs which he published in London in 1823, that he had obtained ten passports

and eight thousand golden ducats from the King to give to the rebel chiefs, as he calls them. But who were these rebel chiefs? Certainly neither Colonel Russo nor De Rosa, in Capitanata, since there would not even have been time to treat with them. Not the chief of my staff Deconcili, or my aide-de-camp Cirillo, both brave and honourable officers. Without being either noble or rich, as the historian Colletta says, Deconcili was in easy circumstances, and belonged to a most honest and respectable family of the city, and certainly would never have degraded himself by the acceptance of the passport, and still less of the money which Carascosa mentions. At all events, even had there been influential men of the liberal party disposed to so base a traffic, their example would never have succeeded in making the numerous body of men, who had declared themselves for the public cause, lay down their arms.

I employed the days of the 4th and 5th, which seemed to be interminable, in the capital, seeking the best means of getting to Avellino, and I thought that at the worst I might land in disguise upon the shores of Salerno, and thence reach the mountains. Several officers were exerting themselves to induce the fine regiment of dragoons and another of mounted rifles, quartered at the Ponte della Maddalena, to accompany me to my head-quarters. The Prince of Strongoli, ever warm in the cause of patriotism, was in hopes of inducing two excellent officers, who commanded two squadrons in the neighbourhood of the capital to pronounce with their troops in favour of liberty. Whilst I was in this state of uncertainty, I received gratifying intelligence respecting the regiments of dragoons and riflemen. Soon after I reached home Prince Strongoli

arrived; we were conversing together when my servant entered to say, that an officer was without who desired to speak with me alone. It was General Napoletano who came to tell me that the brigade of horse waited for me at the bridge of the Maddalena. Fortunately, my brother was not at home; I ordered one of his servants to mount and wait for me at the bridge. Without saying any thing to Strongoli, who was afterwards induced to forgive my unavoidable rudeness, I got into General Napoletano's carriage, and towards sunset found myself in front of the regiment of dragoons, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Tapputi, and that of the riflemen under the command of Colonel Celentani. The police had arrested Florestano's servant with the horse. I mounted another offered me by Tapputi, and having General Napoletano by my side, I told him to order the march, and we took the road to Laura. To arrive sooner, we were obliged to pass through dark narrow roads, called *cupe*, where our horses could only advance one by one. Scarcely had we begun our march, when I was joined by Captain Rappola and his company, and by a regiment of infantry, of which I do not recollect the name: Rappola had served under me in Spain, and had almost prevailed upon the whole regiment to follow me. The sight of the small body of infantry caused me the greatest pleasure, for without it, the infantry of Carascosa might unopposed have fired upon my cavalry. We reached Laura at dawn; I caused the horses to be fed and rested, and then to recommence our march for Monteforte. At the same time I sent off messengers in whom I could confide to Avellino, with letters announcing my speedy arrival at the head of a brigade of cavalry.

After a couple of hours, we resumed our march, which was up steep acclivities. In the villages through which we passed, there were only women, children, and very old men; the rest, militia or Carbonari, were in arms upon the mountains between Monteforte and Avellino. The women clapped their hands from the windows, calling out "Viva la Constituzione." They addressed me by my name, telling me that their husbands, brothers and sons, were gone to fight for the public cause. This enthusiasm cheered the hearts of the entire brigade; for to put oneself without the law and not feel a certainty of success, is certainly no slight undertaking. As I drew near the summit of Monteforte with my troops, I perceived a multitude of armed Carbonari, and amongst them the militia in full uniform, with their advanced posts according to the usage of war. My column was astonished, for although they had faith in what I said, they had not expected to see so much. The first company of militia I met was that of Chiusano, commanded by the excellent Captain Buono. Officers and privates both greeted me with their tears rather than with their voices, and the soldiers in my suite likewise wept with emotion. The militia said: "We had been told that you, our father, were in prison in the castle of Saint Elmo, and we had sworn to deliver you this night." How grateful at all times is the multitude, and how rarely does it err in its judgment! Whilst I had commanded the province, I had obliged the inhabitants to array themselves in military garb at their own expence, to instruct themselves, and to do hard service. I had never permitted the most trifling fault to pass unpunished; nevertheless, they loved me as an affectionate father, for they felt instinctively how warm and true was my affection for them,

and they were aware that I had shown more severity towards the opulent and the powerful than towards the poor, and that I had been just towards all. In the populous community of Monteforte, the inhabitants were in a delirium of joy. Seeing me amongst them with two regiments of cavalry, they looked upon the Constitution as already gained. Carascosa and Colletta have both written, that the Carbonari and the non-carbonari population were ignorant of the very meaning of the word. They knew it only too well; for they shouted: "No more arbitrary taxes; no more wanton arrests!" which cries were loudly repeated, even by the women.

Whilst I was surrounded by a population full of joy, confidence, and determination to make every sacrifice for the public good, symptoms of disorder were manifesting themselves in Avellino for want of a leader. Captain Piccoli, in defiance of his superiors, and actuated by a sentiment of patriotism, had conducted the whole cavalry regiment, Principe, from Nocera to Avellino. He had reckoned upon my presence in that city, but not finding me there, he would neither present himself before General Colonna nor Deconcili, the chief of my staff. If Deconcili had excellent friends in that city, he had, nevertheless, excited envy, and the discord which resulted was, perhaps, one of the causes which made passports and money be accepted by those whom Carascosa mentions, terming them inaptly, "chiefs of the revolution." Several Carbonari, enemies of Deconcili, quitted Avellino, and came at full speed to tell me to hasten my arrival; but to make my entrance into the city with the greatest caution, for that Deconcili, instigated by his ambition, had conspired against my

life. I laughed at such a warning; for on the one hand, I was aware of the moral power that I possessed over this population, and on the other, I knew Deconcili to be incapable of so senseless and perfidious an attempt. I told General Napoletano to give orders to the brigade to rest for the horses were tired, and then to follow me with the staff. It was his opinion, as well as that of several other officers, that it would not be prudent to expose ourselves to the possibility of any machinations: I replied, that in a few minutes they would see that I did not need a thousand horse to be well received by the people of Avellino. We had scarcely left Monteforte for Avellino before we encountered a carriage with four deputies from the Carbonari, sent out to meet me. They addressed me in a troubled manner. I was so engrossed by the thoughts of all that still remained to be accomplished, that I paid little heed to what they were saying; but the officers who were with me attracted my attention, by telling me that the deputation seemed to distrust the sincerity of my intentions. I immediately turned round and addressed them. At my words, they got out of the carriage and almost threw themselves at my feet, asking me to pardon them, and then followed me. A few minutes afterwards, Deconcili, Cirillo, the other officers of all the corps, and the provincial authorities came to meet me. The brother of Deconcili, Matteo by name, and a most honourable man, told me that it would give satisfaction to the people were I to ride through the principal streets of the town. I immediately did so, although several Carbonari of respectability entreated me to enter my own house, thinking I was in danger. I perceived that all were excited, and

full of enthusiasm at the great event. The population of Avellino, as well as that of the neighbouring communities, received me with many manifestations of joy. After I had ridden through the town, every feeling of doubt or distrust, which had been felt by many worthy citizens in the multitude, was dissipated. Fortunately, my calmness of mind increased in proportion to the difficulty of the arduous situation in which I found myself.

CHAPTER IX.

1820.

My first proceedings at Avellino—The King publishes an edict, in which he promises a Constitution—The Liberals ask for one like that of Spain, which is promised—A new ministry is formed—I receive intelligence at Avellino that the Spanish Constitution has been adopted, and that I have been appointed General-in-chief of the forces in the united kingdom—I go to Nola—Convention between the Vicar-General, (the Duke of Calabria,) and myself—I order that the troops of the line, the militia, and the armed Carbonari should assemble at the Campo di Marte, near Cape China.

On entering my house, fatigued as I was, I immediately issued orders for an attack on the camp of Carascosa at early dawn. I had with me four regiments of cavalry, nearly all the militia of the province of Avellino, amounting to about four thousand men, and a battalion of riflemen. The armed Carbonari were in considerable numbers, approaching twenty thousand. I expected from Foggia the cavalry of Colonel Russo, five thousand militia, and as many armed Carbonari as I could desire. Whilst I was engaged in issuing instructions to the different chiefs of the corps, and thinking upon the best means of provisionally organizing the

Carbonari, I received letters from the Duke of Calabria, and messages from the King, to tell me that his Majesty had granted the Constitution of Spain, which did away with the necessity of fighting for one.

The following is a brief account of what took place in Naples. On learning my movement at the head of two regiments of cavalry, all the young men of liberal sentiments, seeing that the Government was incapable of withstanding the revolution, assembled in a body and demanded that the King should grant them a Constitution. The King called to his council his ministers and the persons most devoted to him, and endowed with the greatest sagacity, and it was their unanimous opinion, that the necessity of the case demanded that he should grant what was required. They could not indeed advise otherwise; for excepting the royal guard, great part of which remained faithful to the King, he had no adherents; and even the royal guard would not have dared to declare itself against the will of the nation. If this guard did not follow the example of the army, it was more from its having accompanied the King to Sicily than from any advantage it enjoyed over the other corps. The force of circumstances having constrained the King to grant the Constitution, he issued the following edict:—

"To the nation of the Two Sicilies.

"As the wish to be ruled by a constitutional form of government has been manifested by the nation of the Two Sicilies, we promise, of our own free will, to publish the fundamental laws of this Constitution within a period of eight days. Until the publication of the Constitution, the utmost vigilance of the law will be exerted for the maintenance of order. Having thus

satisfied the public wish, we hereby order the troops to return to their corps, and all others to resume their usual occupations.

"FERDINAND.

"Naples, July 6, 1820."

At the same time the King chose another ministry, and upon the plea that the state of his health would not allow him to undergo the fatigues indispensable to Government, he appointed his son, the Duke of Calabria, Vicar-General of the kingdom. This Vicar-Generalship recalled to the public mind the want of faith which the King had shown in his conduct in Sicily; and people began to look upon the royal edict as deficient in precision, inasmuch as it did not state what the Constitution was to be. The younger portion of the population of the provinces all hastened to Naples, anxious to acquire information; and of these young men there was not one who did not manifest the most ardent desire for liberal institutions. The young men of the provinces joined those of Naples, and both tumultuously and with threats demanded the Constitution of Spain. This violent proceeding produced the following edict:—

"The Constitution of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies will be the same as that adopted in the kingdom of Spain in the year 1812, and sanctioned by his Catholic Majesty in the month of March of the present year; subject to such modifications as the national representatives, constitutionally assembled, may think fit to make to adjust it to the particular circumstances of the royal dominions.

"FRANCIS, Vicar."

The Liberals on perceiving that this decree was

signed by the Vicar, Duke of Calabria, instead of the King, began anew, and with just cause, their clamour and threats, until the same decree, signed by the King himself, was again made public.

It is here useful to reflect how great is the forbearance and the simplicity of the multitude, and how the love of power urges Princes to dissemble. This multitude, who had witnessed the blood shed by Ferdinand in 1799, or who knew it from their fathers, instead of lending ear to any suggestion of vengeance, said: "Let us not speak of the past; let our imprisonments and our banishments, our murdered fathers and brothers be forgotten; let the King only govern us in unison with a national congress, he will be loved and respected as our Prince." Ferdinand on his part said, "My power was given me by the Almighty, and ye, insolent people, ought not to dare either to sit in judgment on my actions, or even to complain of them. Now that I am compelled, I will promise every thing, but you shall soon feel that a King is not to be offended with impunity."

On the same day, the 6th, another ministry was formed, and as those who had held office under Murat were looked upon as Liberals, the King and Vicar gave the ministerial portfolio to such of Murat's ministers as were least guilty of entertaining liberal opinions, such as Zurlo, Ricciardi, Campo Chiaro, Macedonio and Carascosa. The last, who was regarded with dislike by the whole Carbonari, had the war department provisionally; for they hoped that I would assist him in that office, nor were they mistaken.

On learning that I had returned to my head-quarters at Avellino, the King foresaw that all the corps of the army would proceed thither to be, as it were, consecrated as Liberals. He, therefore, sent for my brother and begged that he would succeed Carascosa in the

command of the troops at Nola, hoping that Florestano having concerted with myself, would have been able to keep them in that city. Florestano replied that he had not been in active service for five years past, and that if the public were now to see him in office they would accuse him of a wish to aggrandize his family, and that he therefore begged to be allowed to serve only in the event of a war. The King would not admit such an excuse, and replied, that he begged it of him as a personal favour. Florestano out of delicacy was obliged to accede, and accordingly departed for Nola. The result of his going there was, that several regiments remained with him; then out of that jealousy which always prevails between military corps, those who came to Avellino were accused of being rebels by those who had not come, whilst the latter were branded by the former as servile. This jealousy was very injurious at a later period, for it was taken advantage of by the enemies of the revolution. I received official intelligence that the King had granted the Spanish Constitution, and that I was appointed General-in-chief of all the forces of the United Kingdom. It would now appear that my enterprise was successfully terminated, and that we might sit down and enjoy the blessings of freedom. But I was far from entertaining such an illusion. Had the kingdom been an island in the midst of the ocean, had Europe not mixed itself up with our affairs, or had the Holy Alliance, which had twice entered Paris not still been in arms, we might have terminated all things successfully and without the effusion of blood, for the King had no party in his favour. But Ferdinand being still on the throne, and the powers of Europe choosing to support him for the sake of their own interests, I could not consider our work as done.

On the morning of the 7th, my house was full of people from Naples; and it was with a feeling of deep pleasure that I beheld amongst them the Prince Strongoli, to whom I was much attached as he was both a good patriot and an honest man. He was accompanied by the worthy Major Ciancicillo, who was good for everything but the digesting certain misdoings of the Carbonari. Strongoli had been sent by the Duke of Calabria, and he told me a great many things in the name of the Prince which were highly favourable to the good cause. I had no doubt at all about receiving the most liberal promises from the King and the Vicar, but I could not help mistrusting at all times their sincerity.

Strongoli told me that all the royal family were to remain at Naples; to say the truth I could scarcely tell whether to rejoice at this intelligence or not, for the departure of the Court would have tended to make us at war with all the powers of Europe; but in this case I should have been free to inflame the people with patriotism. If the Princes were to remain with us, war would be less probable; but then, not only should we have concealed enemies with the executive power in their hands, but it would be wholly impossible to give an impulse to the nation proportionate to the necessity of the case. According to Strongoli, the King and the Prince of Calabria were both extremely anxious for my return to Naples. They said that without my presence there, they would be afraid to remain, lest some commotion should take place. I had scarcely time to converse with Prince Strongoli, for every moment deputations from the communities and from the Carbonari kept pouring in, not only from the province of Avellino, but from that of Salerno, and

even from the young men of the capital. Advice from all quarters was not wanting. I by no means despised the inexperience of the young men; their enthusiasm delighted me, but I had not time to talk with all. I received a letter from the Duke of Calabria, to whom I wrote an answer in the midst of many persons and of as many affairs. I was not satisfied with my answer, but time pressed and I was compelled to despatch it. I was obliged to make a proclamation, but interrupted as I was at every moment, after the very first line had been written, I found myself under the necessity of giving it to my friend De Franceschi, President of the Criminal Tribunal of Avellino to present it, having first briefly conveyed to him my ideas upon the subject. I have not preserved any copy of it, but I am convinced that with the exception of the few lines written by myself, the remainder must have been of a homely order of composition. During the whole time of the Constitution, almost every thing that was published with my signature was written by me—I say almost always, for at times I charged De Luca to act as my secretary. It was reported, nevertheless, in the kingdom, that I had some one to write for me. Of all the Generals and superior officers, I was the one who wrote, although badly, still the best of them all, not excepting the historian Colletta. This last, many years afterwards, being in Florence, studied the Italian language under good masters, and thanks to such labour, he succeeded in making all Italy peruse his elegant accumulation of falsehoods.

I begged Strongoli to relate to the Vicar what he had seen of the number and enthusiasm of the deputations; and, at the same time, of the tranquillity which prevailed in the midst of this confusion, and intoxica-

tion of patriotism. I added, that I would return to the capital in the 9th, at the head of the army, the militia, and a part of the Carbonari. Lastly, I recommended Strongoli to intreat his Royal Highness, the Duke of Calabria, in my name, to send me on the following day a confidential person with whom I could arrange as to the form of oath to be taken by the King upon the composition of a provisional governmental Junta, and upon the period to be fixed for the meeting of parliament. Strongoli made a note of what I told him, promising to refer everything I had said to the Duke of Calabria. Carascosa and Colletta in their works, constantly speak of the Carbonari of Monteforte, "whom I was obliged to consult." They asserted what they only fancied. If uch Carbonari as counselled me had really existed, they would have been known, and the two historians would have taken care to give us their names. All that I did in those days came from myself alone. About sixty thousand men, the armed Carbonari, the militia, and the troops, half maddened with joy at the fulfilment of their desires, were kept in a state of the most rigid discipline, and the Carbonari maintained themselves at their own expense. In the midst of the most disinterested patriotism, only one dishonest proposal was made me by some person employed by the administration. They promised me four hundred thousand ducats if I would remain, with all the military corps about me, encamped between Nola and Avellino, adding, that with so considerable a sum, secret assistance might be distributed to the Carbonari all over the kingdom, who might, by these means, be held in readiness for every summons. I replied that they were not aware of the pure patriotism of those sectaries, or rather of the

population of the kingdom capable of bearing arms, and that I certainly would not lend myself to corrupt them, instead of exalting their patriotic sentiments.

On the evening of the 7th, all the corps of the army in Naples and its vicinity, with the exception of the royal guard, were stationed between Nola, Monteforte, Avellino, and Salerno, and sent me their usual reports. On the morning of the 8th, I passed on to Nola. Here they spoke to me of the priest, Minichini, as of a suspicious man. I gave orders that he should be brought before me. A Colonel present replied that he regarded himself as more than a King. I immediately commanded the Colonel to bring the priest to me, either by fair means or by foul, between four grenadiers. Minichini came of his own accord, and with far more humility than might have been expected. I did not wish to defraud him of the merit of having been one of the first to pronounce himself in favour of the national cause: I gave him a commission, that he might be entitled to a salary, and exhorted him to behave honestly, and not to forfeit the benefit he had acquired.

It was no small undertaking to reduce all the armed Carbonari to order, for they were to folow the militia and the army at eight o'clock the same evening to the Campo di Marte, near Naples. The Duke of Calabria and the ministers were anxious that I should reach the capital, being excessively alarmed at the joy manifested by the people; but I defy Colletta and Carascosa to say that the slightest disorder occurred during those days. In the meanwhile, Rocco Beniventano arrived in Nola. He was a highly respectable man, and endowed with an elevated mind; he had been charged by the Vicar-General, the Duke of Calabria, to estab-

lish and sign the secret convention between that Prince and myself, which was to determine the new order of things. The following are the articles of the convention, copied from the original.

1. That after my return to the capital, the King should, in his private chapel, and in the presence of the provincial Junta and of myself, swear upon the Gospel to the Constitution of Spain.

2. That a provisional Junta should be constituted in the following manner. I should present a list of sixteen honourable men, civilians, and of six military men. Out of these twenty-two individuals, the Vicar-General was to select five to form part of the Junta. These five were then to name twenty others, and out of these twenty the Vicar was to select ten, two of which were to be military men; thus the Junta would be formed of fifteen individuals.

3. At the instance of the ministry, the Junta was to assemble the Congress as speedily as possible, according to what is prescribed in the Constitution of Spain.

4. That all those who had been put into prison or sent into exile on account of their political opinions should be set at liberty and recalled to their native country; and that those who had been deprived of their offices on the same account should be reinstated.

5. That the choice of the commandants of fortresses and castles, and the generals in active service, was to be made by the ministers, in accordance with the Junta.

6. That Lieutenant-General William Pépé, should assume the chief command of all the forces of the

State, so as to guarantee to the nation the establishment of the Constitutional Goverment.

7. That the army and the militia should swear fidelity to the Constitutional Government.

8. Agreeably to the recommendation of the General-in-Chief, all the citizens and soldiers who had signalized themselves in bringing about the new order of things were to be rewarded, and the province of Avellino declared a first class province.

The historian Colletta, an equally bitter enemy to myself and to the political change, speaking of the composition of the Provisional Governmental Junta, says—" It was composed of fifteen members, proposed in the camp, and elected by the Prince; they were all experienced in keeping in due order the people, and were all honest and honourable friends to the monarchy. Amongst them were none from Monteforte, no Carbonari." A little afterwards, Colletta forgets what he had said of the wisdom and disinterested patriotism which was manifested in the camp on this occasion. At the same time, having more at heart his own style than the truth of what he ought to have told in it, he wrongly asserts that none of the members of the Junta were Carbonari. Certainly, Colonel Russo, proposed by myself as one of the members, was a Carbonaro. As to the experience of the members of the Junta in keeping a restraint upon the population, as none of them had ever occupied any high office, and as they knew that under an absolute government those who are in power learn how to keep the population in slavery and not in good order, this assertion of Colletta borders upon the ridiculous.

In this Convention I committed two errors; the fist

was in not inserting a clause obliging the King to resume the reins of government, and the second in demanding a reward for those who had exerted themselves in so noble a cause. I was guilty of the former of these errors in the hope of attracting the Duke of Calabria to the interests of the Constitution. I attempted to remedy the second by declaring loudly that I would never consent to accept any reward, hoping thus to excite the magnanimity of others to refuse the rank and honours which the Vicar-General had decreed in their favour.

Having settled every thing respecting the Convention, I made all necessary preparations to conduct to Naples in good order, on the following day, the army, the militia, and the Carbonari, whose self-love would be pleased at showing themselves armed and in such excellent condition. At the same time it was useful to pass under the eyes of the ministers of the Allied Princes, such a powerful multitude, well armed and in the best discipline, although united together for the first time. The Duke of Calabria was anxious that I should diminish as much as possible the number of Carbonari who were to accompany the militia, fearing that their presence might cause some serious disorder. I replied that I would answer for the public tranquillity; at the same time, to calm his fears, I sent about twenty thousand Carbonari back to their homes, retaining about the same number with me.

The militia of Capitanata, amounting to about five thousand, were not yet with me. They were a remarkably fine body; for as that province possessed more wealthy landholders than the rest of the kingdom, their uniforms and arms were of a richer description. I expected the arrival of Colonel Russo and his regiment

of cavalry from Foggia. Russo, from not having obeyed my order to present himself at my head-quarters, on the pretence that my letter had not reached him, had occasioned much danger to the public cause, and to myself. But if he feared to run the risk of losing his military rank, he had always shown himself brave in war. Feigning to believe the excuse he offered, I caused him to be appointed a member of the Provisional Junta, being certain that he had the public cause at heart.

After having seen the different columns of Avellino, Nola, and Salerno, march towards the Campo di Marte, near Naples, I myself quitted a few hours before night, to watch the proceedings of the troops on the Salerno road. I went in a carriage with post horses, accompanied by a single aide-de-camp. Taking every precaution not to be recognised, I crossed the city of Naples, which was illuminated to celebrate the freedom which was thought to be a durable blessing. Before midnight, I reached the lodging which had been prepared for me in a village close to the camp, where I hoped, for the first time after four days of agitation and sleeplessness, to rest for three or four hours.

CHAPTER X.

1820.

The night I passed in the neighbourhood of the Campo di Marte —I review the army, the militia, and the Carbonari—Carascosa comes to the camp; his conduct—The columns begin their march—I present myself to the Vicar and to the King—I go to my house to see my brother—Discourse which I hold with the Generals and superior officers of the army—Replies of some of the Lieutenant-Generals — The employments bestowed upon them.

I WAS in hopes that no one knew the house in the vicinity of the camp in which I passed the night of 8th July, and yet I found it surrounded by a great number of young men, almost beside themselves with excitement. I fell upon an expedient, thanks to which I liberated myself from them, whilst I flattered their self-love, and availed myself of the patriotic feelings by which they were animated. I told them to return the following morning with a list of their own names, for I needed their services, and that I meant to send them to the different militia Carbonari whom they would find in the camp, to compliment them in the name of the Carbonari of the capital upon their presence there, and upon the active part they had taken in putting down despotism. I told them likewise that they would be doing a more useful thing to explain to the Carbonari

of the communities the advantages to be derived from a Constitutional Government. They were mostly all students, and the following morning they faithfully executed what I had pointed out to them.

After having given several necessary directions, I finally got to bed, but not to rest. To sleep it is necessary to possess a quiet mind, and during the four hours I remained in bed, I could not close my eyes, nor did a single hour struck by the village clock escape my ears. The recollection of past times rushed vividly upon my mind. At the same time, twenty-one years before, thirty thousand respectable citizens were languishing in prison for the love of liberty; thousands of them were driven into exile, and hundreds were put to death. In those days, despotism took advantage of the ignorance of the people to such an extent, as to urge them to pillage, and to the committal of every excess, and of the most unheard-of and brutal cruelty. What progress had been made in one-and-twenty years! for without the loss of a single drop of blood, without the slightest possible disorder, we had in the course of five days overthrown a tyranny which had existed for centuries, and this, with the arms of the very same people who had formerly been its warmest support. I continued to ruminate, saying to myself, "Since history has preserved the records of Southern Italy, this is the first time that her different populations, so foreign to each other, have joined together hand in hand to labour at the grand work of their national regeneration. What miracles may not be expected from the children of Trinachia, Bruzi, Lucani, Salentini, and Sanniti, now that they are free, and that they work conjointly for their common welfare? And does there exist a human power which can prevent the people, from the

Alps to the Tronto, from joining in holy brotherhood with those from the Tronto to the Lilibeo?" I could not dispel such ideas from my mind, where they were constantly reproduced under various forms. Involuntarily I addressed myself to Vincenzo Rossi, who had perished on the scaffold, and whom, in prison during my youth, I was wont to call the Cato of Naples. I apostrophized him thus: "Thou wouldst forgive this Ferdinand, who took thy life, if rising from thy tomb thou couldst see him grateful to the generosity of the nation for forgetting so much blood shed by him—and what blood!"

But arbitrary power is too much for human weakness, and the existence of virtue is incompatible with an absolute throne, so that I was greatly inclined to doubt the royal faith and gratitude. These ideas agitated me as violently as if I were suffering from an attack of fever. This reflective mood in such turbulence of motion, seemed strange even to myself. In brief, as soon as day dawned, I bounded from my bed, and was soon after on horseback at the head of my staff.

My first care was to assure myself of the companies of the Carbonari. I recommended them to prove themselves worthy of the noble cause they were defending, by emulating the militia in their obedience to their chiefs and in the preservation of order in their ranks, and thereby impress a high opinion of themselves upon the numerous strangers who had flocked to the capital. They promised me to act as I wished, and were true to their word. Several officers, and various other persons of my acquaintance observed that in general the Carbonari appeared to belong to the wealthier classes of the

population, but that amidst these detached companies many seemed extremely poor. I replied: "if you believe in a Providence, kneel down in thanks at beholding the men who followed Cardinal Ruffo in 1799, and who perpetrated all the horrid deeds you have heard, now ready to uphold the cause of freedom." The officers answered by expressing their fear that even now the lower classes would renew the disorders which had existed at that unhappy period. I informed them that the times were changed; that all classes had made great progress, and that events would soon prove to them that this opinion of mine was not an erroneous one.

Before mid-day Carascosa arrived at the camp, having employed means repugnant to the feelings of a General, as he himself relates at full in his work, to excite the soldiers to fight for the royal cause; the result was, that both the troops and the Carbonari manifested the greatest possible dislike of him, so much so, indeed, that he regarded his life as in danger. He expresses himself as follows, in the Memoirs which he has written in French: page 117. "Je rencontrai enfin le Général Pépé, qui s'aperçut de mon danger, et qui chercha à me rassurer. Il me prit sous le bras, voulant par là montrer à la multitude qu'elle devait me respecter." Carascosa presented himself to me so agitated and cast down, as to salute my aide-de-camp, Major Staiti. I was vexed to see a General, valiant in the field, and who professed great friendship for myself, allow himself to be so oppressed. At the cost of my life, I would have saved his; but in reality it was in no danger, so that I have not the least merit in having done for him what little I did. He asked me who I wished to be Minister of

War; I replied, "yourself, who so bravely fought the Austrians in 1815; you will so organize the army that they will be even better able to fight them than before, should they go to war with us." I then took him by the arm, and made him pass with me along the ranks of those companies who seemed most exasperated against him, and by whom he was no longer addressed in opprobrious terms as had happened on his first entering the camp. The disorders which do really occur during a revolution are always exaggerated when the times become quiet; and when none have been committed, the enemies of the revolution invent some. Here may be seen the contradictions into which Colletta fell in writing of these days. In page 238 of his work, he says: "The paid troops, the militia and the sectaries, preserved the strictest discipline in the city; they appeared veteran troops in peaceful times under a powerful monarchy." The same historian says, a little farther on, in page 241, "The greatest misdeeds were daily committed by infamous and audacious men, who first in one place and then in another, but more generally in the Campo di Marte, drew together the people in arms, and harangued upon the government, during which the most seditious passages were the best received." This sudden change from the severest discipline to boundless disorders, according to Colletta, must have been extremely rapid, and actually must have taken place whilst the troops, the militia and the Carbonari were commanded by the same man; for, both before and after, they were under my orders.

A little after mid-day I ordered the march, which began, having in front the squadron of the Bourbon regiment, which had quitted Nola for my head-quarters.

Next followed the militia of the province of Avellino, in beautiful uniforms. After them came the regiments of infantry of the line, followed by all the squadrons of the army. The cavalry preceded the Carbonari, who amounted to several thousand, armed with guns, but without uniforms. The Vendita of Nola having been the first to declare itself, was the first to file off. The Priest Minichini being a native of Nola, headed the Carbonari of that city. He was on horseback, in clerical robes, armed, and wearing the insignia of the sect, which induced strangers and many natives of the capital to regard him as the chief of all the Carbonari. It is not easy to depict the joy caused by the appearance of these columns, who were greeted with enthusiasm by the whole population of Naples, increased by those of the neighbouring towns and villages. Nearly five hundred thousand inhabitants of the capital, drawn out along the noble road leading from Capo di Chino to the royal palace, drunk with joy, drowned with their enthusiastic shouts the noise of the drums and of the artillery. An honest shopkeeper drew near to me, having in his hand a cage filled with birds, which he set at liberty. This incident awakened much merriment, but it was somewhat imprudent, for it frightened my horse, which in consequence gave me a great deal of trouble.

These public rejoicings recalled to my memory those which I had witnessed at Bologna in 1815, and I could not help saying to myself, "May the destinies of Italy grant that the result of this day be far different!" My friends told me the next day that they had remarked an expression of deep sadness upon my countenance; and how could it be otherwise, when I beheld my country hovering between the sublime and the ridiculous;—

between entire liberty and a thraldom more despotic than before? The satisfaction manifested by all classes of the population was derived from a sentiment of common interest, since they all gained by this political change without losing anything. The nobility was not touched in its ancient prerogatives, for they had been lost long since; neither were its members wounded in their feelings of self-love, the most conspicuous amongst them having been the first to declare themselves against King Ferdinand in 1799 and in 1806. The clergy had been deprived of the property it possessed, and its prospects, far from being diminished, were likely to be enlarged. Even the strangers who were spectators of the event could scarcely credit their eyes, on beholding a people subjected for years to the most sordid bondage, now all at once, without any foreign aid, or any effusion of blood, pass on to liberty. They likewise remarked with wondering admiration, that when the most ill-dressed of the Carbonari, oppressed by the heat of July, presented themselves at the stalls of the iced-water sellers, the latter refused to receive payment for their water, whilst the poor Carbonari would not go away until they had paid.

Finally, I reached at the head of the army, the spacious square of the royal palace. According to the military custom, I saluted the Duke of Calabria, who, surrounded by his family, courtiers and generals, stood in a large balcony, and then I placed myself opposite to the Prince to let the troops file off. The Vicar-General, to do something agreeable to the people and to the army, had ordered all those about him to attach to their breasts the ribbons of the Carbonari. The servants distributed ribbons to the assembly, and the Duchess of Calabria declared that she had herself, with her own hands,

formed them into cockades. The Vicar was the first who had assumed this ornament. I said to myself as I looked towards the balcony of the royal palace, "There are the only enemies of the nation." In fact, there alone did petty private interest prevail over the great, the noble, and the national. The greater part of the generals, fearful of seeing their former and recent servility exposed through the medium of the liberty of the press, and not to risk the loss of their well-secured fortunes, cursed from the bottom of their hearts the establishment of freedom. The same feeling was uppermost in the courtiers, who were fearful that the new order of things would restrict the powers of the Prince, and preclude his rewarding their baseness as aforetime. One amongst them, who was no more than a simple gentleman of the bed-chamber, to flatter the Duke of Calabria, exclaimed, pointing to the Carbonari, "Not all those sugar-loaved hats (such were worn by the lower orders of the population) would make me sleep in peace." The Vicar, who was notorious for the most refined dissimulation, blamed this speech loudly, saying, that they who were wont to sit upon two chairs were liable to break their necks. And who was this gentleman of the bedchamber? The Marchese Modrone, who in 1799 had been sent into exile as a Jacobin: it was he who related this dialogue to me in the presence of the Marchioness Riva, of Mantua.

Whilst the troops were filing off, a certain Marquis de Attellis, a Major on half-pay, thinking to fish in troubled waters, on beholding the companies of Carbonari pass, began to cry, "*Viva la Republica!*" I gave orders to have him arrested, and carried to the castle of St. Elmo. My conduct was generally approved, for there existed a sincere desire for the general

welfare; and as every one said that a republic was no longer suited to the times, they had the good sense to rest satisfied with a defined Constitution.

The filing off of the columns lasted a considerable time, after which I ascended to where the Princes were, accompanied only by one aide-de-camp. The historian Colletta states that I was accompanied by General Napoletano, Lieutenant-Colonel Deconcili, Morelli, and even Minichini. He asserts what is wholly false; not from error, because he was present at the time, but to give an unfavourable idea of the revolution, and to make it appear an anarchy, as it would have been, had I shared my power with my subordinates and the priest Minichini. What will serve fully to demonstrate the character of Colletta is, that not only does he make me say what I never uttered, but he puts into the mouth of the Vicar a reply which was never pronounced by him, and which I affirm to be false. He states that the Prince said, "We all owe gratitude to the constitutional army and to you, worthy chiefs." To give greater weight to his assertions, the historian adds, that the Vicar addressed his discourse to several persons instead of to myself alone. Indeed, I had at the time not one of my suite around me, and still less was I accompanied by other chiefs.

According to the custom of that Court, with which I was, alas! but too well acquainted, I kissed the hand of the Vicar and of his wife. I expressed myself, not in studied phrases, but as I felt, from the bottom of my heart, pretty nearly in the following terms. "Your Royal Highness cannot retain a doubt, after what you have beheld, that the nation ardently desires the establishment of liberal institutions. The example of Spain, and the exertions of a General may have tended to give

an impulse to the motion, but it must have taken place in any case; for even under Joachim, it was attempted both by the people and by the army. When once his Majesty the King, yourself, and all the royal family shall be sincerely united with the people, you will become their idols. All of us natives of the Two Sicilies were aware before we undertook this movement, that it would displease Austria, with whose strength and whose alliance we are fully acquainted. But on recalling to mind that in 1806, the French, although supported by arms and by the credit of the wealthy classes, were twice upon the point of quitting the kingdom, we feel that now, when the nobility and the people, the rich and the poor, the educated and the ignorant, are all united in one ardent wish, we may bid the stranger hence, and in Calabria we will come to our last reckoning with him. And if we are destined to fall beneath the combined forces of the unjust though powerful allies of Europe, our fall will not be fruitless; we will not fall without having first made such an obstinate resistance as shall bring fame to the oppressed. It is a happy omen for the nation, to have acquired its freedom at the very moment when the heir to the throne, who has resumed the title sanctified by former usage, and so renowned during our ancestors, of Duke of Calabria, was landing amongst us. For myself, Prince, that my feelings may be known to you and to all my countrymen, I here declare most solemnly in the presence of this numerous assembly, that if under any pretence whatsoever I accept at any time the slightest recompense, I authorize every citizen from that moment to regard me as a man fallen into the lowest conceivable degradation. When our country shall cease to require my services, I will renounce not only the chief command of the army,

but every kind of military employment, since the career which I shall have run will have availed to place me at the summit of happiness, having put it in my power to support the public cause."

The ministers and generals gathered closely around the Prince and myself, knowing full well I should express all that I felt. The Vicar replied that he was fully convinced of the sincerity and disinterestedness of my patriotism; that the King his father, and himself would ever regard the cause of the nation as their own, and that the happiness or misery of the country would be the happiness or misery of all the royal family. He then told me that we must go and see the King, who was expecting me, in his bed, where he was confined by illness. I followed his Royal Highness and we both entered the chamber of the King. I drew near to the bed, where his Majesty reclined suffering from illness—and what illness? My pen recoils from revealing it, but yet with shame do I say it, the attack of fever under which his Majesty was labouring, was produced by terror, and nothing else! And yet he was born under the same sky as the dear Lazzaroni, with whom he had breathed the same air in his youth; with those Lazzaroni who, without any chief to guide or any one to advise them, had in the days of Masaniello and of General Championnet fought in the capital against the stranger with a degree of valour which would seem incredible had it not been related by foreign authors. At the foot of the King's bed stood his wife, the Princess of Partanna. He extended his hand, which I kissed, according to the custom; and I said, "now your Majesty reigns over the hearts of all." He answered, "I hope, General, you will conduct yourself honourably." Let the reader imagine an aged King

accustomed during half a century to reign just as he pleased, now reduced to keep his bed out of fear! During five years, although disinclined to establish liberal institutions, he had shown himself just and favourable towards the liberals, and towards myself extremely benignant. He had always approved of what I did, and had overlooked the affair of Lieutenant-Colonel Lanzetti, one of the judges of Murat. I was touched by the few words he uttered, and endeavoured to show that I was grateful. I took his hand again, and kissing it; said, "Sire, it is impossible, after what I have done, and after what has taken place, that you should believe in the loyalty of my intentions, without knowing certain particulars of my life. From my earliest years, I have believed that the land in which we are born is not our country unless it possess liberal institutions and fixed laws, and that even at the expense of our lives and of our affections, we should make every effort to obtain them. Joachim was kind to me in no common degree, and yet three times I conspired to oblige him to grant us a Constitution. This did not prevent me, during the campaign of 1815 from doing my duty, and even more than my duty, if a soldier may be allowed to say so, to keep him upon his throne." The Duke of Calabria, meaning to say something that would be agreeable to me, interrupted me, exclaiming: "Sire, General Pépé went to Avellino with the brigade of cavalry, because he had heard that orders had been given to arrest me." Upon this I resumed, and addressing his Royal Highness, said: "I should ill justify the confidence with which his Majesty now honours me, were I to confirm what has been erroneously stated to you. I went to Avellino to act according to my principles: the movement of the

Nola squadron was a mere accident, without which, a few days later, I should, but in better order, have acted as I have done. Everything had been prepared by me, and I even intended to have commenced the revolution in the latter part of June. That your Majesty and your Royal Highness may better read my very soul, let me say I am truly happy to reflect that this event has not injured the happiness of the royal family; but even had it been otherwise, I should have been grieved, but I would never have forsaken the national cause. Let not your Majesty and your Royal Highness attribute this exposition of my feelings to any want of respect, but to my warm desire to reveal to you the loyalty of my heart in the arduous situation in which I find myself."

Although the King was not accustomed to such plain speaking, he was contented, and became so re-assured that he recovered from his fever. Two days after, he said to the Prince of Denmark, who was then at Naples, that my frank and unstudied speech had removed all his fears. I spoke and acted thus openly to satisfy myself, and not from any hope of making them forget what I had done; for I had long known that Princes and men in power never forget an offence or a supposed injury.

Before he would let me depart, the Vicar insisted upon presenting me to his children, the eldest of whom, now King Ferdinand II. was then about ten years of age. My mind was occupied by serious matters, and I would have kissed even the feet of all the Princes to have got away; nevertheless, I forgot that it was a Court custom to kiss the hands even of the infant Princes. But it seems that the Duke of Calabria had this custom greatly at heart, for he said to his children,

"Give your hands to the General to kiss," and I accordingly kissed the hands of the children.

From the King's palace I hastened home to embrace my brother. I found him smoking his pipe with admirable stoicism, laughing at the miseries of this life, and at all that was related to him; for having remained at home instead of accompanying the other Generals to Court, he had seen nothing. At this moment, Carascosa came to tell me that all the Generals and superior officers of the army were expecting me in the large hall at the Ministry of War. We proceeded thither, and being nearest to the Lieutenant-Generals, I said to them, "The chief command of all the military forces of a kingdom is obtained by some extraordinary instance of bravery in the field, or by having conquered in many battles. Such claims do not exist in my case, and it is the mere force of the political circumstances in which we stand that has induced me to accept the chief command which is conferred upon me. As soon as the state of things which imperiously obliges me to retain it shall no longer exist, I look upon it as a glorious part of my duty to withdraw from the command. I shall now maintain the same rigid discipline that I have exercised in a less elevated rank, without which no military virtue can exist. Superior officers and Generals, I exhort you to reflect,—this is the first time for eleven centuries that we are all Neapolitans, and what is still better, that we are not enfeebled by civil dissentions, so that whatever glory or shame we may deserve will be our own. Fortune has now given us the choice between the admiration and the contempt of mankind."

Military habits, more than all others, tend to incite generosity of feeling, and my brief speech, artless and

unrefined, but dictated by a patriotic impulse, awakened generous and natural sentiments in the hearts of my companions. Carascosa, as the Minister of War and the oldest of the Lieutenant-Generals, replied in these precise word, "General-in-Chief, you have raised yourself above us all by what you have done for the country, and we shall all glory in obeying you." Ambrosio was the second to speak, and said to me, "If you will allow me to act as your aide-de-camp, I will ask that office of you." The same request was made by General Filangieri. The generous offers of these two brave officers acted upon the nature of Colletta, who repeated the same offer, little foreseeing that when times had changed, he would write that the exposure of one's life, rank, and fame, for the national welfare was an act of perjury.

The Constitutional form of Government was then, as it is now, desired by every class of the nation, and as when I entered Naples, the success of the Spanish revolution was known, whilst the intentions of the Allied Princes were a profound secret, all the Generals and Colonels were favourable to the revolution. If, at a later period, they by degrees changed their manner of viewing things, it was because they became aware that the whole of Europe was conspiring against us, and that they did not choose to expose themselves to the evils which attend the vanquished. In support of what I advance, I will state that on the same day the Generals demanded and accepted commands which they would not have done without the political change. On quitting the assembly of Generals, I withdrew into a private room with Carascosa, Ambrosio, Strongoli, Filangieri, Petrinelli, Arcovito, and Colletta. I told Carascosa, that on the following day he would receive

the definitive charge of Minister of War, of which I had obtained the promise of the Vicar. Ambrosio was destined to the government of Naples. Filangieri to the command of the royal guard. Strongoli and Arcovito to the command of two military divisions. Petrinelli was appointed director of the artillery, and Colletta of the engineers. Florestano, who from his military habits would have been better suited than any of these officers to be in command, refused every office and remained quietly with his pipes and horses.

Now, the writers Carascosa and Colletta, who in their works affect to have disapproved so entirely of the revolution—why did they hasten copiously to benefit by its fruit? Never, but for this so-much-blamed political change would Carascosa have been Minister of War, or Colletta Inspector-General of the engineers; although, I confess, Carascosa had sufficient merit to deserve that office.

CHAPTER XI.

1820.

The Junta is assembled—The King swears to the Constitution—The Constitutional oath is taken by the army and by the militia—I request the abolition of the dignity of Captain-General—Banquet given by the city of Naples in the Campo di Marte—The Neapolitan Ambassadors, Castelcicalo and Alvero Ruffo—Impatience of the Vicar to behold the red cockade resumed—The decree placing all the militia of the kingdom upon an equal footing with those of the third military division—Liberty of the Press—Colletta, the historian, at the theatre of San Carlo.

THE members of the provisional Constitutional Junta were worthy and moral men, but only two or three of them proved willing to support the cause of the nation with vigour. It was the opinion of the majority of the Junta, that we should avoid war at any rate, and that our national independence, instead of being maintained by the army, or by the energy of the armed population, ought to depend upon the wisdom of our conduct. By wisdom, they intended that even the very name of revolution should be forgotten, or softened down to this phrase, "political change;" that the Carbonari should cease to exhibit any signs of existence, and that in the theatres and public places, the audience should sit mute to avoid displeasing the Allied Princes. The Junta wished that my brother should become one of its

members; the King and the Vicar expressed the same wish. The former were unsuccessful in their attempts to make him join their body, but when the King said that he should feel great pleasure in seeing him become a member of the Junta, Florestano acceded out of delicacy, and to avoid the appearance of an obstinate refusal, which would seem to be taking advantage of the already diminished royal power. The arrival of the Duke of Calabria in the Bay of Naples on the morning on which our political movement began, gave rise to the belief that there existed some understanding upon the subject between that Prince and myself. This report was spread even through a distant part of the country, and many Liberals were thereby induced to believe that the Duke was sincerely disposed to favour the new order of things. As it is always easy to find reasons in support of what we wish to believe, many persons argued that during the last four years, the King had exerted himself to efface the recollection of what had occured in 1799. They added, that nothing would have been easier than for the King to have remained on board the vessel on which he had gone out to meet his son; but on the 2nd of July he had returned to the capital, where he was easily induced to grant the Constitution of Spain. All these circumstances gave rise to the notion, that being weighed down by age he wished to repose, and that he would not for the sake of absolute power have exposed himself to new perils by exciting a civil war. Nobody recollected the old adage, which, although trite, is not less founded upon the knowledge of human nature, "that the wolf may lose his skin but not his nature."

The oath which the King had promised to take to abide by the Constitution was expected with the utmost

impatience. Accordingly, on the 13th of July, the King proceeded to the royal private chapel, where, in the presence of the ministers, of the members of the Junta, of the grandees of the Court, and of myself, as General-in-Chief, Ferdinand the First swore in the name of God that he would maintain and protect the Constitution of Spain of 1812, with the modifications presented by the Parliament, and accepted by himself. After pronouncing the oath in a loud and firm voice, like a man happy to express the feelings of his soul, he approached the spot to which I had retired from a sentiment of modesty, and said to me, with his eyes suffused with tears, "Believe me, General, I have now sworn from the very bottom of my heart;" as he said so he pressed his hand upon his heart, keeping it there. I was so affected, that I wept at beholding his tears, although from the balcony of the chamber, which had been converted on that day into a chapel, and in which I stood, my eyes rested upon the spot, whence, in 1802, loaded with chains, I had been at an early age conveyed to the Fossa del Maritimo by order of this same King Ferdinand. I was induced, more by the confession of his past perjuries and the repentance he manifested, than by the tears shed by the aged King, to address some complimentary words to his son. The Duke, flattered by these words, urged me to repeat them to the King, that he might derive consolation from them. I excused myself on the plea that it was not fitting that I should speak before so many persons who surpassed me both in age and merit. But the Duke turned towards his father to beg that he would enjoin me to repeat the words I had just uttered, and which really were dictated by my heart. Obliged to obey the King, I said in a loud voice, "Now, indeed, you are King of

the Two Sicilies; you reign no longer over an enslaved people, but over the hearts of free men, who are grateful to you for the Constituton which you have granted them by a solemn oath, and which will impart more strength to your kingdom than you could ever have obtained from a numerous army and servile adulations. Ruggieri the Norman, Alphonzo of Aragon, are nothing in our eyes compared with yourself, who have given us freedom, and made us men. In return, the love and devotion we bear you will be eternal. Your enemies will henceforth be the enemies of our country; and in future it will be our wish that an ambitious and powerful enemy may come, that he may feel of what the Southern Italians are capable when they follow their King to the field of battle in defence of their national honour and independence." The King applauded my speech by his tears, and the other persons present by their acclamations. What I said was unstudied: the words I uttered were the expression of what I have felt night and day during the whole course of my life. Unaccustomed to speak in public, with the exception of some short addresses to the soldiers, I was fearful lest some awkward truths might escape my lips, calculated to displease the King, in the presence of men conspicuous for their merit and knowledge.

By a strange fatality the people are always indulgent towards Kings; and now, forgetful of the past perjuries of Ferdinand, his oath sufficed fully to content them. Sensible persons thought that a King who had once been guilty of perjury would most likely be so again. Many of my friends taxed me with too much goodness, meaning weakness, and smiled at the emotion produced in me by the tears of the white-headed King. Miserable condition of humanity! If you submit to tyranny,

you are degraded; if you are generous towards the tyrant fallen from his power, you are reckoned imbecile; if called upon to vote his sentence of death, you are proclaimed a worthless regicide. Oh! thou who idolizest thy country, when thou wouldst serve her, follow the impulse of a noble feeling, and despise the injustice of man and of fortune!

The conduct of my usully taciturn brother, Florestano, produced considerable sensation. He unsealed his lips towards the end of one of the sittings of the provisional Junta, and addressed himself as follows to its members: "I look upon several of you as men of enlarged minds, and all as honourable and honest citizens; nevertheless, it seems to me that we are not going the right road to maintain the solidity of our Constitution and the security of our homes; and to protect them from foreign powers, who, in my opinion, will most certainly invade us a second time. I should not act like a conscientious citizen were I still to retain a seat in this Junta." Having said thus much, he gave in his resignation in terms which did not admit of refusal, and was accordingly succeeded by the Prince Cariati. To those who asked him the motive of such conduct, he replied by a monosylabic ejaculation, sending forth at the same time a puff of smoke from his pipe. When we were alone together, Florestano would remark, that worse would happen to the Parliament than to the Junta. "The nation," added he, "will send inexperienced men to the Congress; these will be led by *paglietti* (a term given at Naples to lawyers), and the paglietti will ruin the public cause." He prophecied but too truly!

About this time, the column composed of the fine militia of Capitanata, and of the cavalry regiment commanded by Colonel Rosso arrived. I went out to meet

them, accompanied by all the Generals who were in the Capital, and who could scarcely credit their senses on beholding five thousand militia, magnificently accoutred, preceded by a band of music, and preserving their platoons in as good condition as those of the troops of the line. The Colonel, the Marquis De Rosa, presented me the certificate of good conduct, given by the syndics of the different villages where the militia had stopped. The astonishment of the whole population, as well as of the ministers, at their appearance, was immense. The people exclaimed, that with such a militia, and that of Avellino, which they had already seen, I might have accomplished ten revolutions instead of one. When I was alone with the Duke of Calabria, he said to me, "There is but one thing I envy you, my dear William, and that is, the splendid Capitanata militia which arrived here yesterday. Nothing but your perseverance and your peculiar art could have succeeded in organizing them so well."

It was necessary that the army, the militia, and the navy should take the Constitutional oath. I awaited the arrival of the column from Foggia, and thus about thirty thousand men, drawn out along the shore of Chiaja, took the oath according to the form, of which printed copies were distributed amongst them. Every company took the oath in the presence of the Captain, and the Captains in their turn pronounced the oath before their Majors. The superior officers took the oath to the Generals, and these to me. Ambrosio Filangieri, Colletta, and many others, in a loud voice, their hands upon their hearts, and their eyes raised to that lovely sky, swore to be faithful to their country and to the Constitution. The Duke of Calabria arrived at an early hour in an open carriage, accompanied by

his family; and under the piazza which lies at the entrance of the Villa Reale, were soon mingled together Princes, Generals, and people. The officers of my staff would have kept back the good lazzaroni with their open smiling faces, but I did not allow this, saying, that such attendance must be agreeable to the royal family. It was a noble sight; all seemed animated by the same feeling. Oh! you, who have betrayed all these fair hopes, and who, for the sake of your private interest, have cast your country into slavery and shame, what happiness have you reaped from your infamy?

During the first days of the revolution, and notwithstanding what I had said to the Vicar of my determination never to accept any recompense at Court or elsewhere, there was a question of raising me to the rank of Captain-General. Many patriots of reputation came to tell me that I might retain such a post for life, a circumstance which would be most favourable to our liberty. I replied that the public esteem gave more power than the highest rank; and to prevent the possibility of such a question being renewed, I wrote to the Duke of Calabria, requesting the abolition of so high an office, as being quite unnecessary with so limited an army as ours.

The following is the answer of the Prince:—

"Naples, July 12, 1820.

"General,

"The proposal you have addressed to me is an evident proof of the moderation which animates you, and of the noble disinterestedness which guides your actions. Although I duly value such brilliant qualities, I must acknowledge that I fully agree in your opinion, and I think that the abolition of the office of Captain-

General will conduce greatly to the public advantage. I will therefore not fail to do what I can to effect the abolition above mentioned.

"FRANCIS, Vicar-General."

On publishing this correspondence, the papers mentioned that it had caused much sensation.

The city of Naples gave a grand banquet in the Campo di Marte to the militia and troops: the table was laid for ten thousand covers. An equal number of officers, subalterns and privates were selected from each corps. In the middle of handsomely-served tables was elevated a magnificent pavillion, having the appearance of a temple. Fifty steps led to the entrance, and here was served another table to which all the great dignitaries of the Court and of the kingdom had been invited. The Duke and Duchess of Calabria honoured the banquet with their presence. A universal sympathy seemed to bind us together, and the expression of patriotic enthusiasm was such that even the courtiers might have been taken for Jacobins. When the Duke retired it was my duty to accompany him to his carriage. Although his wife was only thirty-five years of age, she was extremely stout. The Duke could not give her his arm, because he was gouty. I did not dare offer mine, not because I feared that Castilian vengeance would be executed upon me, but because what would have been a mere act of politeness towards any other lady, would have been interpreted into an excess of presumption, and a want of due respect towards a Princess of the royal blood. Therefore the poor Duchess of Calabria was obliged to come down the fifty steps as well as she could, unattended.

A great disturbance took place at this time. I had ordered that the Farnese regiment of infantry should proceed to Gaeta to garrison that town. The officer, displeased at quitting Naples on such an occasion of festivity, had the impudence to say in the hearing of the soldiers, that it was not their corps that ought to go. The soldiers mutinied immediately after dinner, and without knowing what they wanted, sallied forth with their arms and baggage in the direction of the bridge of the Maddalena. My aide-de-camp, Major Staiti, carried orders to a regiment of dragoons to mount. In the meanwhile, Generals Filangieri and Ambrosio, the former Inspector of the Farnese regiment, and the latter Governor of Naples, galloped after and overtook these misguided men, whom they persuaded to return to their quarters. They had scarcely passed the bridge of the Maddalena on their way back, before they beheld the dragoons drawn out in military order, and as they supposed placed there to cut them in pieces. Actuated by this supposition, they immediately fired upon the cavalry. Being thrown into the greatest disorder and finding themselves close to the sea, they plunged into it up to their breasts. Lieutenant-Colonel Rupputi, of the dragoons, was severely wounded by the first musket shot. The cavalry charged the infantry, and the combat was now carried on in the water. The Farnese regiment had a great many killed besides the wounded, the dragoons had several wounded but no killed, their adversaries in the water being unable to direct their fire effectively. The soldiers of the former regiment were taken prisoners and conducted to the castle of St. Elmo. Ever true to my system of contributing to the comfort of the soldiers by every means, but never to allow a fault to

pass unpunished, I ordered the culprits to be brought to justice. A hundred and twenty of them were condemned to death, and I issued directions that this sentence should be executed by decimation. My decision opened a correspondence between myself and the Duke of Calabria, in which he approved himself, like the Lion of Casti, to have "*dolce il fiet, venignii denti,*" whilst I was for a moment judged by the simple multitude as cruel and tyrannical. As the Vicar would not allow the sentence of death by decimation to pass, I restricted myself to ordering three to be led to execution; afterwards to conform still more to his wishes, I limited the number to one. It seems incredible that the Prince, whom no one could deprive of his right of granting a pardon, would not allow even this one to be shot. The following is the third letter written to me upon the subject by the soft-hearted Duke:—

"Naples, July 20, 1820.

"General,

"My whole soul is penetrated with the desire that these five days of our political regeneration, which was effected with so much tranquillity and moderation, should not be darkened by the death of these brave men, who once evinced so much zeal for the good order of the kingdom, and who in a moment of excitement have been led astray from the path of honour. I have just granted them a reprieve from death, their punishment being commuted into imprisonment with chains.

"FRANCIS, Vicar-General."

Thus, to save the life of one man at the expense of discipline, he condemned one hundred and twenty to

irons, and the army was deprived of that number of soldiers. What was it that induced the Vicar to such clemency? Not the tenderness of his heart, as was apparent when he mounted the throne: he was accordingly induced so to act from a desire of appearing merciful, or because his royal soul was not displeased to behold disorder and want of discipline penetrate into the corps which had proved themselves favourable to the national cause. Had I executed the culprits, whether three or even only one of them, I should have set all the others at liberty.

The royal guard is the worst establishment that can possibly exist in an army. Not only are the corps of which it is composed extremely expensive; but being constantly under the eye of the Prince, and being better paid, fed, lodged and clothed than the other corps, they lose every feeling of nationality; and whenever a question arises between the interest of the nation and of the Court, they invariably forsake the former and defend the latter.

The royal guard of Naples was more closely attached to the royal family than is generally the case in other monarchies, from the circumstance of its having accompanied the Court to Sicily. I spoke to several members of the Junta, touching the advantage of disbanding the royal guard, and sending one company into every regiment or battalion of the line, with the title of "*select company*;" but I was told that it would be impolitic in us to do what had not been done in Spain. Being obliged to renounce my idea on this matter, I bent all my endeavours to improve the *morale* of the guard during the reviews; for so little confidence had been placed in it, that it had been excluded from serving in the Castel Nuovo. I made arrangements

for it to return there, and even had the royal guard on duty at my own house, to show that I trusted myself to their honour. I must admit, however, that I was taxed with imprudence for so doing. Filangieri, who had the command of that body, told me that my speeches and my conduct had imbued the guard with feelings of nationality. I did not flatter myself such a supposition was true, and the result proved that I was right.

Notwithstanding the interested affection of the royal guard for the King, I was informed that his guard of chasseurs, who were not, indeed, very numerous, and whom he regarded as most faithful, was divided into two factions, one of which was considerable, and had conspired against the life of the King. I thought that the public welfare, and my own honour, obliged me to inquire closely into this matter. As the conspirators were in connexion with the Carbonari, I easily discovered that nothing but the truth had been told me. Upon this, I spoke upon the subject to the Vicar, who wrote me the following letter.

"Naples, July 18, 1820.

"I immediately communicated to the King, my august father, all the respectful and affectionate things said by you in reference to his chasseurs: he desires that both cavalry and infantry may return to their usual quarters at Portici. Will you, therefore, issue orders in consequence, and remove from those quarters any other troops that may be there? I have also expressed to the King, my beloved father, all the attachment evinced by you to his royal person. I am grateful to you for it, and it is with pleasure that I tell you so.

"FRANCIS."

It was a strange situation to be obliged, out of a sentiment of patriotism and honour, to watch over the life of a King, who, if he could regain his absolute power, would most likely manifest his gratitude by cutting off my head.

The Neapolitan Ambassadors, Castelcicala, at Paris, and Alvero Ruffo, at Vienna, not only refused to swear fidelity to the Constitution, but showing themselves more royalist than the King, they wrote that, not being able to recognise the Constitutional order to which the King had been forced to adhere, they threw up their employments. When the Vicar read the two letters to me, tears of anger escaped from him. From that period, I have ceased to wonder at the spontaneous tears of women. The conduct of these two Ambassadors was the first indication I received of the address of the Princes of Europe, and of their hostile intentions against our liberties.

When I had entered Naples with the army, the soldiers of every rank, and even the Vicar, wore on their breast, and in their hats, the tri-colour cockade of the Carbonari. The Vicar was now as impatient that the army and militia should assume the red cockade of the Bourbons of Spain and of Naples, as he had been needlessly to adorn himself with the badge of liberty. His impatience could not have been greater, if those colours were to have decided his right to the throne. In order that the red cockade might be resumed without any outbreak, I sent circular letters, secretly, to all the Carbonari; then, in an order of the day, I prescribed the resumption of the red cockade, which took place without the slightest disturbance. The Vicar appeared extremely satisfied, and expressed his gratitude in an apparently open-hearted manner. I told

him that I was sure the nation did not wish for more than the King had granted, and that I thought it would be a better proof of patriotism to consolidate our institutions, than to extend them. I added, that if some senseless men, impelled by private interest, had acted in opposition to what I advanced, I would willingly lend my assistance to justice to effect their arrest, which, in the provinces, would be executed by the Carbonari militia. To persuade him still more to believe me in preference to flatterers interested in misinterpreting the wise intentions of the patriots, I continued, that if it pleased him, I would make public the sentiments I had just expressed, in a proclamation addressed to the nation. The Vicar thanked me, saying, that he sincerely loved his country, and the Constitutional Monarchy. To justify the favourable opinion he seemed to have conceived of me, I added, that my heart and sympathies were wholly republican, but that being convinced of the impossibility of establishing a republican Government in our days, I looked upon every citizen who laboured to bring about such a consummation, as highly mischievous to his country. The Vicar was, or affected to be, satisfied with my sincerity.

Two days after, I met General Filangieri, Prince of Satriano, who was coming out of the cabinet of the Vicar. He told me that the royal family was in danger; and that the Carbonari were conspiring to exterminate it. I asked him if he had mentioned this circumstance to the Duke of Calabria. He replied that he had done so, upon which I replied, that he had been ill-informed, and that he had unintentionally put much mistrust into the heart of the Vicar. His Royal Highness sent for me into his apartment. I begged him to say frankly if

he gave any credit to what Filangieri had told him. "Certainly," replied the Duke, "how can I doubt, when such a *vendita*, in such a house, has sworn to exterminate all kings?" I replied, "if your Royal Highness can believe that, you must hate the Constitution, and all the innovations which have taken place amongst us." I then explained to him that such an oath was a mere form of the Carbonari sect, which even as the highest order of Freemasons do, always swore the extermination of kings. The Freemasons, however, had always been the most refined courtiers of the Princes of Europe. I then added, that I would bring before him the most conspicuous Carbonari in the capital, and that if they did not succeed in chasing all suspicion from his mind, he would do right to cease honouring me with his confidence. He was amazed, and then thanking me for my offer, said it was needless, as he had full confidence in my words. Neither the King nor the Vicar ever doubted my sincerity; sometimes, they thought me deceived as to the intentions of the Carbonari, who they thought, would one day or other act as the Jacobins had done in France towards Louis XVI. What with their cursed cowardice and their courtiers, they always looked upon the black side of things.

About this time, died General Napolitano who had followed me to Avellino with the brigade of cavalry. He was an instance that genius can do more than education. Previous to 1799, he had been a priest and curate; in the time of the republic, Napolitano served in the cavalry and attained the rank of captain. Being driven into exile, he held the same rank in the Cisalpine Republic, and afterwards in the kingdom of Italy. After fighting bravely under the banner of Napoleon, and finally under that of Murat, King of

Naples, he acquired the rank of Major-General. Napolitano was a man of ordinary mind; his manners were soldier-like, and not only did he fight bravely himself, but he knew how to make his subordinates do likewise. As usually happens in revolutionary times, his death was ascribed to poison, but such a report soon died away, as is generally the case with what is false.

I hastened to cause the Vicar to promulgate a decree relative to the organization of the militia, which in all the provinces were to be put upon the same footing as those organized by me in the third military division. I foresaw that I should not obtain exactly the same result, for it is much easier to give orders, than to have them carried into effect; nevertheless, I left nothing undone to attain so useful and desirable an end. The Carbonari gave me a great deal of assistance in this undertaking. The six military divisions on this side of the Straits were to furnish fifty thousand militia, all of them landholders; without reckoning the national guard, of the capital which was nothing but militia with another name.

There were no bounds to the liberty of the press, and although I had not time to read all the newspapers which appeared, I had an abridgment of their contents written out for me. I observed that there were many stubborn truths upon men in office, but they were always truths. The Generals, unaccustomed to such language were indignant; several, Ambrosio and Carascosa, for instance, were both ill and well spoken of, but Colletta had never one line in his favour to mitigate all the attacks made against him. One evening, he suffered a deep humiliation in the theatre of St. Carlo, where three Generals had a box on the second tier, close to

the stage, and where all our companions were in the habit of going. During the period of the Constitution, I seldom went, partly because I had little time to spare, and partly to escape the applause which greeted me. One evening, Colletta appeared in front of the box in full uniform. At first, he was taken by persons not very well acquainted with me, for myself, upon which great applause and clapping of hands took place; but as soon as the mistake became known, and Colletta was recognised, they hissed him to that degree that he was obliged to quit the theatre, furious with indignation. I was grieved at this incident, for I was aware that our strength lay in our union, and that the self-love of man is never wounded with impunity.

CHAPTER XII.

1820.

The people are irritated against the Ministers Medici and Tommasi, who had just retired—Condition of the Carbonari in the capital and provinces—Examples of the respect paid by the Carbonari to the laws—The foreign Ministers demand a guard for their safety—A gratuity is offered me—Conduct of a small number of Generals devoted to the Court.

When I affirm that during the revolution of 1820, there were neither disorders nor crimes, I do not mean to imply that we were living in that forced state of sepulchral tranquillity which exists under an absolute government. At first, the youthful part of the population was in agitation everywhere, but especially in the capital, which was full of students from the different provinces. When I assert that the general sentiment of patriotism was a most disinterested feeling, I do not think that the conduct of a small number of individuals, who sought their private interest instead of that of the country, is a contradiction of my assertion. But neither the base cupidity of those individuals, nor the excitement of the noble youths, who often erred from inexperience, ever endangered the existence of public order. During the nine months of our Constitutional Government, ordinary crimes greatly diminished; one

alone of a serious nature, to which I shall allude hereafter, was committed from political motives, and no marauders were heard of throughout the kingdom. The following is what took place in the month of July, which was reckoned the most disorderly of all the nine. Thousands of citizens of the middle classes assembled together in the Strada di Toledo and the Place della Carità, loudly demanding the imprisonment of the dismissed ministers, Medici and Tommasi, threatening to set fire to their houses if the ministry did not order their arrest. I received a letter from the Duke of Calabria and another from the Minister of Grace and Justice, saying that the capital was in a state of complete anarchy. Borelli, the President of Public Security, asked for assistance, and General Ambrosio, Governor of Naples, wrote to ask me whether he should not beat the alarm. I replied to all, that I would soon quell the disturbance, which had been produced by ill-judged patriotism and the heat of July.

Majors Cianciulli and Staiti came to ask me what regiments should mount, to which I replied that I did not want any troops either on foot or on horseback, but that they were to order my drosky, and accompany me in it. They were both extremely surprised at beholding us thus unaccompanied turn in the direction of the Largo della Carità, which was crowded with a multitude maddened with fury, shouting, "Death to Medici! death to Tommasi!" My small carriage could scarcely make its way into the crowd, and its wheels grazed several young men who appeared frantic. The balconies above the square were crowded with people, and a few persons devoted to the Court said, "We shall see how he will get out of the difficulty with only two aides-de-camp in the midst of his beloved Car-

bonari." Several ladies, attached to the new order of things, looked upon myself and my two aides-de-camp as lost men, and fainted away. I stood up in the carriage, looking at the multitude and smiling as if they were acting a farce. I allowed them to exclaim and shout until I perceived that most of them were hoarse, and that all were fatigued, and then I made signs that I wished to speak. A profound silence immediately ensued. The people were expecting some pompous speech from me, when I told them, that as property was sacred amongst a free people, if those who had climbed upon my drosky broke it, they should be made to pay the damage in ready money. This foolery held them in silence, and undecided what to think, I then resumed in a more serious tone, "I am not one of those who think that the national independence can be supported by beating our breasts for mercy, as if we were criminals; but as long as I live and have the command of the public forces, I will never consent to give the Powers of Europe the slightest pretext for proclaiming that they will send their armies into this kingdom, to put down anarchy and to abolish crime. You exclaim, 'Death to Medici! death to Tommasi!' are they not both, as well as yourselves, citizens of a country, which, thanks to heaven, is now free? And you, the patriots, you, the champions of the Constitutional Government, point out to me the *barracche* in this capital where the worthy *Cugini*, instead of the evangelical maxims and the Christian virtues adored by the Carbonari, preach vengeance and oppression; point them out to me, that after destroying these *barracche*, I may answer for it to eight millions of my countrymen. I am not Masaniello, nor are you those lazzaroni, who although they honoured the Neapolitan name by bravely fighting

against the foreign enemy, fell again into slavery from the want of union. Select from amongst you a deputation of honest men, and send them to confer with me; if the desires they make known to me are just, you will have all the credit I possess to support them. Withdraw to your houses, my dear children, and when you assemble in your Vendite, your Grand Masters will point out to you how citizens, animated by pure patriotism, should support the cause of liberty." This address of mine, although brief, for I had never accustomed myself to public speaking, produced such an effect upon the multitude, that they dispersed, and never met again to alarm the Government.

After the revolution, the Carbonari could no longer be called a sect, for it had extended itself to every class of the nation, and embraced all those citizens who were raised a little above the most indigent class. Those who were not Carbonari before the fall of arbitrary power, became so after; some from pure patriotism, some because it was the rage, and others to serve the Court. It would be strange to maintain that out of about three hundred thousand Carbonari none were of bad natures, or had evil intentions; but these were so few in number that to remain in the ranks of the Carbonari, they were obliged to feign patriotism and virtue. The Carbonari in the provinces were more pure, for as it was easier to know the bad citizens, they were excluded; and to a certain degree, there existed an aristocracy of morality. In the capital, which was so much more populous, it was easy for unworthy persons to become Carbonari; nevertheless, I will shortly state a fact which enabled me to confound those who accused the Carbonari unjustly. By means of this sect, I was enabled to maintain all the measures

adopted by the Government, which I regarded as useful.

I must point out an instance of the respect paid by the Carbonari to the laws. One day I attended the Council of Ministers; the Vicar presided. They all began to exclaim, in voices of alarm, that the Government no longer existed, that anarchy had reached its climax. I replied, that although I watched most carefully over the maintenance of public order, I had not as yet perceived the slightest symptom of anarchy. The chief judge, Ricciardi, then rose to speak, and said that a Captain of the National Guard of Naples had been confined within the Castel del Uovo, for some delinquency of which he had been guilty, but that, being a Carbonaro, his fellow sectaries had enabled him to effect his escape. I turned round to the Vicar and to the ministers, and said I was fully aware that before the existence of the Constitutional Government many delinquents had escaped from prison, and that the ministers had never dreamt of declaring the country, or even the capital, in a state of anarchy on that account. But to prove clearly that the laws were then more efficacious than in past times, I would engage, in the course of the following day, to make the Captain return to his prison. I added, that I neither knew the Captain, his character, nor the fault committed by him; but that I was certain of the morality of the majority of the Carbonari. They all looked at each other, and Ricciardi, as if to make easy to me the means of keeping my promise, said that he would request the favour of His Highness, the Vicar, to assure me, if the Captain should return to the Castel del Uovo and be condemned, that he would grant him a free pardon. I replied: "The basis of the present Govern-

ment should be morality and vigour; therefore the Captain shall return to his prison without any conditions, and if he be condemned, he shall undergo his punishment." The Vicar and the ministers, who were accustomed to see me keep my promises, declared that I should render a great service to the cause of public tranquillity. I assembled the chiefs of the high *Vendita* and told them that the honour of the sect, no less than the public welfare, imperiously required that the Captain should return to prison, and that if that were not done, I would close all the Vendite in the capital, placing at their entrance Carbonari militia, to prevent any one going in. The Captain returned of his own accord to prison. The Vicar and Ministers, unable to doubt a fact which they had witnessed with their own eyes, chose not to attribute it to the morality of the sect, but rather to my firm determination of resorting to any extremity rather than yield. I had certainly some merit in this case; but if the greater part, or even a considerable portion of the Carbonari had been immoral, all my firmness would not have produced a similar result.

I have always thought it far wiser to endeavour to give a good direction to the weakness of a people than to attempt to destroy it altogether. The Carbonari were fond of showing themselves, and desirous of not being forgotten. They took it into their heads to celebrate a great festival in the Church of the Carmine al Mercato. They invited many magistrates, and amongst others, Filangieri, Intendant of Naples, and uncle of the General; I was likewise invited, and as they always did whatever I wished them to do, I had not the slightest hesitation in granting their request. I was first obliged to review them, after which I had to listen to a sermon preached by a

bishop, and which was perfectly Constitutional. As my mind was full of the principal events which had taken place in my country, I almost thought, as I looked out upon the market-place, that I there beheld Conradin, Masaniello, and the heroes of 1799, led to death. Masaniello especially was before my eyes, for I was surrounded by Lazzaroni and Carbonari in crowds, who, according to the rites of the sect, were armed. After having spent several hours in this manner, they all returned to their houses, satisfied and quiet. Nevertheless, the indefatigable enemies of the revolution asserted that the capital was under the yoke of banditti, and a prey to the greatest disorder. I suppose that Colletta alludes to this harmless festival in page 241, when he speaks of the Carbonari in this high-sounding strain :

" This numerous and victorious sect, no longer cautious to conceal its mysteries, desired a triumph, and accordingly celebrated with all its mystical rites a holy and public ceremony. On a festival day a multitude of Carbonari, displaying the insignia of their sect, began a procession. In the first ranks were seen priests and monks bearing on their breasts the cross and the dagger, arrogant in appearance, and maintaining a strict silence. They advanced with measured steps towards the church, where a priest of the sect, or else one intimidated to their purpose, blessed their banners and insignia. General Pépé was present at the ceremony, although not of them. These people, these arms, and these mysteries caused great alarm in the city." These lines will suffice to show the reader all the malignity of the historian. The preacher was a bishop, but had he been only a simple priest, why suppose that he had been intimidated, when he relates

that the first ranks were exclusively composed of priests and monks? When he says that they were silent, he implies that a great miracle must have taken place, amongst the people of Naples. He would not have written thus, had he ever attempted what I did, both as a Colonel and a General, that is to say, the maintenance of silence and immobility amongst old soldiers, who were under arms though covered with wounds. Had Colletta ever been in London he would often have beheld thousands and thousands of members of different corporations, distinguished from each other by the ribbons they wore in their hats, and by numerous flags, pass through the streets of the capital on their way to some particular place, where they were to deliberate upon a petition to be presented to parliament. Such assemblies have never caused London to be regarded as in a state of anarchy. To accustom a people to assemble together without committing any disorder is to teach them to live like free men.

If the Carbonari, the militia, the army, the Junta, and the Vicar-General furnished me with plenty of employment, I was not less occupied by the ministers of the foreign powers, so that I scarcely ever obtained more than two hours' sleep out of the twenty-four. The Spanish Ambassador, Onis, alone appeared, both from inclination and policy, to be favourable to our liberty. He paid me the first visit, and I soon contracted a friendship with him which lasted as long as he lived. The British Minister, A'Court, was in the other extreme. He detested every thing that had been done amongst us, and when I succeeded in refuting his imputations cast on our revolution, he replied that at all events we had lost the pleasure of the *dolce far niente*. "The *dolce far niente*," I replied, "may suit the slaves you

have in your colonies; but not Italians who, in all ages, with the exception of the three last centuries, have been the only people in Europe who have enjoyed the blessings of liberty; and we have also always had Governments without Kings until the end of the last century, I mean those of Genoa and of Venice." At first I was extremely satisfied with the visit which I paid to the Russian Minister, Count Stackelberg. Although I met the English Minister there, Stackelberg without much heeding him, evinced a strong interest in our affairs. When I left, contrary to the usual custom, he accompanied me to the last door, and then being no longer within hearing of A'Court, he said to me: "Vous êtes des hommes comme il n'y en a pas." I then recalled to mind the opinion expressed by Zurlo and Campo Chiaro, when they said that Austria would not dare go to war with us on account of Russia. But these hopes were dissipated by the first despatches received by the Russian Minister from the Emperor Alexander, who instead of availing himself of our movement, which gave great trouble to Austria, preferred the interests of absolute monarchy to those of his own empire; and he restricted his ambitious views upon Turkey.

Shortly after this, the foreign ministers addressed a request to the Duke of Campo Chiaro that they might have a guard at their houses, as they did not think themselves in safety during the anarchy (as they called it) which existed in the capital. Campo Chiaro forwarded me a copy of their request, and I replied that the anarchy only existed in the minds of the Ambassadors, because they were averse to our revolution; that by granting them the guard they asked for, we should only give weight to their calumny, and that it

wns my opinion that their malignant request should be refused, and having written to this effect, an after-thought made me add a postscript, in which I said: "As I fear that the foreign ministers may bribe people to insult them, and to give a colour to their imaginary anarchy, I will send them a guard of grenadiers, and will so contrive that the Carbonari shall prevent the possibility of their getting insulted." My missive was more soldier-like than diplomatic, but words intended to express the truth politely belonged to Campo Chiaro, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

It was necessary to change both the name of the police direction, and the persons employed in it. The former was easy enough to do, and it received the designation of Commission of Public Security, but it was not so easy to find a chief capable of assuming its direction. The high Vendita proposed to me one of their "good cousins," named Borelli, with whom I was not acquainted. I was informed that he was a lawyer of more wit than reputation, and that before the revolution he had been regarded with suspicion by the Government. Although the Carbonari spoke highly of him, I told the deputies of the high Vendita, as it was a question of so important an office, that, before proposing him to the Vicar, as President of the Public Security, I wished them to deliberate in a public assembly upon the proposal they had made to me. The result of this deliberation was, that his talents and his patriotism rendered Borelli deserving of this appointment. In consequence of my recommendation, Borelli received the office of President of the Public Security, which he filled with great zeal, until greater dangers threatened our liberty.

One day the Minister of War put into my hand a

bank note, which had been awarded me by the Council of Ministers, to satisfy the expenses of representing the Government. I refused to accept it, saying that I had neither time nor inclination to give dinners, and that living with my brother was a source of economy to me. When the Duke of Calabria asked why I had refused this gratuity, General Carascosa repeated the answer I had given, adding "I believe that General Pépé, who has refused this money, has not a hundred Napoleons at his disposal." Carascosa was right. Some small gratuities were awarded to several poor but honest Carbonari, who had served the public cause.

Every opinion to which people remain firmly attached from a conviction of its truth, is to be respected; but when men change their politics for the sake of their own miserable interests, they become utterly contemptible. I recollect several Generals who had followed the King to Sicily, and had always shown themselves devoted to him. During the Constitution they became Carbonari, and applied to me to give them active employment.

CHAPTER XIII.

1820.

Causes of the discord existing between the two populations separated by the Straits—Disturbance at Palermo—The fugitive Generals Naselli and Church arrive in Naples—Impression produced in the capital by the events of Palermo—The first ill-directed and vain expedients used to quell the insurrection of Palermo—Prince Cariati returns from Vienna—Prince Cimitile is sent to Russia—Certain Generals refuse to quit the capital; my expedient to compel their obedience—The best and most honourable naval officers, blinded by their patriotism, unjustly accuse the Duke of Roccaromana of treachery.

It is very common to behold a sentiment of jealousy and aversion existing between different cities of the same province, still oftener between two provinces of one State. But when the kingdoms governed by different laws are united under the same Crown, if the King has an interest ill or well calculated to excite jealousy and hatred between the two people, he will have no difficulty in effecting his purpose, and this happened in the case of the Kings of Sicily. Without speaking of more distant times in 1799 and 1806, King Ferdinand of Sicily, with the men and treasures of that island persecuted his subjects of Terra Firma; and afterwards when he was re-established upon the throne of Naples, he made use of Neapolitan soldiers and magistrates to oppress

the inhabitants of the island, and to destroy their institutions. In the meanwhile the people of the two kingdoms, instead of joining against their sorry ruler, had been acting like the dog who bites the stone cast at him, instead of the hand which threw it.

The higher classes in Sicily had approved of the English Constitution far more than the people. I mean in another chapter to speak of this Constitution, and of the circumstances which preceded its establishment from the first years of the last century. I will now limit myself to saying that several of the old Sicilian Barons who happened to be at Naples when the Constitution of Spain was proclaimed, thinking to do something useful to the Court as well as to their own island, made known to Ferdinand and his son their belief of the expediency of having the English Constitution with two chambers proclaimed in Sicily, instead of that of Spain. It is very difficult to state what answer these Barons received from the King and the hereditary Prince. They departed for Palermo, where they arrived on the 14th of July at the very moment of the publication of the events which had occurred at Naples, which the civil and military authorities had employed every possible art to conceal. Whether the Barons just arrived from Naples, joined with others, had excited the people to rise; whether the people had risen of their own accord; or whether they and the nobility in concert commenced the revolution is difficult to decide. At all events, the commotion broke out on the 15th of July, which is the greatest festival in the year in Palermo, being that of the holy protectress of the city; and it is a period when the population is considerably increased by the concourse of people assembled there from the neighbourhood.

The nobles demanded separation from Naples and the British Constitution, the people wanted the Constitution of Spain and independence. The latter prevailed, and the interested Anglomania of the nobility caused them to lose a great part of the influence they had possessed over the people: they only desired the establishment of two houses of Parliament that they might become peers, and thus acquire power.

A few days before the revolution of Naples, the King had sent over to Sicily the two Generals, Naselli and Church, the former as Viceroy, and the latter as military commander. Naselli was an old courtier devoted to the King; Church, an Irishman, who as a Lieutenant-Colonel had distinguished himself in the British army. Not believing in the possibility of so speedy an insurrection, this General was assaulted and threatened by the people, together with General Coglitose who was wounded by his side, and was constrained to save his life by seeking refuge on board a small man-of-war. Thus the weak garrison of Palermo remained without a Governor, and ignorant of the conduct it ought to pursue. Either from imbecility or design, General Naselli allowed the people to break into the fortress of Castellamare, where they armed themselves. Many persons believe that Naselli had armed and excited the people of Palermo, in order to favour the interest of the Court, and to employ the populace against the revolution which had just taken place in Naples. Not being able to restrain the fury of the multitude, armed by his orders, he fled by sea at the very moment when they were about to assault the garrison. This garrison, as I have said, was without a leader, and without any place of defence, for Castellamare had fallen for the second time into the hands of the Palermitans. The condition

of the troops was rendered more desperate by the arrival of an armed multitude sent to assist the Palermitans from Montreale, Bagheria, Capua, Carini, Misilmeri, Pasco, and other places. The troops amounting at the very utmost to about three thousand men, after fighting desperately, were assaulted by so overwhelming a mass of armed men, firing in all directions, and even from the windows in the narrow streets of the town, that they were finally obliged to yield. After having surrendered, some few soldiers were inhumanly put to death; but to rescue the Palermitans from the disgrace of so odious an act, I must state that the culprits were galley-slaves, whose prison doors had been thrown open by the populace. Amongst the officers of the garrison who distinguished themselves greatly by their intrepid conduct, were Colonel Lucchosi, Major Francia, and Major Martinez.

The people of Palermo did not manifest the same respect for the persons and the property of others as had been observed during the revolution on our side of the Straits. Amongst the citizens barbarously murdered by the people of Palermo, were the Prince of Cattolica and Prince of Aci, who were beheaded, their heads being paraded about the town in triumph. Another action which disgraced this revolution was the opening of the doors of all the prisons, and the arming of thieves and assassins. The insurrection had reached such a height, that a monk was seen in the uniform of a Colonel leading one of these loose bands. The causes why this people committed such unexampled excesses during their revolution, and which were unknown in ours, are in my opinion the following: First, the not having experienced all the horrors which had been committed in Naples in 1799; for a popula-

tion who has once been guilty of such deeds, becomes conscious of their barbarity, and does not fall into them again for a long time. Secondly, in the provinces on this side of the Straits, the Carbonari with its example of morality; the organization of the militia; the conscription and ten years' war in distant countries, had civilized and disciplined the population. Thirdly, the nobility, the middle classes and the people all wished the same thing; whereas in Palermo, the multitude and the nobility, while they equally wished their independence, disagreed as to the Constitution to be acquired. The plebeians wanted the Constitution of Spain, and the Barons that of England. I may likewise add that the assault of the garrison so excited the people of Palermo, that they lost all constraint over themselves.

In the meanwhile, the fugitives from Palermo passed over to Naples, bearing thither the sad intelligence of what had taken place in that vast city, and as they wished to justify themselves, they were induced greatly to exaggerate the disorder and ill-usage of which the Neapolitan troops had been the victims. They said a great deal more than the truth, and awakened the indignation of the whole people of Naples.

I was now in endless difficulties and dilemmas. First, I was beset by many Generals and superior officers, natives of Sicily, who having sworn to the Constitution proclaimed in the united kingdom, now demanded to withdraw the oath they had taken. I answered them that it was easy to foresee the consequence of our discord; that they were perfectly free to withdraw their oath; but that in such a case, they would be regarded as deprived of their rank. In the meanwhile, the population of the capital, indignant at hearing that the Palermitans had murdered a great number of our

soldiers, began to utter vague threats against all the natives of that island. Alarmed by such menaces, all the Generals and officers who had previously come to me to withdraw their oath now returned to renew it, and to remain in their respective ranks. I told them that I would regard their first request as null and void; that I had faith in their honour, and that as to the threats of which they had been the object, they were not to pay any attention to them, for I would engage myself that they would not even be insulted General Church was brought to a court-martial and acquitted. He requested leave to quit the country, which I immediately granted him: he afterwards returned with the army of the enemy. As I like to be just even towards my political adversaries, I must say that he did everything in his power to wash out this stain by using all his credit and influence to protect the fallen Liberals, and he did so warmly, and at the risk of compromising himself.

It was necessary to deliberate upon the line of conduct which the Government ought to adopt both towards Palermo and the whole island. My opinion, which I enforced as strongly as I could, was to lose no time in sending fifteen thousand men to Palermo. With such a force in the country, either the whole island would declare itself in favour of Palermo, or this town would stand alone. In the former case it would be indispensable to grant the Sicilians whatever they desired; in the second, it would be necessary to subject Palermo, that we might prove ourselves generous brethren, and with the exception of the separation from Naples, grant the Sicilians everything else they might reasonably demand. It was my opinion, that by leaving Palermo in the state it was, that is to say, unsupported

by the whole island, we should discredit our revolution in the eyes of our menacing foreign enemies. On the contrary, by reasoning with Palermo, it might be said that an absolute Government had recognised the misdeeds of a band of assassins, whereas a Constitutional Government had put down a capital of about two hundred thousand inhabitants. If the Neapolitan revolution had failed, the Sicilians could have no hope of acquiring their liberty; as their freedom depended upon ours, all the expedients which tended to preserve our credit and our liberty, tended at the same time to the advantage of Sicily. Besides this, the circumstance of Palermo standing out alone, caused it to lose all right to speak and to treat in the name of the entire island, and consequently a greater stain would fall upon the Constitutional Government, if it were weak enough to yield to the Palermitans. Finally, the great cause why the separation of the two kingdoms ought to be avoided was the independence of Italy, which could not be preserved without the union of the whole peninsula, and such an union could not be encouraged by the separation of Sicily and Naples. Prudence did not permit me to advance this argument, which would have drawn down upon us still more the hatred of Austria and of the Allied Powers.

With the exception of the Vicar-General, all the members of the Junta and the ministers opposed the proposal which I so strongly insisted upon, of sending a numerous body of troops into Sicily. They were probably disposed to grant to Sicily the independence which was demanded by Palermo alone. They had not even the shadow of such an intent, but were far more opposed than myself to such a concession, to which I would have consented only in the event of the

whole of the island siding with Palermo; an example which might very well have been followed by Messina and Catanea, which were left almost without defence. The ministers and the Junta were opposed to me, actuated by the common tendency of the weak to adopt half-measures; and those which they put into operation were truly laughable. The Minister of War, Carascosa, who was of opinion that we ought to carry on our operations in the island with a very great force, expresses himself thus, in page 156 of his History: "Le Général Pépé pensait qu'il fallait réduire la Sicile, et qu'il fallait de suite y envoyer une force considérable." A little later he adds: "Je proposais de n'envoyer dans cette île que mille hommes seulement, sous les ordres d'un général entreprenant et expérimenté, qui prendrait aussi le commandement de sept bataillons qui étaient alors en Sicile; j'ajoutais qu'il fallait en outre mettre à sa disposition une flottille de bâtiments légers." Amongst the reasons given by Carascosa for so decided a half-measure, was the necessity of not being left with an insufficient force in the event of an Austrian invasion. I replied, that the Austrians could not be prepared to enter the kingdom under four months, and that the more troops we sent into Sicily, the sooner our object would be accomplished, and they would have returned to Naples before an invasion could possibly take place. I offered to go, and as General-in-Chief I could have carried my scheme into effect; but the King and the Vicar protested that if I left them they would both quit the kingdom. It would be too long to relate the correspondence which took place between the ministry, the governmental Junta, and a Junta which had been elected in Palermo by the people. After losing much precious time, they finally carried my plan into execution, as I will hereafter show.

Prince Cariati, who had been sent by the Constitutional Ministry to Vienna to advocate our cause at that Court, returned to Naples about this time. Cariati had been Ambassador at Vienna under Murat, and both as a diplomatist and a citizen he had always defended our national honour. He wished to see our country endowed with liberal institutions, but he did not like them to be obtained by revolutionary means; and although he was not a devotee, I really believe that he expected them to come from heaven. Cariati had honourably executed his commission, and he told us that Austria was excessively grieved at our recent political changes: he added, that it was his opinion, if we were to go on with moderation and without any disturbance or scandal, that the Emperor Francis would not go to war with us. Cariati made use of the following sentence: "The question of peace or war will be decided in the Strada Toledo." Which meant that if we kept quiet we should have no war. The Junta and the ministers treasuring up this saying, left me no peace either day or night. If any articles appeared in the papers which were not sufficiently circumspect; if any allusion to liberty was applauded at the theatre; if any demonstration in favour of liberty was made in the public streets, the ministers, the Junta, and the Vicar wrote me earnest letters to induce me to put a stop to these causes of war. Ah! if instead of consulting honest citizens; if instead of hoping to consolidate our liberty without recourse to extreme measures, I had followed the impulse of my own soul, I might not perhaps have saved my country from all the dangers that surrounded it, but the Austrians should have paid dearly for their invasion. Had I not been shackled by the intrigues of the King and the Prince, and the irresolution of those

who avoided compromising themselves, I might have availed myself of the enthusiasm of the people in the Calabrias, and of the advantageous positions to be met with all over the kingdom.

Several generals spoiled by Joachim, and still more so by Nugent, under the reign of Ferdinand, wished to figure in active service, and to receive their salaries without quitting the capital. They were in the habit of giving in their resignations rather than proceed to their posts, certain that these would not be accepted. I published an order of the day, in which I declared that military men of all grades, up to that of Lieutenant-General, who did not quit Naples in twenty-four hours after they had received orders to proceed to their posts, were to present themselves at the castle of St. Elmo, there to satisfy me as to the reasons which detained them in the capital. As they all thought it hard to present themselves at the castle, they preferred obedience. The example was set by Lieutenant-General, Duke of Roccaromana, the intimate friend of my brother. Roccaromana was appointed to the command of the military division in Calabria, and on his arrival there, he threw me into great trouble without intending it. Several naval officers, eminent for their honour and bravery came to tell me that Roccaromana was conspiring against our country, and reminded me of his conduct in 1799, when he had abandoned the people for the Republic, and subsequently the Republic to follow Cardinal Ruffo. They added, that the intentions of the Duke were clearly manifested in letters which he had written to the Princess Paterno, at Palermo, all of which letters had fallen into their hands and been opened, as they were directed to a hostile town. Roccaromana was the handsomest man

of his day, and so chivalrous that he might have figured worthily by the side of the knights of Ariosto. He had fought bravely for his country and had been engaged in many duels. But when it was a question between his country and Joachim, to whom he was Grand Equerry, or of his country and his lady—poor country! I could scarcely believe such an imputation; but when honourable officers, amongst whom were two captains of vessels, stated that they possessed letters written by Roccaromana proving his treachery to the State, I sent a telegraphic order to him to quit the command of the two Calabrias and to return to Naples. Upon second thoughts I countermanded the order which had not yet been despatched, and desired the officers to return in a couple of hours with the letters they had spoken of. At the same time I wrote to Borrelli, President of the Public Security, to come and speak to me. The officers arrived at the same time as the President; the letters were read and they contained nothing but expressions of affection for the lady. The officers affirmed that in other letters, which had been destroyed, the Duke openly indicated his evil intentions. Borrelli and myself both agreed, that these officers had made some mistake, although their honour was too well known to harbour a supposition that their mistake was voluntary.

CHAPTER XIV.

1820.

Rewards to be given to such military men as bore an active part in the revolution are decreed, but they are not accepted—Conspiracy got up against me in Santa Maria in Porto—The Duke of Gallois is not received in Vienna—The soldiers on furlough are called to complete the army—The formation of the legions is decreed—Several Generals, unable to support the blame cast upon them by the public, accuse the officers who had overthrown the absolute government of treachery.

DURING the long reign of Ferdinand, and the short ones of Joseph Buonaparte and Murat, the subaltern and superior grades in the army were generally conferred out of favour; nevertheless, thanks to the late wars, we succeeded in obtaining a tolerable number of excellent colonels and generals. In the civil wars of the kingdom, in Spain, in Germany, and in other parts of Italy, these officers received many wounds, and had merited approbation and decorations from the French by their conduct when fighting at the head of Neapolitan soldiers; and yet they did not repose due faith in the national troops. Such is the impression produced on the human heart by unfortunate and perhaps unavoidable results. I said to myself, to my officers, to my colleagues, and I said repeatedly, that it had always

been my good fortune to see our people and our soldiers fight with the greatest valour. I was too young to have borne a part in the campaign of 1798, when our soldiers who had never seen a musket, until a few days before, and who were so ill-guided by Mack, afforded a great deal of mirth to Europe. But afterwards I saw the people of the capital fight valiantly against Championnet in defence of a fugitive King.

Some months after, the small republican army in which I served gave every possible proof of great daring and perseverance. In that same year, more than three hundred magnanimous citizens, mostly soldiers, gave up their lives on the scaffold, with the courage of heroes. When in exile, I beheld in the Italian Legion the Neapolitans signalize themselves in duels as well as in the field. In 1806, I saw only too clearly the population of the provinces on this side of the Straits opposing the conquerors of Austerlitz, who notwithstanding their excellent discipline, and the assistance which they received from the inhabitants of the wealthier classes were nearly driven from the kingdom. Again, in Calabria, I saw the conquerors of Austerlitz obliged to admire the valour with which the undaunted multitude fought. Both in the wars of Spain and Germany our troops always merited praise, as they did in Italy. In the campaign of 1817, never did an army end a campaign so unfortunately, after having combatted with so much valour.

In the midst of so many proofs given by my countrymen of their aptitude for arms, both as soldiers and citizens, how could I do otherwise than feel convinced that if once properly organized under the national banner, they would have been more than sufficient to defend our independence? I was fully aware of all the

obstacles which existed to such an organization, for instead of being free to act as I liked, I was shackled by the King, by the Vicar, and by several of my colleagues: nevertheless, I did as much as I could to effect my purpose. By dint of importunity, I succeeded in obtaining from the Vicar, a decree for a commission composed of twenty Generals and superior officers of every arm, to be presided over by myself. This commission was entrusted with the selection of the Majors, Lieutenant-Colonels, and Colonels to be employed actively. At the first meeting I addressed myself to the members of the Junta, and said: "Recollect that a bad Major at the head of a battalion or of a squadron, may cause a great deal of mischief, especially amongst fresh troops, and that the higher the rank of the officer, the more fatal will be the effects, if he be incompetent. Let not any superior officers, ignorant or inexperienced, or of compromised reputation, be ever entrusted with any command." When the scrutiny began, I saw symptoms of the old habits of favouritism and partiality; accordingly I began to set forth to the Junta all the prejudice which would arise from their partiality in designing for the command of battalions or regiments, officers utterly incapable of leading them in time of war. I thus succeeded in obtaining a selection of officers of the higher rank, which if not perfect, was at least tolerable. But the result was, that the officers who were not admitted to active command, humbled on the one hand, and exalted on the other, even by several Generals, did nothing but talk against me, saying amongst other things, that I did not love the army; that all my affections were fixed upon the militia and the Carbonari, by means of which I meant to compass my ambitious views.

The military men, who first declared themselves for the Constitution, did so from motives of pure patriotism; nevertheless, the example given by the Spanish Lieutenant-Colonels, Quiroga, Riego, Areoguera, and Lopez Bagnos, of accepting rewards of rank, and even of lands, produced its due effect in Naples. An equal desire of promotion manifested itself amongst the officers who had first followed me. I condescended to ask rewards for them, either by promoting them a step, or by giving them a military order, to prove that if Kings rewarded the persons who had been devoted to them, the country did as much by the citizens who had exposed their lives for its sake. In doing so I committed a great error, for patriotism should ever be its own reward; and had even a recompense been necessary, it ought to have been awarded by the National Congress. In the meanwhile, the officers who had been excluded from active command, wishing to conspire against me, enticed others to join their party, who thought themselves injured by having been omitted or struck from the list of those promotions, which had been granted by the government as rewards, as I have already stated.

They all met together in the church of Santa Maria, in Portici, to denounce me as a tyrant and a despot. Several excellent officers, out of mere curiosity, committed the error of entering the church. At this time the leaders of the corps, which had been most compromised in the revolution, came to ask permission of me to proceed at the heads of their regiments to punish the conspirators; who under the pretence of being my enemies were in fact those of the State. At the same time they declared in their own names, as well as in those of their subordinates, that they declined

every species of recompense. I told them, that the welfare of the country demanded that this first movement of sedition should be quelled without the use of sword or bayonet. The meritorious officers, who blushed at finding themselves in the church in company with those who had been excluded from actual service by a numerously attended commission, declared themselves warmly in favour of justice, and disclaimed participation with the mutineers who were immediately after dispersed. Not to give a triumph to the foreign Ministers and the Court, I forbore to send the authors of this sedition before a Council of War. I assembled all the Generals and superior officers the same evening in the saloon of the Minister of War, and gave them so severe a lecture, that the following day, every officer of merit had declared that he had entered the church wholly unconscious of the motive of the assembly. Thus terminated this scandalous affair, which was severely blamed by the press and Carbonari. I was obliged for the sake of the public peace to exculpate several Generals, who were not unjustly accused of having been the secret authors of the conspiracy. I was careful to make known in an order of the day, as well as through the public press, that the rewards demanded by me from government for those who had been the foremost to combine to overthrow absolute power had not been accepted, and I highly praised such generosity.

Whilst things were in this state, an old diplomatist, the Duke of Gallo, who had been sent to Vienna, where he had not been received, returned to Naples. Gallo was the person who had been charged by Austria to conclude the treaty of Campo Formio with General Buonaparte. The object of his mission to Vienna, had

been to cause the acknowledgment of our Constitutional Government. The fact of his not being received was an evident proof of the intentions of Austria towards us.

It was now high time to make preparations for our defence, and I was obliged to do so in spite of the Vicar and his Ministers. The former always showed himself ready to support whatever I proposed, although he secretly did his utmost to thwart me. The Minister of War likewise opposed me, more openly, to please the Court. I began by exacting that all the soldiers absent on leave should be recalled, which made the army amount to fifty-two thousand men, reckoning the soldiers who had already served. The Minister of War replied in the following letter."

"Naples, July 29, 1820.

"Before submitting to the inspection of his Royal Highness the Vicar General, the project manifested in your Excellency's letter of the 25th inst., No. 1361, I have the honour to point out to you:

"1. That all the subalterns and privates of the six past years do not exceed eight thousand men.

"2. That amongst these a great number were dismissed the service as incapable; that many are dead, and that not a few have embraced professions which they could only with difficulty quit. Some will be found to have married, or to have gone away from their families; and others have either spontaneously returned to the army or else offered themselves, and been accepted as substitutes. All this induces me to suppose that the measure of summoning all to the army will spread an immense feeling of alarm with little profit, and would but ill-contribute to the wise purpose towards which your endeavours tend.

"I beg your Excellency to consider this subject attentively, and then to advise me whether you still desire me to submit your intention to his Royal Highness.

(Signed) "CARASCOSA."

Whilst the Minister wrote to me that we should with difficulty have assembled a few thousand men from those away on leave, I was certain that at least thirty thousand would have answered my call. I therefore wrote to him again: I spoke to the Junta, and to the Duke of Calabria, in terms to prove to them that I would resort to any extreme rather than not complete the army. The decree was issued as I desired, and the very Carascosa, who had written to me that it would be impossible to assemble more than a few thousand soldiers on leave, publishes in his history, page 162. "Le Ministre de la guerre fit observer les inconvénients d'une semblable disposition. Si la loi, disait-il, s'exécutait rigoureusement, il arriverait dans les dépôts, un nombre de congédiés bien supérieur à celui dont on avait besoin." In fact, as I will show in due time, the number assembled did amount to more than was needful. Such documents will show in what condition my country was, as well as in what a position I found myself.

When once the recall of the soldiers on leave was settled, I thought of arming all the citizens, whom Colletta and Carascosa term Carbonari, and whom I term the nation; for it seems strange to give the name of sectaries to two hundred and fifty thousand citizens in arms, comprising the militia, the guard of security, and the legions. I shall speak more of them hereafter, when I will explain my reasons for the system which I

adopted to arm the nation in the manner in which it was done.

As far as regards an armed force, whether of the line or militia, I have always thought that quality was preferable to number. In a little work entitled, "Italia Militare," which I published in Paris in 1836, I have endeavoured to show that a battalion of six hundred men, accustomed to use their guns as riflemen; inured to fatigue and sobriety; attached by feelings of patriotism to their flag; who would be better clothed and paid than elsewhere; led by officers of undoubted merit: living in certainty that not a fault would go unpunished, or a meritorious act unrewarded;—I repeat that such a battalion would oppose with effect, two or three battalions of an equal force, such as now exist in the finest armies in Europe. A devout believer in this maxim, had I had time and authority to organize the forces of my country in my own way, I should have limited myself to thirty thousand men of the line, and as many militia. By applying myself to their well-being and perfect discipline, I would have defied an Austrian army between the Abruzzi and Calabria. But unable to carry such a scheme into execution, both from want of time and authority, and because I was crossed by the Vicar and my colleagues, I determined to do, not what I wished, but what I could. I endeavoured, under various names, and various organizations, to assemble together all the citizens capable of bearing arms. I said to myself, when once they are withdrawn from their homes and accustomed to carry a gun, they will most likely fly at first, then they will be ashamed of having fled; and they will soon see that the danger of a war *alla specciolata* are less than they imagine, and they will end by facing the enemy, as did the free

corps of Calabria against Massena. The army of the line, disposed according to my proposition, was to be of fifty-two thousand men. The regiments of militia were to be composed of great and small landholders, as I felt the necessity of arming the common people. I thought of causing a decree to be issued, authorizing legions to be composed of them. Some persons said, "why form a militia and legions, instead of organizing both landholders and common people into battalions of a National Guard, as was done in France under the Republic?" I replied, that not knowing what time Austria might leave us to organize ourselves, I had decided on forming the legions, not to throw the militia into any disorder. I obtained a decree for the formation of the legions, but it lay in the war-office, and was only carried into execution, as I will show hereafter, when I took it in hand.

Several of my fellow-generals, amongst whom was Colletta, continued to murmur that a military revolution was not defensible; and in that country, or any other, a revolution effected by the army, whatever may have been its motive, was to be looked upon as an act of treachery. According to these statesmen, all the English, both on land and water, who forsook James II. in 1688, to follow William of Orange, because he was more fitted to promote the interest of their country, were traitors, Washington was a traitor; and so were the Spanish and Portuguese officers, and later those of Piedmont. These said generals, to curry favour with the Court, revealed this theory to the Duke of Calabria, to whom I one day said: that those who spoke thus, declared themselves traitors, for they had conspired with me against Joachim; when with the troops stationed in the Marches, we wanted to oblige him to

give us a Constitution and two chambers. I added that if these Generals had deliberated on the execution of what they thought an act of treachery, they were *ipso facto* what they pronounced myself and others to be. Besides, why did they in public, and face to face, laud me for what I did, and blame me behind my back? And why had they been so ready to derive every possible advantage from a revolution which they regarded as an act of treachery by seeking to attain the highest military dignities? Indeed, amongst all the Generals, I was the only one who, true to the repeated and public declarations I had made, had never derived any material advantage from the revolution.

On hearing me speak of the conspiracy got up at Ancona by these Generals and myself, against the absolute power of Joachim, the Vicar was astonished, and seemed to think, how henceforth he could put faith in their fidelity. It entered my mind to publish in the papers an account of the conspiracy of Ancona, but upon second thoughts it seemed to me that in my position of Commander-in-Chief of the army and head of the revolution, it would not be proper to descend to such a measure. I will end this question upon the fidelity of soldiers towards their Prince by repeating what was said to me many years later, by the Count Mammiani of Pesaro. He made this observation: "Military men speak highly of the oaths taken by them to their Princes; but the answer is easy. The oath was lawful, or it was not; if the former, it cannot injure the holy interests of your country; if the latter, it was wrong to swear, and would be still worse to keep it inviolate."

CHAPTER XIV.

1820.

I break with the Minister of War, and decline accepting the dignity of Grand Marshal of the order of St. George—Visit paid me by the Duke of Narbonne, by command of Louis XVIII—I review the Carbonari, to whom is entrusted the temporary preservation of order in the capital—An expedition to Sicily is decided upon, and the command is conferred upon my brother —A rapid sketch of the political state of Sicily from the beginning of the eighteenth century to 1820.

Even in the greatest sorrows of life there is always some source of consolation. I have derived no small relief from the knowledge that my enemies, amongst whom I must reckon the last three Kings of Naples, admitted that my patriotism was pure and disinterested. Even Carascosa and Colletta acknowledged the same. The former, whose feelings were much changed towards me, said one day in a moment of candour and generosity, "You and your brother are men not to be judged by ordinary rules." Another time he urged me to join my old associates, and put aside my chimeras. I replied, that our country, oppressed by the French and the Austrians, under Joachim and Ferdinand, had always seen me pursue the same path; and that if he and all our companions had not deviated from it, we should still

have been united. Carascosa rejoined, "Do you think I am not fully aware, that were the King to resume absolute power, he would not have my head off?" But as I shall show hereafter, he was not entirely convinced of the truth of what he advanced. Sometimes he proposed that we should drive together in an open carriage along the Chiaja to prevent people from believing what Metternich had affirmed to Cariati, that we mutually detested each other. If Carascosa had been jealous of my office, the remedy was easy, for I had made up my mind to relinquish it on the 1st of October. But how was it possible to overcome his jealousy of my popularity, now that the multitude mistrusted him? But, in a word, he did so much, and showed himself so averse to the new order of things, that I was obliged to tell him that henceforth our friendship was at an end. I added, that I was grieved at being obliged to speak thus, but that it would have been unworthy of me to conceal from him my true feelings. The reader will shortly peruse a letter written to me by Carascosa upon the subject of my frankness.

Our political affairs were in a bad state, when one day on my return home I found a card from the Duke of Narbonne, French Ambassador at Naples. At first I thought it must have been a mistake, but one of the officers of my staff informed me that the Duke had left it in person. I immediately sent my aide-de-camp, Staiti, to ask at what hour I should find him at home. His Excellency replied that he would call upon me. Astonished at this great politeness of the French Ambassador towards a General of the revolution, and determined not to be outdone by him in civility, I despatched Staiti a second time, to say that I would not allow him to trouble himself so far, and thus I

succeeded in learning at what hour I should find him. When I called upon him, he informed me that His Majesty Louis XVIII., and not his ministers, had desired him to tell me, that if every member of the royal family was respected, France would not go to war with us, but that in the contrary case, war would be immediately declared. I replied, that the present would be a good occasion to claim some merit in the eyes of so powerful a monarch, by saying that I would oppose myself to any outrage the people might attempt against the royal family. But that such a declaration would not be sincere on my part; for that the royal family was voluntarily respected by the entire nation, who, forgetting the events of 1799, only recollected the mild Government of the King during the last five years, and were grateful for the Constitution granted by him. In testimony of my assertion, I added, "Read the papers, and you will see, that with an unrestrained liberty of the press, I am often attacked; but the King—never." I continued, "As long as I have the command of the forces of the nation, I feel that it is my duty, at the cost of my life, to protect the royal family from every insult." The Duke of Narbonne appeared to be extremely satisfied with what I said, and he assured me that all should be communicated by that day's post to His Majesty Louis XVIII., who, as I will afterwards show, would not allow me to set my foot in France, when I was obliged to quit Italy.

At this time I received addresses from many patriotic societies in Spain; amongst others, from Madrid, Barcelona, Cadiz, del Ferrol, del Vincerol, Rudela, Segovia, and Murcia. These contained praises far higher than I merited, and the publication of them might savour a little of vanity; but at the same time, such proofs,

showing how highly our revolution was valued in Spain, were calculated to be of service to the public spirit. I restricted myself to the publication of a limited number of these addresses, explaining at the same time why they appeared in the gazettes.

Although in my capacity of General-in-chief, it did not belong to me to organize the National Guard, it was my business to proclaim all the decrees respecting their formation. The Minister of War, however, was in no haste to carry them into execution, and as the corps, afterwards termed the Guard of Security, did not yet exist, I proposed that public order in our vast city should be maintained by the Carbonari of the different quarters formed into companies. When I went to review this corps, the honest citizens who composed it, out of a feeling of vanity decked themselves with its insignia. Several amongst them who had no muskets, carried the daggers which they produced at the Venditas, just as the masons employ a sword in their lodges. The ministers and the members of the Junta, at least some of them, availed themselves of these innocent daggers to cast blame upon the Carbonari, and upon myself who allowed such an enormity. According to them, how could Austria do otherwise than declare war against us, when all the streets of the capital were filled with men armed with daggers, and bearing upon their breasts the insignia of the Carbonari? And yet, as long as the Carbonari were charged with the maintenance of public order, not only did they do their duty, but they assisted the unfortunate with their purses, and exhorted all not to suffer their thoughts to dwell upon the inveterate rancour which existed. The alarm experienced by the Court, the ministers and members of the Junta, at the

review was such, that they fancied I was about to proclaim a Republic. The real error of which I was guilty at that time was an excess of caution and moderation.

After much loss of time and much trouble on my part, the expedition to Sicily was definitively settled. It was necessary to appoint a General to take this command; and the Court, the Junta, and the ministers selected my brother. He was so obstinately bent upon not accepting this charge, that notwithstanding my earnest entreaties, he was on the point of quitting his house not to be again troubled upon the subject. He was reluctant to draw his sword in a civil war, whilst at the same time he was profoundly convinced that the expedition would end badly. The Vicar summoned my brother to the presence of the King to endeavour, for the last time, to overrule his objections. His Majesty in entreating my brother to assume the command of the expedition, made use of the expression, "I *pray* you," which my brother knew not how to resist. Before I mention the political and military conduct of Florestano in that island, I must give a rapid sketch of its political condition from the beginning of the 18th century to 1820. This historical sketch is not mine, but is written by a man whose heart, and mind, and patriotism I highly esteem. It is seldom that our views do not agree.

It is necessary to touch upon the political condition of Sicily thoroughly to understand its revolution, which clearly was called for. Whether, however, it was just or unjust, it certainly happened at a most untoward moment for the common freedom of Sicily and Naples. I look upon it as the principal cause of the ruin of our revolution.

At the beginning of the 18th century, Sicily was in

nearly the same social condition as the kingdom of Naples; but its form and political working were essentially different. In the first place, Sicily, separated from Naples during so many centuries, had all the forms of a separate kingdom. It possessed a distinct flag, distinct money, a Viceroy, a different order of magistrates, and, finally, another ecclesiastical discipline, more independent of Rome than that of Naples. These forms were like those of a kingdom independent even of Spain, although in point of fact Sicily and Naples were both subjected to that foreign power. Sicily enjoyed without interruption what is now styled a Constitution; a parliament which granted the public revenues, a great part of which were not administered by officers of the crown, but by a permanent committee of the same parliament. This committee, termed a Deputation of the Kingdom, had the right of defending the privileges of the nation, and of representing the same in the intervals between the general elections. At the same time there existed a powerful aristocracy; the Holy Inquisition; a regular and secular clergy, very numerous, and abounding in wealth; a judicial system entirely dependent upon the crown, and therefore affording no guarantee for the lives and liberties of the citizens. Great rivalry existed between the most considerable cities, especially between Palermo and Messina, excited thereto by the petty policy of Spain. In a word, it was entirely a State of the middle ages with its advantages and faults.

The two kingdoms of Naples and of Sicily, each preserving its own institutions, were united under the sceptre of Charles III. This Sovereign was crowned at Palermo, and selected Naples for his usual residence.

There were of necessity two capitals. The Government was established in Naples, whence a Viceroy was sent into Sicily every two years. The Government bent all its efforts against the stubborn Sicilian aristocracy, an aristocracy of nobility and *municipalty* (allow me this expression, which is in point of fact exact). This aristocracy, both unjust and injurious, had during many centuries defended the privileges of the nation against the power of the monarchy, especially in financial matters. The new Spanish Bourbon dynasty, which had still before its eyes the despotism of Louis XIV. and of Philip II., strove to break down this order, and tried to establish in the island the same public order as existed on the continent, and which offered great advantages to an absolute government. A war was thus originated between the aristocracy of Sicily and the despotism of Naples; a war in which the two people bore a part,—a war which still exists, although the aristocracy has been destroyed in Sicily, and the strife is carried on by the *Tiers Etat.* The proceedings of 1820 were an episode in this war, when, unfortunately, the revolution of Naples may be said to have represented despotism.

We will not follow the uninterrupted course of this struggle. The conduct of the Neapolitan Government on this occasion was not without some pretensions to justice. During the course of the 18th century, some few useful innovations were introduced into Sicily, but this did not prevent an attempt to destroy the greatest of social benefits—liberty. The occurrence of the French Revolution and the subsequent war were succeeded by a most ardent love of money, which attacked both Ferdinand and Maria-Caroline, who then governed for

him. The object of the struggle was soon made evident Until then it had been coloured by the pretence of progress in civilization, the welfare of the inferior classes, and of the population of the villages; the same pretext was used from 1815 to 1820, and is still brought forward. During the last ten years of the eighteenth century, the Court openly avowed its intention of taking as much money out of Sicily as it could possibly obtain. This, of course, brought about an opposition between the Court and the Parliament. The Court could not easily corrupt the latter, because the aristocracy had a personal interest in paying as little as possible. The contest was a little mitigated at the period when the Court was obliged to seek a refuge in Sicily, and adopted there a course of flattery and apparent concern for the good of the country. On their return to Naples, the cloven foot was once more visible. On being driven a second time into Sicily, it was not possible for the Court to resume their system of deceitful blandishment, on account of the necessity of providing for the Neapolitan subjects who had followed their masters (for thus they termed them) into Sicily, or of those who had remained in their country, to serve their cause by means of treachery and sedition. The Queen demanded money more imperiously than ever.

The Parliament of 1810, instead of satisfying these exorbitant demands, granted a little money, and then turned its attention to reorganize the administration of the finances; giving at the same time a rare example of generosity and justice by abrogating the exemption from the public taxes enjoyed by the nobles, and taxing all the estates in proportion to their incomes without

making any distinction between the feudal and the allodial lands. Rendered by this measure hopeless of executing their intention according to the laws, the Council of the Queen determined upon openly violating them.

In 1811, these royal edicts imposed new taxes which had not been decreed by Parliament. As several nobles protested in a legal manner against so unheard-of and enormous a violation of the Constitution, the Queen caused five of them to be arrested; Belmonte, Villafranca, Aci, Castel Nuovo and Angio. She threatened to put them to death, and confined them in a most horrible prison.

But the Court, quite blinded, did not see that it was weak, and that it was giving umbrage to those who were powerful. Everybody in Sicily hated the Queen, the King, the Ministers; the Neapolitan emigrants sighed for a government less hostile to its interests. The army was small, discontented, and chiefly composed of Sicilians. The militia was numerous and commanded by the nobles. The English, who defended Sicily for the sake of their own interest, against the French, had considerable forces there both at sea and on land, and they paid moreover a heavy subsidy for the maintenance of the land and naval force of the country. But these powerful allies had found out the secret machinations of the Queen with Napoleon; and were fearful that the Government, headstrong as it was, might one day throw itself into the arms of King Joachim, who was armed and at hand, eager to accomplish any brilliant undertaking. I have touched very lightly these circumstances, which are well known. The two forces, that is to say, the Barons of Sicily and the

English commanders, equally moved by interest to put a stop to the increasing boldness of the Court, soon came to an understanding together. On the frantic act of the arrest of the five Sicilian Barons, Lord William Bentinck, the British Minister at the Court of Sicily, who was a man of great resolution, spoke to the Queen in a threatening manner upon the subject; finding her obstinate and determined, he felt that nothing but facts could daunt her. The authority with which he was invested did not, however, suffice to permit his reaching these facts. He went to London and returned in three months with full command over the British forces, and authority to use them against the Court, should such a course be necessary to bring about a reform of the Government. Great were the demonstrations made by the people both at the departure and return of the English Minister; they serve to show how heavily such despotism weighed upon all, and what hopes they entertained that Lord William Bentinck would be able to restrain it. And he did succeed in doing so. The Queen was removed, and the King obliged to feign himself in bad health, and to create as Vicar, with an *alter ego*, Prince Francis, heir presumptive to the crown. The illegal taxes of 1811 were revoked. The five Barons were set at liberty, and several of them elevated to the ministry in the place of the Neapolitan emigrants. Parliament was called together, and it contemplated a reform of that very Constitution which had shown itself, a short time previous, so feeble a protection against the usurpation of the King of Naples. These changes were effected about the beginning of 1812.

The Houses of Parliament, which had been composed of three chambers, the Baronial, the Ecclesiastical, and

the landed interest, was now reduced to two; the Chamber of Peers, and that of the Commons. Great scope was given to the elections: the parliament was annual, the proposal of subsidies was exclusively given to the Commons; the legislative power belonged to the parliament, the decrees of which the King might either adopt or reject but not modify; the responsibility of the ministers, the security of the executive power, and the independence of the magistrates were established. Such were the bases of the new Constitution which was called "the English," because it had been formed by means of that nation, and had been partly copied from their own. But every one will see that it was but a reform of the old Constitution modified according to the new social exigencies. It was, however, the ancient parliament with three chambers that deliberated upon their reform, and the King consented to it in the legal form. The feudal system was abolished at the request of the Barons themselves, who instigated by a momentary zeal for the public good, and knowing the necessities of the times, sacrificed not only the gewgaws of their feudal rights, but likewise considerable revenues. And their independence, which was the ardently desired object of every Sicilian, the independence of Naples, and of every other of his dominions was solemnly decreed by the parliament and consented to by the King.

It was not that the order of the State was changed; but the Sicilians, fearful of the tendency to concentrate every thing in Naples, sought to obtain some new guarantee that such should no longer be the practice. In 1760, 1802, and 1806, the parliament had always demanded, and the King had granted the preservation of this independence. Now, it was not the verbal

security which might be contained in a new promise that was sought; but it was hoped that a fundamental law, granted with so much solemnity, would have been less vain than the word of the King.

The old parliament was dissolved and a new one called. The latter began to perfect the new order of things, which had only been touched upon in the fundamental law. They completed the political laws; they digested the civil and penal codes; they systematized the financial departments, as well as those of the war, the magistrates, and the municipalty, which were greatly enlarged. But now the interests which were opposed to the new order of things, whose voice had hitherto been drowned in the general enthusiasm, began to manifest themselves. As generally happens in such cases, a small portion of the nobility, the ancient magistracy, and the underling officials, all adhered to the Court. Another portion of the *Tiers Etat* sighed after the French system of democracy, which Napoleon had long since completely set aside, and this faction confounded in its affection Napoleon with the Republic, committing an error which was, however, founded on truth. The remainder of the nobility and part of the *Tiers Etat* inclined towards the new Constitution, and termed themselves "*the Chronicles*," from the name of one of their papers. The lower orders applauded from their hatred of the former government and of the Neapolitan emigrants, but they were not capable of appreciating the utility of the reform, because the economy which arose from the war, and not from the form of government, had for some years past increased the wealth of the country. England, against whom almost all the other ports of the Mediterranean were closed, purchased the produce of Sicily at a high

price, and sold their own exportations cheaply; whilst the consumption of the English troops stationed in Sicily was another source of wealth to the country. The population, therefore, loved the English, and rejoiced in the humiliation of the Court, but could not understand the real utility of the new political system, because the ephemeral and economical effects of the war had removed that poverty, which causes the weight of despotism to press so heavily upon its victims.

Another source of division arose from the schism between the nobles and the party which entered the parliament to abolish the law of primogeniture. This design pleased some and displeased others. The democrats and the courtiers coalesced against the Constitutionalists, who were divided amongst themselves, and sank in reputation, from the fact of their dependence upon a foreign power, and their having fallen into some of the usual abuses incident to the possession of office. On the other hand, the municipalty were not contented with the mere abolition of the feudal system, and the nobles would not understand that half concessions tend more to awaken hatred than gratitude. To this must be added the division of local interest, which arose in the courts and sessions of the provinces. The representatives of the other cities insisted upon this point, which was repugnant to the magistracy of Palermo, accustomed for centuries to treat the provinces with rapacious insolence. Such discord caused the parliament to be dissolved and summoned several times in the course of three years, whilst at the same time, it gave rise to more than one change of ministry, and made public opinion waver; and the Court who fomented all these different feelings began to hope. These were the inevitable effects of political and social transition.

Nevertheless, the new legislation progressed. A few years more would have seen all these divisions subside and the Constitution deeply rooted.

The Constitution was formed in 1812. Three years after, Napoleon fell; the Bourbons returned to Naples and the English quitted Sicily. The English had reformed the Government in Sicily, just as you would make a trench to fortify an advantageous position in time of war. After the victory they forsook the position and allowed the trench to be destroyed. It is infamous to make such use of a population, but it is always the case when the people do not know how to profit by the opportunity which fortune offers them. The people of Sicily, as we have already stated, were divided. The King meditated upon divine right, and regarded any and every part taken by the people in the Government as an ancient or modern usurpation. He found the Congress of Vienna favourable to his designs; and was desirous of organizing Italy in the manner most pleasing to Austria, who was inimical to every institution which savoured of liberty. Thus procuring or purchasing a plenary amount of power, Ferdinand caused himself to be recognised King of the Two Sicilies. From this untoward exaltation he derived the right of annihilating the kingdom of Sicily with its new and old Constitutions, and of uniting the laws of the new kingdom to those of the Napoleonic despotism which he had found at Naples. The British Government had shortly before guaranteed to the people of Sicily the Constitution of 1812, both publicly and by facts far more manifest and binding than deeds or documents. But England thought her character for fair dealing safe (and every one knows what is the fair dealing of the British Government) by stipulating that

no Sicilian should be molested on account of the events of 1812, and that Sicily should enjoy a judicial and administrative system of laws, entrusted to Sicilians, and independent of those of Naples.

Supported by England, Austria and the rest of Europe, King Ferdinand did not hesitate, in 1816, to prorogue by an edict of his own, and without calling together the parliament, the taxes voted by the parliament of 1815. Whoever complained was cast into prison. Two laws of the 8th and 11th of December, 1816, established the newly guaranteed rights of Sicily, united to Naples politically, but separate in its administration; and then was added, that in the event of the necessity of increasing the public taxes in Sicily, the King would assemble a parliament. The Duke of Calabria remained in Sicily as Viceroy of the kingdom, with ministers, a court, and all the appendages of royal authority. But all these were empty appearances, and deceived nobody. In Sicily the people shrugged their shoulders and murmured, but nobody ever thought of revolting against the Holy Alliance.

During the four years which preceded the latter part of 1820, the Minister of Naples, as we have already said, was all kindness and humanity upon the continent. Nothing now remained to be done, but to change the name of Joachim upon the laws, for that of Ferdinand I., as he styled himself. But the execution of this step changed the face of every thing in Sicily. The simple municipal system was superseded by that complicated and costly machine, which the French (perhaps jestingly) termed civil administration. The number of magistrates, of officers, of men in office, were multiplied in every possible manner to make partisans in the new State. These were of two sorts: bodies of men

without either capacity or conscience, termed men in office; and judges, and those officers of the police, which the provincial cities now acquired, and who were the centre of the civil administration, and were called *intendenze.* Thus did the Government gild the pil which was joyfully swallowed by many of the cities. As might have been expected, the taxes were nevertheless increased. Some of these were: the conscription, which is only endurable when there is a country to be defended and glory to be acquired; the registration, the stamps, the taxes on games of hazard, and other taxes unknown to poor Sicily, which had taxed itself during so many centuries. The deprivation of all political rights, and the increase of the taxes were more irksome to bear from the fact of their being brought about by those who were looked upon in the light of foreigners and enemies; nor were the people wrong in so regarding them. Leaving out of the question that, all over Italy, the inhabitants of one town regarded those of another as foreigners, those emigrants who during ten years had sucked the blood of the poor Sicilians and acted against them in the capacity of emissaries and spies of the Queen might justly enough be looked upon as enemies. As to the Neapolitans who had acknowledged Joachim, the Sicilians had been fighting against them daily; and it was not likely that they could embrace them now that they were come to support despotism and insult the Constitution.

The reverse of fortune, which in Sicily succeeded to the general peace, made this slavery doubly felt. The prices of things, which had risen in Sicily almost as high as in England, fell all at once, like water which sinks to its natural level after the bursting of a dyke. The farmers were all ruined by their produce having

fallen fifty per cent. The calamity overtook the tradespeople. The landholders and labourers were not ruined, but they found themselves reduced all of a sudden from prosperity to poverty. Opulent and free Sicily in an instant became enslaved and poor. It is needless to speak of the cordial hatred and discontent which arose against the Government of Naples. Towards the spring of 1820 this discontent had increased; for the Government of Naples increased its errors by recalling from Sicily Prince Francis and his Court, and sending instead the white-headed and imbecile General Naselli, and by showering down a storm of fresh decrees.

Whilst the public mind was in this state, on the evening of the 14th of July intelligence was received of the revolution of Naples, and of the promulgation of the Constitution of Spain. The people were crowding the streets, for it was the feast of St. Rosalia. They suddenly burst forth into an ecstacy of joy; the tricolour of Naples was seen upon the hats and breasts of all. The peasantry were "hail fellow well met" with the Neapolitan soldiers, who hastened to hoist the insignia of the Carbonari. After some hours, people began to think of their independence. This desire was awakened in every heart, because all were aware of the political rights of Sicily, and of the wrongs inflicted upon them by Naples. As selfishness invariably mingles itself with every generous idea, several nobles who conspired for the Chamber of Peers, began to cry out "independence" louder than the rest, that they might regain the English Constitution in preference to that of Spain. This feeling, which manifested itself in Palermo, was generally prevalent all over Sicily. But the cities which had been recently constituted chief provinces, and which while they had seen little foliage, had not

had time to taste all the bitterness of the fruit, were by no means disposed to return to the English Constitution. They were fearful of losing their tribunals and their *intendenze*, and of being always obliged to depend upon a capital. They preferred the new Naples to the ancient Palermo.

Three questions must here be advanced. Had Sicily the right to assemble its parliament and resume its legal operations as soon as the violence which had suspended it had ceased? Certainly it had. The Congress of Vienna could not unite a Constitutional State to any other kingdom, without the most solemn deliberation of its own parliament. Still less could the Congress of Vienna destroy the Constitution of 1812, designed by the parliament and approved by the King. In fact, the Congress had not taken this step; the illegal decrees of 1815 proceeded from King Ferdinand alone. Another question is, whether the Constitution of Sicily of 1812 was preferable to that of Spain? We will not attempt to argue that question on principle. The popular voice in Sicily resolved it by demanding the Constitution of Spain and independence. Finally, there remains the question, whether Sicily ought to have separated itself from Naples whilst Naples was shouting liberty and preparing to fight for it against Austria? I reply, no!

The Sicilians say that they desired the maintenance of the political union, but with a separate representative and administrative system. They spoke of what Scotland and Ireland had been, and of what Norway was. They contended, that by accepting the union of the kingdom, under the Constitution of Spain, they would have renounced their own rights, and effected the destruction of their own legal parliament; that a people

can rebel against a despot, but not against their own national representation; that the Sicilian Deputies, being only a quarter the number of those of Naples, could never have protected their own interests. They said that the case of Sicily was not that of a province, which ought to submit to the majority of the nation; but that of a nation, which has to deliberate whether it will become a province. That it would be foolish to accept only one parliament, and then afterwards to demand a separation; whilst it would be wise to do just the contrary. The right of a Sicilian assembly to deliberate upon a political union with Naples was conceded by General Florestano Pépé, when he terminated the siege of Palermo. The parliament of Naples tore up this clause, after it had been duly executed on the part of the Sicilians. Separation was mortally and equally injurious to Naples and to Sicily. May their animosity be ended for ever! May the sad lessons of 1820 cure the Neapolitans of every tendency to usurpation and injustice; may they admonish the Sicilians that they can never be free, until all Italy be so, and that the first requisite towards such a consummation is independence of a foreign yoke, which is only to be obtained by union amongst ourselves. To this end all local animosities and interests should be sacrificed. The basis of our family compact should be faith and justice. And may God grant that henceforth there may not be found a people of Palermo to oppose a Constitutional army of Naples, nor a parliament of Naples to tear up a treaty, concluded by one of its captains, in accordance with the institutions of its government and the rights of Sicily.

But to resume the sad relation of facts. I must say that in Palermo the revolutionary feeling was carried

to an extreme. On the 15th of July, the people exclaimed that they would have the Constitution of Spain and independence. A yellow ribbon was added to the tricolor of Naples, as a symbol of the desired independence. General Church, an Englishman in the service of Naples, reprimanded the soldiers who were fraternizing with the people, and a priest aimed a blow at him with a poniard, which missed him and wounded another person. The people then rushed into his house, and heaped everything they found in it in the public square, and then set fire to the pile. Having thus acquired a taste for incendiarism, on the 16th the people ransacked the Stamp Office, that of the Registrars, the criminal archives, the house of the ex-minister Ferreri; they tore in pieces and burnt the implements of the public games of hazard, tore down the royal arms, the statues of the King, and having penetrated into the castle, carried off all the arms in the armoury. Several soldiers had abetted the execution of this violence. The Government did nothing to repress such disorder, but whether out of fear or for what purpose, cannot be said. It is very certain, that the Lord-Lieutenant, who was a noble Sicilian, a servant of the Court, and a man of small capacity, had little love for the revolution of Naples, and less still for that of Palermo. He listened to many different counsels, adopted all, and followed none, whilst the people were tumultuously committing the depredations we have alluded to. He was always weak, irresolute, and faithless. At first he neither repressed nor encouraged; when he found the sedition increase, he began by endeavouring to deceive, and then employed force. A civic guard, composed of artisans commanded by nobles, according to the traditions of the tumults of the

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was ordered by the Lieutenant, and together with the soldiers was placed in the fortresses. But during the night of the 16th he caused them to be disarmed, and sent forth the garrison in order of battle into the streets of the city, in conformity to the advice of a council assembled by him in haste. Then ensued the miserable struggle of the 17th of July, in which a body of the people fought against the troops for eight or ten hours, and finally, after much bloodshed, gained the advantage. The prisons were opened, the forts were taken by assault, and the panic-stricken soldiers were made prisoners, or else dispersed over the country. The Lieutenant fled by sea and proceeded to Naples, where he spread about a series of infamous falsehoods. All authority was destroyed at Palermo, where the plebeians remained masters, not the people; for both the nobles and the citizens, alarmed by the incendiarism of the 16th, and still more by the cannon of the 17th, had nearly all taken refuge in their houses.

A few hours after this victory, on the evening of the 17th, these same plebeians formed a Government under the denomination of Provisional Junta. This was composed of nobles, lawyers and artisans, and the choice fell upon the most pacific men in the world. The President was Cardinal Gravina, Archbishop of Palermo. The Junta took prudent measures to restore order, and did nothing to foment the revolution. It seemed, that those who were the honest advocates of a revolution, and those who sought to incite to violence and disorder, equally wished to put down this Government, which had been created in haste by a handful of plebeians, and by a monk who had signalized himself in the contest with the soldiers, but who was a jovial soul

and nothing more. It was hoped that in a few days this false step would have been remedied by deposing the Cardinal, and putting in his place one of the most ardent of the Constitutionalists, the Prince of Villafranca, who was a man who could speak eloquently, but who knew not how to act. Nothing was gained but a little public order, and the Government remained the same. Equally fearful of the people and of the revolution, it only sought to deceive the one and restrain the other.

On an examination of the conduct of the Provisional Government of Palermo, it is easy to see that it aimed at appearing to do everything, whilst in fact it concluded nothing. It sent forth manifestations, inviting the towns of Sicily to send representatives to Palermo, and to follow up the revolution. But these manifestations contained phrases, and not guarantees; neither did they touch upon what interest the towns had, or might have, which were called upon to revolt. Regiments of infantry, of cavalry, seamen, armed bands, and naval forces were ordered, considerable sums of money were expended in these preparations, which served to provide stipends to the most turbulent of the insurgents, but not to carry on a war. No force was sent to excite the revolutionary party in the towns of the island, with the exception of Caltanissetta, where a disastrous victory was obtained. I say disastrous, because the undisciplined band and its leaders, who had been selected from the least worthy, ransacked the town which resisted, and excited more hatred than fear. Nor was the Junta more wise in its treaties with the Government of Naples, with which it lulled itself and endeavoured to lull the people of Palermo. The result was,

that Messina, Catania, Siracuse and Trapani, which, after Palermo were the most important cities in the island, voluntarily remained under the Government of Naples; whilst the rest of the island, which reckoned about a million of inhabitants, declared itself for the revolution, more indeed by word than by deed. The Chevalier Abela, a Siracusan by birth, marched from Palermo with a considerable band to excite his country to rise, and to make war in the country. He narrowly escaped falling a victim to the want of discipline of his people, or of the treachery of the Junta. When the Government of Naples clearly evinced its intention of spreading war throughout Sicily, the Government of Palermo sought only to discourage, disarm, and disunite the revolutionary party, of which it was the chief. Colonel Costa, who went out of Messina at the head of fifteen hundred men, overran Sicily just as he pleased, and encountered no other resistance than that offered by a small band, easily put to flight. The revolutionary action was confined to Palermo, where the acts of the Junta were insufficient to extinguish it.

Nevertheless, this was attempted. The Junta of Palermo discovered the counter-revolutionary secret of our age, of which so vast an experience was made in France in 1830. The landholders, merchants, and artisans who exercised any considerable branch of industry, formed in the city a numerous class, who preferred tranquillity even at the expense of their liberty, or rather who preferred being molested by the Government in an established manner, than to be capriciously tormented by the people. This class in Palermo had been alarmed by the noise, rather than the deeds, of the multitude, in arms and unrestrained since the 17th of

July. The Junta formed them into a National Guard, which trusted more to its numbers than to its weapons, which, indeed, many were afraid to handle. With this National Guard they had hoped to restrain the multitude; the National Guard, on the other hand, trusted in the Junta to prevent the plebeians from having any new occasion of tumults and bloodshed, or of attacking private property. The Junta and the National Guard of Palermo wished to support the revolution just as much as they could, without making use of the people. They wished to treat, but not to fight. Although the spirit of independence might be said to exist all over Sicily, the ardour of action was confined to the plebeians of Palermo alone, plebeians disorderly and without chiefs, but full of sagacity and ever ready to fight.

General Florestano Pépé landed at Afahi, and then proceeded to Urmini, where the President of the Junta of Palermo, the Prince Villafranca, went to meet him, and to treat of peace. He had made it clear to the Junta, that *they* lacked the means of carrying on the war; then he had induced them to send him on a mission to treat of peace. The right of the Sicilian Assembly to deliberate upon the plan of union with Naples was the basis of the treaty. Both the Junta and the National Guard of Palermo desired it sincerely. This was the best method of pacifying both countries, and it is unfortunate that the people of Palermo refused it because it had been misrepresented to them by the Junta, and that the Parliament of Naples likewise refused because it could not boast the splendour of a victory. Villafranca treated with Pépé at Urmini; but before the treaty was signed or ratified, he wrote directions to Palermo to let the Neapolitan troops enter that town and give up the fortresses to

them. The multitude of Palermo regarded such conduct as treachery; the civic guard contented themselves with the orders of the President. On the 25th of September, 1820, a contest took place in the city. The Civic Guard was vanquished, disarmed, and sent unharmed to their own houses. The population issued forth to oppose the Neapolitan vanguard, and then began the siege. This ended in the noted capitulation concluded with Pépé, by the Prince of Paternò, an old and rich Baron, who had belonged to the Junta, and who by feigning to follow all the impulses of the populace, had succeeded in obtaining full power to make peace. Thus, a man was found who induced the plebeians of a great city to enter into the only agreement between the two nations, which was just but none was found to induce the Parliament of Naples to do the like.

CHAPTER XV.

1820.

Information imparted to me by an emissary from the secret societies and from General Lecchi—Extreme dissimulation of the Duke of Calabria—Labours of the corps of Engineers under the command of Colletta—Letter written to me by the Vicar breathing the warmest patriotic sentiments—How the national Congress was composed—The King refuses to renew his oath in presence of the Congress—Answer from the Duke of Calabria to my communication in which I express my intention of resigning the chief command on the 1st of October.

Amongst other difficulties, it was not possible to me to learn, with any degree of exactitude, either the preparations of the Austrians, or the dispositions of the patriots between the Tronto and the Alps. Those upon whom I could alone depend were the Piedmontese, because they had an army superior to that of Naples, and that they had Genoa and a fine position in the Alps. Genoa especially was always present to my mind, for our own navy being far superior to that of Austria, we could have kept up a communication by sea with that city, which, with a very little assistance, might have resisted the Austrians for a long time. But would these have ventured to cross the Po, and draw near the Tronto, leaving Genoa behind

them, where the Neapolitan troops could so easily join the Lombardo-Piedmontese patriots? It was not possible to obtain the information I stood in need of, for the ministry would not tell me the favourable intentions of the people of those countries, or the preparations of the Austrians, fearing thereby to excite me to adopt rigorous measures, which they would look upon as rash. It is only too true, that it is not possible to introduce new institutions with old men. I came to the conclusion that it would be well to send into the country which lies between the Tronto and the Alps, three men, who would certainly not keep back their observations, and pay their court to the ministers and the Vicar. At first this expedition was not authorized as had previously been the case on several other occasions. To succeed in obtaining it, I was constrained to threaten the ministers that I would publish their refusal in the newspapers. The three men selected for this mission were Major Pisa, who afterwards died a General in Greece; Captain Blanco, a learned and honest man, although a great talker, and Riccardo Tapputi di Bisceglia, a man of much talent. Blanco was charged to report all that he might hear upon the political affairs of the day in the course of conversation with persons employed in diplomatic capacities. Tapputi was to devote himself to an association with men of commerce. Pisa, who was a zealous freemason and Carbonaro, was to inform me of the intentions of the Secret Societies between the Tronto and the Alps, as well as what might be expected from the people in case of war. The two former on their return said that the universal opinion was, that war was inevitable, and that Austria was making serious preparations for that purpose; that our revolution was the object of general

admiration, and that ardent vows were made for the preservation of our liberty. Pisa was admitted into all the Secret Societies, especially in Piedmont and Lombardy. The Carbonari of Piedmont, instead of holding the language usually adopted by sectaries, vaunting their strength and promising assistance, said, that though they ardently desired to be of use to us, they were not yet prepared to make the slightest movement. Pisa found the patriots of Milan full of good intentions, but they were unable to do aught before we should have crossed the Po. He had an interview with the brave and able General Zucchi, who desired him to tell me, that were I to advance with the army, or even part of it, towards the Po, I should rush on my own destruction; and that my best chance of successfully opposing the Austrians was to await them in the advantageous positions to he found in the Neapolitan kingdom. Joachim speaking one day of Zucchi, said that he was the best General in the kingdom of Italy. From what my three emissaries, and particularly Pisa, said to me, I became more and more confirmed in my intention of awaiting the enemy in the kingdom, and of only coming to a decisive battle in Calabria.

Dissimulation is a vice which increases with power in the hearts both of the weak and the powerful; but it acquires such hold on feeble minds that it degenerates into a habit, and they are false even when they can derive no benefit from being so. I do not believe that there ever existed a Prince so insincere as the Duke of Calabria. He told me that he could not conceive how a King, who was free to give a Constitution to his people, did not hasten to grant them such a blessing. "With a Constitutional Government," continued he, "there is no responsibility either towards God or

towards man: the King is not liable to injure any one unintentionally, whilst he has a thousand ways of doing good; and finally, it enables him to live in the enjoyment of peace and security." I told him once, that if he did not like to be led by the nation, he ought to meet its wishes in order to become its leader. His Royal Highness never forgot these words, and in all his discourse, and in some of his actions, he showed himself to be, apparently at least, as liberal as myself, so as to remain at the head instead of in the rear of affairs. For six weeks I was induced by his actions to suppose that from a wish to reign before the death of his father, he tolerated, if he did not love, the new order of things. But one day a trifling incident served to destroy the illusion, and convinced me that he hated the Constitutional Government with even greater intensity than his father. The following is the manner in which I became aware of this. A small column of soldiers who had obtained their discharge from military service were obliged by a new decree to quit the province of Lecce and return to the army. They were conducted by a young man, a native of Lecce, who travelling at his own expense, obtained permission from his municipalty to bring them to Naples. He delivered into my hands the certificate of their good conduct upon the road, and I learnt in addition, that he had often indulged them with refreshments at his own private expense.

I related to the Vicar, in presence of the ministers, the patriotic conduct of this young man, proposing at the same time that he should not be allowed to return to Lecce without first receiving some token of approbation from the Duke of Calabria. One of the ministers asked me, if I thought he ought to

receive the order of St. George. I replied that although the conduct of the young man had been extremely patriotic, it did not merit so great a recompense; but that were the Duke to gratify him by some trifling present, such as a watch for instance, the young man would have a proud satisfaction in showing it to his countrymen. It will seem incredible, but the Vicar replied: "Where should I find money to make such a present?" From that moment I was convinced that his mind was dead to every noble feeling. I could not, however, say what I thought of this Prince, for in the situation in which we were placed it was necessary either to get rid of him entirely, or else to hoodwink him; every half measure would have been an error. He exhibited towards me the greatest esteem and friendship, which feelings were of course affected; whilst I was obliged to manifest in public the fullest confidence in his patriotism, to avoid any great shock before the meeting of parliament.

There was a question of putting the frontiers in a state of defence, and of improving the condition of the different fortresses, but many difficulties were to be overcome before this could be effected. General Colletta, formerly an artillery officer, with the rank of Lieutenant, since the events of 1799 had exercised the profession of Civil Engineer. On the entrance of the French in 1806, he was promoted to the rank of Captain of Engineers, through the intervention of the Minister of Police, Salicetti. Without ever having given him an opportunity of showing his skill in the field, Joachim raised him, seven years later, to the rank of General of Engineers. After the late political events, he obtained the command of the engineers, termed by the French *le corps du genie.* I am not

aware of his special knowledge in that capacity, but I am certain with his utter inexperience in warfare, it was impossible that he could organize any efficient system upon the frontier; all that he did was to order a great number of expensive and useless works which his friend, the Minister of War, and the Duke of Calabria, allowed him to carry into execution. Nevertheless, several useful works of fortification were effected at Gaeta, Pescara and Civitella de Tronto, which fortresses, in my opinion, and according to my general system of defence, ought to have been still more improved. To my thinking, thanks to these three fortresses, and an intrenched camp in Calabria, between the woods and the Appennines, which going from the frontier to the Straits, branch off, to the right and to the left, we could have received the Austrians in a manner which would have cured them of all desire to interfere in our affairs. The only other thing I could have desired was to fortify several convents standing upon the summit of high mountains, in which we could have deposited cartridges and provisions for the use of the detachments and bands sent forward to watch the invaders. As our naval forces were far superior to those of the Austrians; if advancing into Calabria, a portion of our own troops stationed in the above-mentioned provinces would have put to sea and landed at Gaeta, the effect of such a step would have been fatal to the enemy. Massena, when he was supported by all the landholders formed into a militia, and had with him the conquerors of Austerlitz, did not venture into Calabria until he was in possession of Gaeta, which fell into his hands through the inexperience of its defender, who however was a brave soldier.

In the early part of September I received the following patriotic letter from the Duke of Calabria.

Naples, September 9, 1820.

"To the General-in-Chief, Guglielmo Pépé.

"I have ordered flags to be made for the fifty-two battalions of the brave militia, who gave us their services with so much zeal and exactitude; as well as for the fifteen legions, who will I am sure rival the former in support of the Constitutional throne of the King, my august father, and the independence of the nation. The Princess, my beloved wife, who fully shares my wishes for the welfare of the nation, has desired to embroider the ornaments of the flags in token of the interest she takes in these brave supporters of their country. I have thought it well to inform you of this, being aware of your sentiments and of the desire you feel to see the constitutional system established by my august parent, more and more consolidated. I am with great esteem,

"Yours,

"FRANCIS, Vicar-General."

It was necessary that I should publish this letter, otherwise he would have done so himself. It is easy to imagine the satisfaction of the poor nation in reading in the papers these warm sentiments of patriotism issuing from the heart of the hereditary Prince, who already exercised the regal authority. His talk did not differ from his writings, and he seldom spoke of my patriotism to the persons to whom he gave audience, without extreme praise, and without expressing his regret that he had not himself originated what I had done. A few sensible men mistrusted him; the multitude believed him to be sincere, and those who

pretended to be sharper than others, said that he was liberal from self-interest, and from the wish of reigning during the life of his father. How was it possible to destroy an opinion thus imbibed by the people? Had I attempted to open their eyes to the truth, not all the confidence they reposed in me would have prevented their accusing me of being jealous of the popularity of the Vicar. There is nothing so sad as to see an evil without being able to apply the remedy!

I had concentrated the whole army between Castellamare and Gaeta, with the twofold intent of forwarding the instruction of the troops and of accustoming the provinces to remain quiet without the usual garrisons. The provinces were in consequence kept in order by the militia which belonged to the Carbonari. This sect necessarily had great influence in the elections, all the militia being electors of the first class. The ministers were awaiting the result of the elections with the most anxious impatience, fearing greatly that the choice might fall upon men of extreme liberal principles. Their little knowledge of the human heart, caused them to be amazed when they learned that, out of the seventy members elected, very few had the reputation of being ardent sectaries. Thus does it always happen in large communities: they select their judges, their administrators, their deputies, and even their chiefs in the civil militia, out of honest, sensible and intelligent citizens; the contrary rarely happens, unless under the influence of corruption or of violent passions. Of these deputies one was a cardinal, nine ministers of the church, twenty-four landholders, eight scientific professors, eleven magistrates, two government functionaries, nine doctors-in-law, five military men, and three merchants. According to the Constitution of Spain, the first electors name the second, who are

very limited in number; these then name the deputies and generally select their friends and relations, because where there are but few individuals, there generally prevail secret practices. One of my brothers, Giovanni Battista, was named representative of the district of Catanzaro, and wrote me word that I should be elected his deputy. I immediately wrote to beg that he would oppose such an election, and that if it did nevertheless take place, I would refuse it, as, since it was impossible to do several things at one time, I should incur the public censure; and accordingly I was not elected deputy.

From the very earliest commencement of our revolution, I had said and repeated that the maintenance of our liberty would depend entirely upon the Congress, which if strong and vigorous would drive away the invader, but if weak and incapable, neither myself nor any other citizen, were he a second Epaminondas, would be able to save our country. It was not possible to foresee what course would be adopted by the parliament; but the circumstance of its having been elected by order of the King, and its not being in any way compromised, made me fear that its members would not do their duty, and defy imprisonment, exile, and the swords of the greatest powers in Europe. The Congress of the United States of America wavered during a period of three years, until the English Government committed the highly impolitic act of declaring it in a state of rebellion. The *Etats Généraux* in France were, it is true, called by the King, but they were urged on by the people, and when they came to expedients and compromises, they were at least not threatened with a foreign invasion. But in 1815, the French chamber, not being compromised after the battle of Waterloo, preferred accepting humiliating

conditions from the conquerors, that they might escape the vengeance of the Bourbons, to attempting resistance with a hundred thousand veterans, who were stationed about Paris.

Before the parliament had assembled, several of its members had manifested their determination not to permit the King to charge his son, the Vicar-General, to swear fidelity to the Constitution in his place in presence of the Congress. The deputies who were lawyers, supported the same opinion, saying that if the King did not himself swear, the legality of the assembly would be brought into question. The King did in fact, through the medium of his Minister Zurlo, make known his intention of allowing the Vicar-General to take the oath in his stead. The deputies replied, that if the King persisted in such a determination, they would not meet at all, and that they would request General Pépé, in the name of the public, not to give up the command. Intimidated by this threat, the King promised to be present at the opening of Congress, and to take the necessary oath. He committed a great error in showing his reluctance to take the oath, and his consequent dislike to the Constitution itself. Still more foolish was the conduct of the parliament and the people in not constraining him to abdicate in favour of the Duke of Calabria. I must say, that a very few days after my return to Naples, when all sentiment of fear had quitted the King's mind, he very openly evinced his dislike of the new order of things. Not only did he entirely give over frequenting the theatre, as had been his custom, but he abstained for the first time in his life from being present at the parade of Piedigrotta, which took place on the 8th of September. This ceremony had been instituted by his father, King

Charles, in commemoration of the battle of Villetre gained by the Neapolitans and the Spaniards over the Austrians. Some persons, however, attribute a more remote origin to this ceremony. A long time after, I was informed that during the three months which preceded the opening of parliament, the King was in the habit of exclaiming in the presence of his faithful adherents, as he paced up and down the room, "I am born free, and I will die free." As if he thought that his own freedom was incompatible with that of his people.

This anecdote recalls to my mind a sentence repeated to me many years later, at Brussels, by Barrère, the celebrated conventionalist, who said that the greatest lovers of freedom were Kings. He might have elucidated his position by saying that they love it so well, they do not wish any one else to possess it. I will state another painful truth, which is, that all nations, more or less, are like beasts of burthen. During the nine months which the Constitutional Government lasted with us, when we had full freedom to write, and to meet, and to send petitions, first to the Governmental Junta, and afterwards to the Parliament, not a single paper contained, or a single public or sectary congregation uttered an exclamation against a King who, after having shed so much blood in 1799, and after barbarously deceiving the people of the Two Sicilies, renewed his perfidy against us in 1820.

On the eve of the 1st of October, I wrote to inform the Vicar that on the following day I should give up the chief command. He replied by the following letter :—

Naples, July 6, 1817.

"The confirmation contained in your letter of your intention of to-morrow giving up the chief command of the army, in the presence of the representatives of the nation, only tends to prove to me more than ever the sentiments of honour and disinterestedness which I have had cause to perceive in you during the period you have held the command of the army, for the advantage of which you have spared neither application nor labour.

"I feel certain that these generous sentiments will make you hasten to the defence of the constitutional throne of my august parent, and of our national independence. In the meanwhile, I shall not abstain from availing myself of your experience and zeal on every possible occasion.

"Grateful for the attachment which you evince to the King, my august parent, to myself, and to the nation, I sign myself your most affectionate

"FRANCIS."

The priest, Minichini, who had made himself so notorious, was always discontented, nor did the manners which he instilled into the young Carbonari tend in any way to the maintenance of order. More than once I summoned him before me to warn him to change his conduct. To avoid scandal, I gave him an employment in the Department of Public Security, and he departed for the city of Messina.

Not to leave any thing that might contribute to the public welfare unattempted, I paid a visit to the wife of the King, the Princess Partanna, with whom I had a most extraordinary conversation. I said to her that

by virtue of family or social considerations, it was not possible for a subject ever to become Queen; but that, according to the new Constitutional Government, such no longer existed, and she could, therefore, become Queen. It will scarcely seem credible, but by an artful turn of speech she gave me to understand that she preferred being the left-handed wife of an absolute King to being Queen under the Constitutional system. She told me that the King found himself in great want of money, his private income from Sicily having failed. I assured her that the parliament would allot a liberal allowance to the Prince.

The Princess Partanna belonged to one of the most illustrious Sicilian families; but she was so poor that when the King found himself a widower on the death of Queen Caroline of Austria, she was obliged to borrow money of her family to provide herself with mourning fit to present herself at Court. She had been extremely handsome, was ignorant, vivacious, kind, amiable, and more opposed to our freedom than a Queen.

Before quitting the command of the army, a lady told me that the Marchioness Passari di Fermo wished to have some talk with me. I went to see her, and with tearful eyes, which added lustre to her rare beauty, she exclaimed:—"Yourself, your country—which is so dear to you—and the whole Peninsula will be betrayed by the King, the Duke of Calabria, and the highest amongst the Generals." This noble creature went on to detail circumstances to me of which I was only too well aware. Situated as I was, not being able to adopt extreme measures, I was obliged to feign to believe that the guilty were the victims of calumny. This must have induced this amiable lady, who was so truly Italian in heart, to accuse me of a degree of simplicity I was far from deserving.

CHAPTER XVI.

1820.

Opening of Parliament, to which ceremony I accompany the King —Speeches read by his Majesty, myself, and by the President of Congress—I ask leave to serve in Sicily as aide-de-camp to my brother—The veterans who had returned to their flags are ill-treated, and desert by thousands—A letter written to me by the Vicar, and my conversation with him—Carascosa becomes unpopular and resigns office—I am charged to induce him to resume it—Offers made to me by the Ministers—I am blamed for having given up the command—Letter addressed to me by the Parliament.

However long may be the period of existence which fate destines for me, I shall never be able to erase from my memory the recollection of the 1st of October, 1820. To confer more splendour upon the august ceremony about which I am to speak, I summoned into the capital part of the garrison of Gaeta and Capua. The troops which lined the road between the royal palace and the vast Church of the Spirito Santo, where the King was to swear fidelity to the Constitution, in presence of the Congress, were exceedingly numerous. The people of the capital and from the provinces could scarcely be contained in the vast street and square of the Strada Toledo. Exactly at twelve o'clock, the whole royal family issued forth. The carriage containing the King and the Vicar came last of the royal procession, and was followed by myself and my staff on horseback. We advanced at a slow pace: the applause

was great, but not enthusiastic: it seemed a feast wherein King, army, and people all laboured to manifest a feeling of reciprocal confidence and affection. The multitude is generally endowed with a sentiment of prophetic instinct. The past perjury of the King, his conduct during the preceding three months, created sad presentiments. On reaching the church, we found it full of spectators, who maintained a silence to which we are not accustomed in our demonstrative country. The King took his seat on the throne; his son was by his side, and he was surrounded by the grandees of his Court. Not knowing where to place myself, I was called to stand near the Princes. The King pronounced the oath, with all the forms and with the intonation of a man who did not think of committing a new perjury. He had scarcely finished, before tumultuous applause burst from the surrounding multitude in the building. Galdi, the President of the Parliament, pronounced a discourse, which, though somewhat lengthy, was full of erudition and patriotic feeling. The King then handed a paper to the Vicar, who read, in the name of his father, a speech containing the fairest promises.

My turn came next. I had written a very short but energetic discourse. The Minister of the Interior, Count Zurlo, told me that it was too Spartan. I then desired him to write one for me, for that it was impossible for me to indite what I did not feel: I consequently read the following short speech, which was in fact Zurlo's, not mine.

"I behold your Majesty seated upon the glorious throne of the Constitution, and the object of the public love and gratitude. This is the most memorable epoch in our history, and all my wishes are fulfilled. Faithful to my promise and to the precepts of the Constitution, I here, in the presence of the representatives of the

nation, resign the chief command of the army which I had only accepted from my attachment to the nation, and to the real interest of your Majesty and dynasty."

I was unable to read these feeble expressions with any degree of energy. The King replied, "I accept your resignation, and at the same time I assure you of my satisfaction and gratitude for the manner in which you have maintained order and tranquillity during the late emergencies."

Before quitting the church, I was surrounded by the greater number of the deputies. To see united for the first time in Parliament the representatives of the provinces of the south of Italy, and the *amour propre* which nature so abundantly bestows on men making me recollect that this majestic spectacle was in part due to my good fortune, caused me to reject the idea of having a single enemy among my fellow-citizens; therefore I embraced General Carascosa. Afterwards at the head of my staff, I accompanied the King and the royal family back to the palace. The people were then less frigid in the applause which they uttered on the passage of the King: at the same time, however, the multitude appeared to pay more attention to me than to the King. I was vexed at this, because I wished his Majesty to be gratified in every possible manner, but especially by applause. The regiments which had been with me in Avellino, and many zealous Carbonari, manifested great sorrow at my having given up the command. General Ambrosio pressed my hand as he said, "What you have done to-day will long be remembered."*

* Following the impulse of my mind, I sent a letter to the Minister of War, which I transcribe, with his answer. If my letter shows that in a state of less excitement I might have better expressed my thoughts, it also clearly appears that in this case, as

I was never in greater favour with the mass of the people than after I had given up the command. The Generals, my colleagues before my resignation, were dissatisfied at my holding the command; when I no longer held it they were displeased at my popularity. They did not approve of my walking about the streets of the city dressed in plain clothes instead of my uniform. Colletta especially, was so much displeased, that he mentions the circumstance in his work in the following terms: "The condition of the kingdom was rendered still worse by the private life of General Pépé, who after giving up the command of the army, did without any pomp or sign of authority, cause the public to believe in the fall of the revolution. By dint, however, of exciting his partisans and the worth-

in all others of my life, I followed the best policy—honesty and candour.

"General, "Naples, October 1.

"You never had a friend more sincere than myself; but lately I had sworn never more to see you. This morning at our interesting spectacle, I said, 'The heart of a Neapolitan ought to feel nothing but the love of his country and an ardent desire to co-operate for the national glory, even at the expense of his life.' Therefore, I embraced you. If the reason which estranged me from you did not exist, I have acted well; if it did, I have acted still better. The mass of the Neapolitans are excellent; but good leaders are rare. Preserve yourself for the good of the nation, and may you be happy! "G. Pépé."

ANSWER.

"General,

"You have written me that you had sworn never to see me more, and you had already told me the same thing, *vivâ voce*. Now the love of our country alone makes you change this decision and embrace me. I therefore thank our country for this change. To enter into details or to recriminate would be degrading to both; I restrict myself to wishing you prosperity and happiness.

"M. Carascosa."

less part of the population, the Government was constrained to appoint him Commander-in-chief of the militia, a new and most important charge; and one which was equally dangerous to the monarchy and to freedom." In the meanwhile this historian came to see me, and approved of everything I did. Far from having desired to be made chief of the militia, as Colletta wishes to make his readers believe, I had requested leave to join my brother in Sicily as his aide-de-camp. This request of mine was well known to Colletta, as all the papers spoke of it at the time; but it did not suit the spirit of his work to say so. The Duke of Calabria sent me the following reply:

Naples, October 4th, 1820.

"General William Pépé,

"I have read with great satisfaction your letter dated the 4th instant, wherein you request to serve your brother as aide-de-camp, now that he is under the walls of Palermo. This is to me a new instance of your zeal and attachment to the King, my august father, and to the nation, as well as of your entire disinterestedness and freedom from all personal ambition: I will take into consideration whether or not your request can be granted. I cannot, however, but regret that your absence should take place at a moment when your services would be profitable to us. I must express to you at the same time the sentiments of real gratitude with which I am yours, "FRANCIS."

I was informed that the Vicar and the ministers would have liked me to have quitted Naples; but that their fear of being without me in the capital, which was teeming with the most fervent patriotism prevailed, and consequently my request was refused.

At this same period, the dismissed soldiers who had

been recalled to the army, on arriving at the depôts formed at Naples, found themselves obliged to sleep upon the bare ground; for the minister giving no credit to their patriotic feelings, and consequently not looking forward to their arrival, had not even provided fresh straw in their quarters. What with seeing themselves so ill-received, and finding that I was no longer in command of the army, these soldiers, amounting to about three thousand, deserted and went back to their homes. Who would believe that the King, the Vicar, and the ministry, instead of opening their eyes and acknowledging that their aversion from the new order of things, and their obstinacy in not giving credit to the national enthusiasm was the real cause of this evil, chose to lay all the blame upon me? They conceived the base suspicion, that by way of rendering myself necessary to them, I had placed them in such a position by secretly exciting such disorders. The Vicar accordingly wrote me the following letter:—

Naples, October 5th, 1820.

"In accordance with what I have already said to you of my intention of availing myself of your zeal and knowledge in the service of the King and nation, I now write to you upon the subject of the numerous desertions which are taking place amongst the veterans who have returned to the army. I am the more grieved at this circumstance, from the fact of its occurring principally amongst those brave men of Avellino, who were the first to obey the call of their country, and to return to their former military duties. This induces me to fear that some obnoxious spirit, adverse to our national glory, has been secretly labouring to entice them from their duty, and deaden their patriotic zeal. It will be easy for you to investigate this, and bring

them back to the straight path from whence I feel convinced that they have only deviated at some evil instigation. This is a moment when we must all labour for the welfare of our country. I shall be obliged to you, if you will communicate to me the result of what you may do to put a stop to such a scandal in the eyes of strangers, with your observations upon this affair. With great esteem, your, "FRANCIS"

The perusal of this letter would lead a man to suppose that the Duke of Calabria was the model of patriots, and myself an ill-disposed citizen, one of those Tribunes who excite the multitude for the indulgence of their own ambitious designs. I must remind the reader, that at the time I received this letter I was divested of all command, consequently the Vicar was asking a General without any command to provide a remedy for evils which the Government could not overcome. It was truly ludicrous, that at the very moment when they thought me in possession of such power over the multitude, and when they doubted the rectitude of my intentions, they would not by any means allow me to quit the continent. I began an answer, breaking for ever with the Duke of Calabria; but I tore it up on reflecting upon my poor country, which stood so much in need of services even to my self-sacrifice.

On the following day I went to the Vicar, with whom I had a long explanation. I told him, that after giving up the command, I had never interfered in any political matters, and that little intrigues were wholly foreign to my character: the Prince would not allow me to finish, but interrupted me, saying, "I know very well that you love our country beyond measure; that you desire nothing for yourself; that you have no ambition." At this last word I interrupted him, and exclaimed, "Prince,

not only am I ambitious, but I am boundlessly so; I could take no rest if I thought that there existed a citizen more tenderly devoted to his country than myself. Put me to the proof; propose to the powers of Europe that they acknowledge our Constitution on the understanding that I present myself to one of them unconditionally, so that they may do what they like with me; and be certain that I shall not shrink from giving myself up to any one of them." The Vicar held me by the hand, and appeared deeply affected. On returning home, I hastened to execute what the Vicar had requested of me by word of mouth. I began to write strong circular letters to the Carbonari of the different provinces, particularly to those of Avellino; and as the citizens of the sect were really desirous of the general welfare, they so managed that in the course of a very few days the deserters returned to their different corps.

The discontent against Carascosa was so great, that, fearful of exciting some outward demonstration, he withdrew to his country residence at Capo di Monte. The following morning at an early hour, the Minister of the Interior, Zurlo, whom I had so defended against the popular antipathy, came to me and said, "General, I love our country almost as much as you do, and this brings me to speak to you now. You have withdrawn yourself; you desire nothing; your modesty and moderation have rendered you invulnerable and formidable. We cannot go on without you. Unless you consent to accept some employment or some recompense, it is not possible for the Government to go on. The Minister of War has retired, and dares not resume his portfolio. What shall we ministers become, if one of our colleagues is obliged to retire because he is unpopular in the public square!" I asked Count Zurlo, why he had not advised the Vicar to send me to Palermo, telling him, that the

office of aide-de-camp to my brother, whilst he was fighting in Sicily, was far better suited to my honour, than the more conspicuous office which he offered me. Zurlo replied, that neither the King nor his son liked to remain at Naples without me. Zurlo then proceeded to tell me that by accompanying him to Carascosa, to persuade him to resume his office I should gratify the Vicar.

We arrived at the villa of Carascosa. I assured him that since the time I had quitted the command, I had never in any way interfered with the army and the Carbonari; but that to conform to the desires of the Vicar, I had taken the necessary steps to put an end to the disorder caused by desertions, which were so calculated to injure the country. Carascosa allowed himself to be persuaded to resume his portfolio, after I had assured him that he would not be molested either by the Carbonari or by the journalists. He was pleased to be a Constitutional minister, even though he was adverse to the Constitution. Before we separated, a question again arose between Zurlo and Carascosa of bestowing a recompense upon me—and what did they offer me? The order of San Gennaro, the military government of Naples, and a title at my choice, with a pension. I was vexed to the heart, but I complained more to Carascosa than Zurlo, telling the former, that he had known me too long to suppose that I would ever accept the least thing from the Government.

I was aware that the ministers, imitating the conduct of the other Constitutional Governments, had endeavoured to secure a party in the Parliament by promising patronage and employments. They only secured, however, about fifteen deputies, and even these did not openly support a Government whose fall was anticipated. The ministers, nevertheless, were so little conscious of their own weakness and of public opinion, that they

were attempting to establish a second chamber. Although such an attempt was extremely arduous at that time, it might have been carried into effect, if an acknowledgment of our liberty had been obtained from the powers of Europe. In such a case, I would have co-operated with all heart, not by secret and silent measures, but by openly stating my opinion in public. The introduction amongst us of a second aristocratic chamber, by means of corruption, as the Court wished, separating our cause from that of the Castilians, without any certainty of avoiding war, could only have been projected by dishonest and corrupt citizens.

On quitting the chief command I had written to the parliament. The following is the reply of that body:

"NATIONAL PARLIAMENT OF THE TWO SICILIES.

"Naples, October 12, 1820.

"To his Excellency, Lieutenant-General Don Guglielmo Pépé:

"General,

"The Parliament received with pleasure the sentiments expressed in your letter, and could not refrain from admiring them, as well as all those for which you are distinguished, and which render you worthy of your country and of liberty. You have been one of the first promoters of our political regeneration; but your moderation in the midst of the glory which surrounds you, is the brightest virtue which adorns you. The country will know how to value the services you have rendered it; and the Parliament, interpreting the wishes of the nation, expresses to you all its gratitude and satisfaction. After releasing his country even from the fear of a foreign invasion, Washington showed to mankind an example of moderation. The examples of heroes only speak to the hearts of those who are prodigally endowed by nature with generous and sublime senti-

ments. You, General, have imitated that great man, showing thereby that you were worthy of being one of the first to raise your voice in favour of our national independence. Continue, General, in the career of glory, and whatever may be the grade assigned you by the King, you will show Europe that you are worthy of the praises bestowed upon you by the whole nation.

(Signed, the Secretaries)

"TITO BERNI, "NAZARIO COLANERI,
"VINCENZO NATALI, "FERDINAND DE LUCCA."

However satisfied I might be with the praises bestowed upon me by the Parliament, I could not augur well of its political views in support of our liberty. The supposition that our country was beyond even the fear of foreign influence, as were the United States of America, when Washington quitted the military command; the recommendation given me to continue in the career of arms, whatever position the King might choose to assign me, were expressions which did not prove the Parliament to possess those vigorous sentiments and views which were requisite in a position like ours so full of difficulties, and surrounded as we were by enemies.

END OF VOL. II.

LONDON:
Printed by Schulze and Co., 13, Poland Street.

00022290

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 23 January, 2019